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Preface 
 
This thesis marks the final chapter of my Masters degree in Business Administration here at 
Agder University College. I’ve learned a lot over my years here and come to appreciate this 
school greatly. I’ve always been a curious soul, always interested in learning, seeing and 
experiencing new things. Agder University College has facilitated that in a great way.  
 
In my forth year I participated in a very interesting course dealing with culture and ethics in 
multinational organization. From there it quickly became apparent that working in this field 
was something I wanted to do. 
 
This thesis has enabled me to write about a series of very interesting, challenging and 
important topics. In 1992-1996 I had the experience of living in the Middle East and I’m quite 
certain that I some day will be back there to work and to live. Personally, I’ve learned a lot 
about the various fields presented through this thesis and hopefully also been able to 
encapsulate and relay some of it. I’ve chosen to present an extensive theoretical foundation 
for my thesis, ranging from culture and its differences manifestations, to ethics and 
corruption. Not surprisingly I’ve come to see that almost every element of it is intricately 
interconnected. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my advisor Professor Andreas W. Falkenberg. He has over the 
last couple of years provided invaluable guidance, advice and inspiration. I’d also like to 
extend a sincere thank you to all those that have contributed to this thesis and to my family 
and friends, for their patience and advice. In particular I want to thank my father, John 
Grimsby, who has been a great asset and discussion partner in this process. 
 
 
Kristiansand, 8th of June 2007 
 
 
___________________ 
Andreas Grimsby 
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1.0 Introduction and background 
1.1 Culture and business practice 
We have reached a level of globalization of which probably was unimaginable to our 
ancestors only a few generations past. But even today, with almost unlimited access to 
information, communication and interaction, we still manage to make the simplest mistakes. 
 
There are naturally a lot of differences between Scandinavia and the Middle East. Our 
different cultures have emerged from different sets of geographical, historical and 
philosophical constraints, challenges and properties. 
 
Culture and cultural values supplies frames for people’s action and helps distinguish right 
from wrong. These values also tend to be reflected in the rules, laws and regulations - 
institutions we establish to govern our societies1.  
 
This thesis will seek to give an introduction and something to spark curiosity and provide 
some information on cultural differences between Scandinavia and a section of the Middle 
East: The Arab Gulf states. It will look at some of the origins of the different cultures. It will 
also present some of the manifestations of these two different cultures. This could again serve 
as a supplement to a practitioner’s personal experience.  
 
Knowing how to, is certainly important. But in order to be truly successful, we might also 
need to understand why. Thus the difference between the great and the magnificent is perhaps 
in the latter’s understanding of why. 
 
As a practical example we will look at corruption. When compared to Scandinavian countries, 
this is an issue throughout the Arab Gulf states. Even though it’s also a problem with us. 
Corruption will be used in an attempt to illustrate much of the intricate dynamics of these 
theories on a very real issue.  
 
We will ask: When Scandinavians do business in The Arab Gulf states - can successfulness 
walk hand in hand with consciousness?  
                                                 
1 Chapter 3.7 and 3.8 
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1.2 Scandinavia and the Arab Gulf states 
The groupings selected are common groupings; also referred to, understood and used locally. 
Internally, their cultural heritages are quite similar; implying that what is true in one place is 
likely to also be true in another. 
 
• Scandinavia – Norway, Denmark and Sweden. 
Their customs and culture is somewhat similar with regards to history, language, 
habits, religion, and beliefs.  
 
When for the sake of comparison these peoples will at times also be referred to as 
Europeans, Westerns or Christians. 
 
• The Arab Gulf states - Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). 
 
This selection of Arab nations is not arbitrary. They represent a useful grouping since 
these six nations, like Scandinavia, shares a lot in terms of customs and culture. While 
some of these countries have vast immigrant workforces and a lot of companies 
featuring expatriate, native Scandinavians in decision making positions, the native 
citizens (defined: a legally recognized subject or national of a state or 
commonwealth2) and their culture will be the object in focus.  
 
This grouping will also at times be referred to as the Middle East (ME) and sometimes 
as the Arab or Muslim world. Its members will often be referred to as Arabs or 
Muslims. The fact that Arabs consider themselves Muslim3, before e.g. Saudi’s or 
Kuwaiti nationals4, is also apparent in the fact that cultural heritage – as evident in 
laws and customs (disregarding different levels of Westernization) is more often than 
not similar5.  
 
                                                 
2 Citizen , The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
3 World Values Survey question G015 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 5-6-07 
4 World Values Survey question G015 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 5-6-07 
5 Morrison, T. et al (2001) pp. 132-144 
 
 
9 
Another reason to the choice of the Arab Gulf states is for the purpose of generalization. The 
Arab Gulf states are all reasonably peaceful and developed countries. The Gulf, the Arab 
World or the Middle East are other constellation that, while sharing a lot, also would include 
countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Israel and the Palestine territories. In profound ways 
these countries distinguish themselves from the selected Arab Gulf states. Political turmoil, 
occupations, democracy and terrorism create very different circumstances, even if the cultural 
origin is quite a like.  
 
1.3 Phenomenon 
Scandinavia and the Middle East - can success be achieved while maintaining a good 
conscience? On ethics and profits as two very different cultures meet. 
 
2.0 Methods 
2.1 Choice of methods and selection of sources
6
 
We investigate a phenomenon because there is something we don’t know. If we knew, we 
would need to measure, ask or inquire. Since a phenomenon is usually intangible we can’t be 
absolutely certain even after we’ve conducted our measurement. Thus, validity and reliability 
is a main concern in any measurement process. External and internal validity is mainly 
concerned with if we measure what we set out to measure. Whereas reliability is mainly 
concerned with if our findings are consisted with what similar studies have found.  
 
Heritage, culture, institutions, moral reasoning and corruption are all fields that are included 
in this thesis. It spans several fields of sciences or at least several directions within a science 
(depending on how we choose to perceive ‘a science’).  
 
With a broad field, much information is called for, both in the form of theory and practical 
information (data). Due to the amount of information necessary, secondary data sources 
(other’s work, articles and statistics) – which can be immensely time saving - was opted for as 
the main sources of information. The utilization of primary information sources (interviews, 
questionnaires and measurements) is limited to the corruption section of this thesis. Overall 
                                                 
6 Based on Andersen, O. (spring 2006) ME-407 lecture notes  
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the theory and secondary data employed throughout is deliberately intended to be of a high 
quality and it was found to be highly consistent. There aren’t many surprising or conflicting 
findings that can’t to a reasonably high degree be explained. Thus we have a good degree of 
external validity, as we can make generalizations based on these findings. 
 
Secondary sources must never be used without caution and critical common sense. Using 
invalid or unreliable observations in a line of reasoning would yield an invalid or unreliable 
conclusion – even if it at times would be correct. Of course the requirements to a source will 
depend on the claim it’s intended to support, the relative importance of this exact source (or 
claim) and the boldness of the source (or claim). If we exercise some sensible restraint, there 
is a lot of good information to be found. 
 
Primary sources were to a large degree opted against for reasons relating to time and also 
validity/reliability. The direst being the time constraint. Collecting and using primary 
information sources is very time consuming. That time could be spent elsewhere where it may 
yield a greater contribution to the whole. In microeconomic terms: the marginal utility of an 
hour spend on theory and secondary information sources is greater than of an hour spent on 
developing primary information sources. In terms of validity and reliability – some of the 
topics involved in this thesis required quite a lot of prior knowledge, both from the 
interviewer in terms of asking the right questions and comprehending the answers - and from 
the interviewed in terms of understanding the question and giving an insightful answer. These 
could perhaps have been serious sources of error in some of these fields. Consequently the 
sample was only used to highlight a specific topic – corruption. 
  
Corruption differs from the other topics. It’s not a construct; it’s readily observable, in the 
sense that anything illegal is readily observable. Given the level of corruption secondary 
information suggests is present in the Gulf Arab states, it also seemed highly relevant. This is 
something a practitioner quite possibly would run into. And both as practitioners and 
ethicians, it’s also an important field to have some knowledge of. 
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2.1 The questionnaire and interviews on corruption
7
 
A sampling procedure involves selecting a sample in order to infer something about a larger 
population. In this case: Scandinavians who work/have worked in the Arab Gulf states or the 
Middle East. The Arab Gulf states were the initial choice. In the courting process corruption 
was actually toned down in favor of the less conspicuous sounding ‘Questionnaire – Doing 
business in the Middle East’. Still, the response rate was just over 50 % from contacts 
primarily found through private channels. This lack of response was somewhat disappointing. 
 
As an experiment a questionnaire was submitted to a recommended would-be respondent in 
Cairo, Egypt. The answers proved to be very much on par with the Arab Gulf states replies. 
As Egypt is an Islamic state (heritage) and Hofstede also chose to include Egypt in his studies 
of the Arab world this was to be expected. Transparency International in fact also ‘clusters’ 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region)8 at times. Consequently a judgment call 
was made, the respondent was dubbed R7 and his answers included.  
 
Eventually there were 4 respondents from Dubai in the UAE, one (R4) form Muscat in Oman, 
one (R5) from Ahmadi in Kuwait and finally one (R7) from Cairo in Egypt. 
 
Several of the respondents had held different jobs or a mixture of positions in the Middle East, 
but all had been connected to the shipping-, oil and gas- or media industry (R7).  
 
The method linguistics for this kind of sampling process is best described as a non-probability 
judgment-convenience hybrid. Non-probability meaning everyone in the population doesn’t 
stand a statistically equal chance of being selected. Judgment and convenience sample 
meaning people were chose on merit and on accessibility accounts. 
 
The respondents are assigned numbers R1 through R7 and the questions are referred to as Q1 
to Q8M. Respondents R1 and R2 have also been subject to interviews, in the shape of the both 
questionnaires and also on a more general discussion about corruption. This to uncover more 
of their opinions and beliefs based on their personal experience. These interviews served to 
shed some light on, and refine some impressions and comments. They still didn’t reveal any 
groundbreaking news – which is indicative that the initial findings are both valid and reliable. 
                                                 
7 Based on Andersen, O. (spring 2006) ME-407 lecture notes  
8 http://www.transparency-lebanon.org/Archives/Press/GCR%202002-%2029.08.2002.PDF 26-4-07 
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Figure 1 – Questionnaire Doing Business in the ME 
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2.4 Validity and reliability in the questionnaire and interviews
9
 
Validity is usually assessed through these three axes: 
 
• Predicative validity. Which is intended to measure is the relation between the 
predictor (which our study should be inspired by) and the criterion it’s intended to 
measure. In this case the answers generally came in as expected, few if at all any 
surprises. This assessment should be based on common sense and seems to hold. 
 
• Content validity (face validity). Does the item cover the concept we wish to measure? 
This is highly sensitive to the definitions we select. In this case it’s very hard to 
explicitly establish or denounce but in terms of the questionnaires: the questions are 
open, clear and reveal what they intend to measure. Consequently they should be very 
fit for the task of proving (or denouncing) what we actually seek to prove. 
 
• Construct validity, which branches into: 
 
o Convergent validity, focusing on whether or not our findings are consistent with 
similar studies of similar concepts. In this case the respondents almost always 
responded in what can only be described as an expected manner. Intentionally, 
some of the questions were inherently difficult to answer straight (Q510, Q8I11, 
Q8M12) and predicatively the jury turn vague and inconclusive. Very much like we 
would expect a jury in a courtroom to be. 
 
o Discriminant validity, holding that a measure should not correlate too much with 
items it’s supposed to differ from. This study is not set with a particular focus at 
this, but the answers do seem consistent. 
 
                                                 
9 Based on Andersen, O. (spring 2006) ME-407 lecture notes  
10 Q5. Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, regulations and 
enforcement? 
11 Q8I. Corruption leads to predictability. 
12 Q8M. If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will only help 
legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to avoid acceptance of corruption greasing 
payments should not be called corruption. 
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Reliability is mainly concerned with the similarity of results produced by other comparable 
measures of the same phenomenon. Implicitly – do our findings correspond with what has 
previously been documented in the field and would another study be able to find what we did?  
 
This kind of sampling and, of course, the relatively low number of respondent could translate 
into validity and reliability problems.  
 
In terms of addressing these possible issues a series of measures were taken. 
 
These interviews and questionnaires (primary sources) were focused around a particular field 
which as discussed could be assumed measurable without too much prior theoretical 
knowledge. The questions asked rather specifically about the respondent’s opinion of what 
turned out to be readily present occurrences. Furthermore it was set up to work in concert with 
magazine and newspaper articles, statistics and theory (primary sources) to illuminate 
corruption. And it did, the answers came largely as expected. Thus we can assume there to be 
a reasonably high degree of both reliability and validity to the findings. 
 
Finally the measurement was conducted and treated in a manner intended to eliminate some 
common sources of error.  
 
• All respondents were presented with the questionnaire and asked to complete them 
with only prior knowledge – and nothing more than a CPI score board and a short 
definition of corruption and culture.  
 
• All questionnaires were distributed and returned within a period of two weeks, in May 
of 2007. There were hopefully no major external happenings (like a huge Statoil, Elf 
or Exxon corruption incident) affecting one reply and not the others. 
 
• Sources of difference are highlighted and to some degree attempted explained. 
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3.0 Theory 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Based on Falkenberg’s model of thesis layout 
 
A (1) phenomenon will be introduced (problem). Then it will then be highlighted by various 
(2) theories which will be shown to exist in the (3) business practice of the real world, 
primarily through anecdotal evidence (secondary sources) and some questionnaires and 
interviews (primary sources). Finally the (4) conclusion with present some suggestion 
uncovered thought the journey.  
 
Phenomenon 
Cultural values and institutions 
Theory:  
Religion, History, Geography and 
communications and others 
Ethics: Utilitarianism, human rights 
and justice 
Practice:  
Religion, History, Geography and 
communications and others 
Cultural values and institutions 
Ethics: Utilitarianism, human rights 
and justice 
 
Power Distance (PDI) Power distance (PDI) 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 
 
Corruption: petty, grand; causes 
and effects and how to deal with it 
 
Corruption: petty, grand; causes 
and effects and how to deal with it 
Conclusion 
Individualism – collectivism (IDV) Individualism – collectivism (IDV) 
 
Masculinity – femininity (MAS) Masculinity – femininity (MAS) 
 
Long-term orientation (LTO) Long-term orientation (LTO) 
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3.1 Conceptual framework 
 A conceptual framework is intended to portray the relationships and/or types of relationship 
among concepts13. 
 
 
 
 Figure 3 – Conceptual framework 
 
The initial forces shaping what we perceive to be ‘culture’ are14: 
 
• Geography, which gives some frames for societies in terms of properties such as 
climate, natural resources etc.  
• History, which is the memory of past and serves as the foundation of our future. 
• Religion tends to reinforce the values that lead to its adoption in the first place15. 
 
Culture is a very broad term but Geert Hofstede (2001)16 suggests that basically it can be 
seen as the “collective programming of the mind”.  
 
Hofstede17, on the basis of his studies of (primarily) IBM employees suggests 5 dimensions 
which we can plot a culture along and get a basis for comparison across cultures. It’s 
                                                 
13 Based on Andersen, O. (spring 2006) ME-407 lecture notes  
14 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #4, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
15 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 114 
16 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 1 
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17 
important to keep in mind that his studies focus on the national culture as seen through IBM 
employees in their organization, and not organizational. His dimensions are18: 
 
• Power distance (PDI), which is related to the different solutions to the basic problem 
of human inequality.  
• Uncertainty avoidance (UAI), which is related to the level of stress in a society in the 
face of an unknown future. 
• Individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), which is related to the integration of 
individuals into primary groups. 
• Masculinity vs. femininity (MAS), which is related to the division of emotional roles 
between men and women. 
• Long-term vs. short-term orientation (LTO), which is related to the choice of focus 
for people’s efforts: the future or the present. 
 
• In addition of Hofstede’s proposed dimensions there will be a multitude of other ways 
to measure and size up the cultural values that underpin society’s interaction. 
 
Still, this is far from complete and heritage from religion, history and geography should 
therefore also be included. As “culture is heavy with values, and values imply judgment”19 
it’s easy to start thinking in terms of good or bad. However, our perception is time and place 
dependent, subject to our cultural relativism20. Thus we must always remember that “any 
solution is best according to the norms that come with it”21. Accordingly, high or low on any 
of these dimensions doesn’t necessarily imply good or bad even if some of them often seem to 
correlate with certain universally undesirable characteristic. 
 
Our values are the basis of our institutions, our ‘traffic rules’22, to behavior. Institutions (as 
the values that they exist to promote) differ from country to country, an even within countries. 
These differences can be minute, or so monumental that we sometimes can agree only to 
disagree, or we attempt to force our view on others. Fortunately, we usually manage to find a 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Hofstede, G. (2001) 
18 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 29 
19 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 327 
20 Falkenberg, A. W. (1996) p. 161 
21 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 327 
22 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #1, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
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mutually beneficial agreement. Evidence: today most nations are involved in trade, few in 
war, which according to Richard Cobden connects us in “bonds of peace”23. However not all 
interaction is of a kind that complies with the principles of ‘the Good’24. 
 
In the conceptual framework the three circles represent publicly ‘acceptable’ actions under 
the realm of ‘justness’, throughout Scandinavia and the Arab Gulf states. Where the three 
sections (circles) intersect we have just actions, suitable for both places. This is represents the 
desired actions set where we should seek to operate.  
 
Unfortunately, the three don’t always overlap. The ‘justice’ or just actions fit only for 
Scandinavia aren’t likely to be undertaken when dealing in the Middle East, as they won’t 
work there. Also actions publicly acceptable in both societies (or at least to those with a 
voice) may but still unjust. There are also actions that fit outside all three circles; these aren’t 
publicly accepted under any circumstance – like for instance grand corruption. This is 
typically more a problem where we have authoritarian or totalitarian forms of government. In 
the words of Lord Acton “all power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely”25 – 
the fact that accountability usually suffers in these areas only serves to further augment the 
problem. 
 
3.2 Religion 
Religion is according to Clifford Geertz (1973, p. 90): 
 
“A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting 
moods and motivations in men by formulation conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”26. 
 
                                                 
23 http://www.globalisationinstitute.org/blog/cobden/the-203rd-birthday-of-richard-cobden-200706031130/ 4-6-
07 
24 Falkenberg, A. W. (1996) p. 164 and (2007) p. 12 
25 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 113 
26 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 327 
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Falkenberg (2006) holds that philosophy (or simply religion, as is an appropriate description 
in the counties in focus) is together with history and geography the basis of our cultural 
values27.   
 
Briefly, Islam is the religion of Muslims28 and Umma is the designation of the ‘all Muslim 
people’29 and can also be understood as the collective nation of Islamic States30. 
 
The field of religion or more specifically Christianity and Islam are vast ones, and we’ll focus 
only on a few select traits that also are observable through its manifestations in other theory.  
 
3.2.1 Origins 
Originally Christianity and Islam (as well as Judaism) originates from the same roots; they all 
hold that there is a truth accessible to true believers31. They all hold matter and spirit 
separated32. They are also all of the opinion that if A is true, non-A is not33 and that “if people 
are informed they will agree”34. We should also keep in mind that ethical rules tend to be 
derived from religion35.  
 
Religion is also known to reinforce the values in a country that led to its adoption in the first 
place36. Religion – within a region thus serves as a ‘coercive isomorphism’37 aligning cultures 
where it’s practiced. Religion doesn’t just further reinforce gender roles38, it affects them as 
well – in particular in Muslim counties this seems to be the case39. The World Values Study 
(WVS) question G105 asks “which of the following best describes you”, an giving citizens of 
Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt the choice of; Above all I’m: ‘Muslim’, ‘Arab’ or their 
own nationality, they all overwhelmingly (62,6 – 79,4 %) chose ‘Muslim’. Consequently it’s 
                                                 
27 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #4, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
28 Muslim, The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 22-4-07 
29 Brøgger, J. (1993) pp. 179-180 
30 Umma, The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 22-4-07 
31 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 363 
32 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 363 
33 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 363 
34 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 364 
35 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 364 
36 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 114 
37 Mintzberg, H. et al (2001) p. 298 
38 Chapter 3.14.2 Masculine and feminine preferences 
39 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 310 
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no surprise that to a lot of Muslims, an attack on their country (or a fellow Muslim country) 
can be perceived as an attack on their religion.  
 
It’s no secret that Christianity has had an essential role in shaping the western civilization40. 
Poland's first post-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki41 said that “the influence 
of Christianity on shaping the face of Europe was so enormous that one used simply to speak 
of Western civilization as Christian civilization.” 
 
Similarly we find Islam to pervade much of the jurisprudence in the Middle East, basically 
through these four central sources42: 
 
• Sharia: the statutes of the Curran 
• Sunna: traditions regarding the Prophets thinking and decisions 
• Ijma: agreement between members of society entitled to voice their opinions 
• Quiyas: inference by analogies 
 
Consequently Islam doesn’t base its justice on free, intellectual approaches. Justice is founded 
through religion43. The separation of the Church’s (religions) power over the State and 
consequent independent development of judicial systems seen in the West is not for the 
Middle East44. In Islamic culture theology has dominated philosophy45. 
 
3.2.2 Islam as a source of power 
Editor of Newsweek International, Fareed Zakaria46 in a column on Islam and power holds 
that47: 
 
“For decades the Middle East has been a political desert. In Iraq, the reason that 
there are no countervailing liberal parties is that Saddam Hussein destroyed them. He 
could not completely crush mosque-based groups and, by the end of his reign, he 
                                                 
40 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 202 
41 http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/030616/story_2.html 23-03-07 
42 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 211 
43 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 211 
44 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 211 
45 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 225 
46 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4917093/site/newsweek/ 19-5-07 
47 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11182278/site/newsweek/page/2/ 19-5-07 
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actually used them to shore up his own legitimacy. In much of the Muslim world Islam 
became the language of political opposition because it was the only language that 
could not be censored. This pattern, of dictators using religious groups to destroy the 
secular opposition, played itself out in virtually every Arab country, and often 
beyond.” 
 
Today dictators (defined as48: a ruler with total power over a country) across the Arab World 
utilize religion as a base of power and to oppress opposition. 
 
“The broader reason for the rise of Islamic politics has been the failure of secular 
politics. Secularism exists in the Middle East. It is embodied by Saddam Hussein and 
Muammar Kaddafi and Hosni Mubarak and Yasir Arafat. Arabs believe that they have 
tried Western-style politics and it has brought them tyranny and stagnation. They feel 
that they got a bastardized version of the West and that perhaps the West was not the 
right model for them anyway. Islamic fundamentalism plays deeply to these feelings. It 
evokes authenticity, pride, cultural assertiveness and defiance. These ideas have been 
powerful sources of national identity throughout history and remain so, especially in 
an age of globalized economics and American power. In face of the powerlessness, 
alienation and confusion that the modern world breeds, these groups say simply, 
“Islam is the solution.”” 
 
Zakaria perceives that Islam has asserted itself as a source of power in today’s Middle East 
due to the failure of secular politics, aided by Western lack of local understanding and 
consequent actions. According to British Muslim author and Theologian Ruqaiyyah Waris 
Maqsood (born Rosalynn Rushbrook) the truth of the matter is that a basically benevolent 
religion and its guiding49 has become a tool for not-so benevolent leaders, who’ve in many 
cases have “been very poor Muslims, if not non-Muslims in Muslim disguise”50. 
 
                                                 
48 Dictator, The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 21-5-07 
49 http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/sharia_3.shtml 22-5-07 
50 http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/sharia_3.shtml 22-5-07 
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3.2.3 Religion and modernity 
As both Christianity and Islam were adopted long ago the underlying values are by many 
perceived as out of sync with society. In a special report by Time Magazine, in 200351 it’s 
claimed that the Church in Europe “is caught between history and modernity52”. Similarly 
Hofstede suggests that “Muslim traditions are still caught in a definition of Truth that hinders 
their coping with modernity”53. The Time report found that “most European countries no 
longer have state religions, and there’s pressure to disestablish [it] in Britain and Norway, two 
that still do54”. In Europe the Church and Christianity have relinquished much of their former 
political powers. 
 
Since religion is a source of power in the Middle East this deterioration is perceived as one of 
the big threats the ‘infidel’ West poses to the Muslim world, where religion (accompanied by 
authoritarian rule) still has a strong stance55. 
 
Put differently the problem daunting Muslims (in particular thinkers, scholars and politicians) 
today is how to adapt to (and adopt) Western thinking and technology without loosing Islam 
spiritualism56. The secular West’s value crisis, divorce rates and social troubles frighten 
Muslim intellectuals57. There still is no apparent solution, and the political liberation of 
Islamic states has put in motion forces that can’t be stopped58. 
 
In terms of political and cultural differences promoted by religion is the fact that Islamic 
heritage by tradition is more egalitarian59 than Christianity’s. Even from the days of Omar 
ibn-al-Khattab (580-644 A.D.60), Islam as an ideology, to a greater extent than Christianity 
considers unnecessary pomp and circumstance as well as lavish pleasure improper61. This 
                                                 
51 http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/030616/story.html 23-03-07 
52 http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/030616/story.html 23-03-07 
53 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 369 
54 http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/030616/story_2.html 23-03-07 
55 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 369 
56 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 227 
57 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 227 
58 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 227 
59 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 114 
60 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umar 22-4-07 
61 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 175 and http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11182278/site/newsweek/ 19-5-07 
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helps explain the fact Arabs are more concerned with equality than liberty62 (or freedom) 
while Westerns consider freedom (liberty) one of their society’s most precious virtues.  
 
3.2.4 The imprints of religion 
The Christian Bible consists of the Old and the New Testament. The Old Testament to a 
greater extent reflects tough values, (an eye of an eye and a tooth for a tooth) and an 
omnipotent and majestic God. The New Testament depicts the tendered values, (turn the other 
cheek) and features the Son of God, Jesus, who is humble, deeply compassionate and not at 
all a ‘macho’ hero63. Scandinavia has adopted the Protestant view of Christianity, which the 
more feminine approach when compared to Catholic belief. 
 
The Arab Gulf states have seen a lot of immigration over the last decades but they have 
retained their state religions, and limited their granting of citizenship to immigrants. There is 
no doubt they all are still very much Islamic counties. Demographically the six Arab Gulf 
states are all predominantly consisting of Sunni Muslims64, with the possible exception of 
Oman where by some counts65 Ibadhi Muslims66 are in majority. The ‘split’ in Islam, 
producing the two major directions of Sunni (and Shia which dominates Persia) occurred in 
680 A.D. after the battle of Kerbela in Iraq67. In brief, Sunni Muslims are generally the more 
masculine-oriented of the Muslim world68. Interestingly, Hoffman notes that “British 
observers of Omani rule in East Africa commented that Ibadhis are the least fanatic and 
sectarian of all Muslims, and openly associate with people of all faiths and pray together with 
Sunni Muslims”69.  
 
Regarding religions relative position in societies Hofstede70 found that masculine values rated 
religion as most important in life where as feminine cultures up rated friends and neighbors.  
The importance of God within religion is also found to be strongly correlated with 
masculinity71.  
                                                 
62 Falkenberg, A. W. in counselling (2007), Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 93 and  http://www.ired.com/news/mkt/me-
econ.htm 26-5-07 
63 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 327 
64 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Islam#Data 23-03-07 
65 https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mu.html#People 23-03-07 
66 http://www.uga.edu/islam/ibadis.html 23-03-07 
67 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 178 
68 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 327 
69 Hoffman, V. J. (2004) p. 205 
70 Hofstede, G. (2001) pp. 301-302 
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The Arab World unsurprisingly scored a medium on the MAS scale, with Scandinavia resides 
on the very feminine side of the scoreboard. 
 
A very (un)practical implication of different religions is in terms of religious holidays. If 
planning a business trips to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (or the Middle East in general) it is 
actually recommended not to be during the holy month of Ramadan, where shorter work days 
and lesser efficiency is the norm72. At that time it’s also considered rude for non-believers to 
eat, drink and even smoke73. At the end of Ramadan comes Eid Al-Fitr, which can last for up 
to ten days. During Eid Al-Fitr business is closed at the beginning and the end of, or in some 
cases even throughout it74. Eid Al-Adha is the more important holyday in the Islamic year and 
businesses close for at least a week75. Resorts and transportation will also be booked solid 
during this festival76.  Government bodies observe these holidays assiduously and are usually 
closed for even longer periods of time. The date of these holidays depends on the Islamic 
calendar77 which is based on the lunar calendar, which is about 11 days shorter than the 
Gregorian ‘Christian’ calendar78. According to interview respondent R1 one should know that 
to Muslims and throughout the Arab Gulf states, Friday is the equivalent of the Christian 
Sunday – the day of rest. This is widely accepted as non-working days also by expatriates. 
Prayer times, five times a day which many Muslims observe should also be taken into account 
and respected when scheduling and meeting. 
 
A survey on the proliferation and nature of Arabic literature, published by Peter Ripken, 
director of the ‘Society For The Promotion Of African, Asian And Latin American 
Literature’79 put a face on Hofstede’s findings: 
 
“For every fiction title from the region [Middle East], there are at least two non-
fiction books on most European markets. Most of these are written by self-styled or 
real European experts about various aspects of developments in the Arab world. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
71 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 328 
72 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 331 
73 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 331 
74 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 331 
75 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 331 
76 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 331 
77 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_calendar 22-4-07 
78 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gregorian_calendar 22-4-07 
79 http://www.virtualliterature.org/content/view/32/49/ 19-03-07 
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eternal problem of the role of Islam, or the role of women in arabo-islamic societies 
are favorite themes of these books. Even before September 11, 2001 this debatable 
trend was fairly strong, and since then there is a flood of books about terrorism and 
Islam, quite many of them with dubious content. The region is being portrayed as one 
of conflicts, with a serious lack of democracy and development in most Arab states 
and terrorist attacks, and this is not only published opinion but also public opinion.
80
” 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• Know that a Muslim Arab is first a Muslim, then a national of i.e. Kuwait. 
• The Arab Gulf states cannot be understood without some understanding of Islam. 
• Islam is not just a religion; it’s also the origin of much of Arab culture, values, laws 
and justice. 
• In Islamic culture theology has dominated philosophy and not adapted much to the 
scrutiny of philosophy. Consequently, to a Scandinavian Islam can seem crude and 
unfair even though it was intended to be egalitarian and benevolent. 
• Islam to Westerners seems to have difficulty coping with modernity. 
• To many Arabs the Western societies have lost their way. Their values crisis’ and 
social troubles are things Arabs want no part of. 
• To Muslims Islam is the true and only faith. 
• Scheduling business during Ramadan is a mixed bag. During Eid it’s recommended 
not to. Do also observe and respect prayer times and Fridays (and often Saturdays) as 
not working-days. 
 
3.3 History 
Another pillar underpinning cultural values is history81. In the words of philosopher and 
author George Santayana “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”82. 
Similarly Robert Schuman believed that in order not to let Europe’s past become Europe’s 
future something had to be done. Schumann experienced two World Wars, fighting from both 
                                                 
80 http://www.frankfurt-book-fair.com/imperia/md/content/pdf/bm-
anmeldung/presse/presse2004/arabpk_juni04_engl/arab_literature.pdf 19-03-07 
81 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #4, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
82 http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/2042.html 22-4-07 
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side of the trenches. Schumann is now better known as the father of the European Union83, 
and today this lesson is true as ever. 
 
The Muslim world and people (Umma) have a long and rich heritage84, the Arabic or Islamic 
empire once reigned from Portugal in the west to India in the east85. 
 
 
Figure 4 – The Islamic Empire 
 
Yet like all empires before it, it inevitable collapsed. Ibn Khaldum (1332 – 1406 A.D.) held 
that it was due to a lack of unity86 as well as a host of internal problems. Arab nationalism did 
not die with it, but as a remerging phenomenon it didn’t really become a force to be reckoned 
with until the middle of the 18th century87. Ibn Khaldum is in fact also credited with coming 
on the verge of asking the question of ‘social vacuum’ and its repercussions88, something 
today witnesses as a source of problems throughout many part of the world. 
 
The popular (western) perception is that Bedouin or Nomad cultures are the traditional Arab 
ways, even though these cultures probably never accounted for more than 20 % of all Arabs, 
of which the majority actually was settled89. Today that’s down to the vicinity of 1 %90. Yet 
                                                 
83 Fjeldavli, Frode of the Norwegian EU delegation, in seminar and discussion 12-04-07 
84 Brøgger, J. (1993) pp. 167-227 
85 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_conquest 25-4-07 
86 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 179 
87 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 180 
88 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 179 
89 Brøgger, J. (1993) pp. 172-173 
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their values is through the Curran elevated to the ‘Will of God’ and their famili-ist values 
have to this day retained much of its potency and made it’s imprint on urbanized areas91.  
 
Arabs are often describes as proud and unmanageable, and these properties are definitely in 
harmony with their way of life92. Family and tribe importance in Arabia and seized territories 
did not decline in cities as a result of urbanization. This is due to the fact that there were no 
democracies or effective organizations uniting people under the level of the central 
leadership93. This is part of the reason why national borders, the likes of which Europe was 
and is riddled with, did not exist94. 
 
If we consider the Christian dominated part of the world as ‘one’, the part dominated by Islam 
should be considered its closes relative, culturally speaking95. The outlined differences taken 
into consideration, the columns of Islam and The Christian civilization for historical reasons 
still have a lot in common96. 
 
The sixteenth century Protestant or puritan work ethic (PWE) emphasized the importance and 
value of hard work and diligence. These factors are by Van de Vliert et al (1999)97 and others 
believed to have contributed a lot to the rise of amongst others Scandinavia98. Scandinavia’s 
harsh climate and short summers99 have also most certainly played a part in this - because 
hard work was necessary for survival. On the other hand there is the (taboo) perception of 
Arab laziness, as seen in for instance the Levine and Norenzayan (1999)100 pace of life 
studies101, like the perception of Emiratis laziness102 and the six-hour working days of the 
Saudis103. This is also reflected in the fact that Westerns are expected to be on time for all 
                                                                                                                                                        
90 Brøgger, J. (1993) pp. 172-173 
91 Brøgger, J. (1993) pp. 185 and 204 
92 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 185 
93 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 179 
94 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 180 
95 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 168 
96 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 168 
97 Van de Vliert, E. et al (1999) pp. 300-301 
98 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Work_ethic - 6-2-07 
99 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 117 
100 Levine, R. V. and Norenzayan, A. (1999) p. 196 
101 Chapter 3.6.4 Measure of a Land - Pace of life 
102 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/dubai_cosmopolis_4543.jsp 21-5-07 
103 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 332 
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business appointments, while the local Arabic population, who are generally not concerned 
with the clock, may or may not be104.  
 
In terms of MAS Hofstede stipulates that most of the variance is due to specific historical 
influences within the regions, and only to limited extent geographical latitude105. He also adds 
that there is nothing indicating a convergence of MAS over time106. 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• Much of the Arab tradition is still Bedouin at heart, famili-ist values. Arab hospitality 
is therefore still at a high level. 
• Historically national borders have not existed. 
• There is no history of democracy. 
 
3.4 Geography 
The final and perhaps an obvious pillar to cultural values is geography. Where a country or 
region is located and its various geographical properties will influence it on all levels. All the 
cultural variables need to be understood together and viewed in the light of each other like 
John Godfrey Saxe’s elephant metaphor107; we can’t make (complete) sense of the whole 
without all the components. 
 
                                                 
104 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 330 
105 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 279 
106 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 279 
107 Mintzberg, H. et al (2001) pp. 2-3 
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Figure 5 – Map of the Middle East
108
 
 
The Arab Gulf states, consisting of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE 
are outlines.  
 
Very briefly, the Arab Gulf states are all quite hot (temperatures reaching 50 degrees 
centigrade (120’s Fahrenheit) in the summer. With the occasional exceptions inland in Saudi 
Arabia it’s very hospitable from autumn through spring109. The area is mostly covered by 
desert110. 
 
Hofstede111 and Van de Vliert et al112 found that temperature plus domestic political violence 
(a masculine trait) actually shows a curvilinear relation with MAS. Hofstede113 found this to 
                                                 
108 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Middle_east_graphic_2003.jpg 20-5-07 Edited 
109 http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761579298/Middle_East.html#p3 5-6-07 
110 http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9110527/Arabian-Desert 5-6-07 
111 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 331 
112 Van de Vliert, E. et al (1999) p. 305 
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make sense since in a cold climate (Scandinavia) survival presupposes mastery of complex 
skills by both genders which make extreme inequalities between them unlikely. This also 
implies that PDI levels would drop with the increased need for technology which is a driver 
for education114. 
 
Numbers relating to population size, major cities and such are not included  
 
3.5 Communications 
Language as Hofstede uses it is a component of culture115. And as such it is perhaps the most 
recognizable part of a culture.  
 
According to the Bible’s book of Genesis 11:7 the Lord decided to “confuse their language so 
they will not understand each other”. The intent was to create a barrier to interaction, 
alongside physical distance and at times politics and religion.  
 
Starting with the British Empire and no doubt aided by the industrial revolution, the rise the 
USA and the digital revolution, English is (informally) today’s global language. It’s spoken 
(as a first or second language) by almost 1 billion people116 a lot of which live in the richest 
and most well developed parts of the world. 
 
As a consequence deals across borders are often brokered in English. The challenge now 
resides with interpretation of the ‘message’. In the words of Morrison et al (2001) 117 “when 
you hear an Egyptians say yes in answer to a question, always consider the cultural context. A 
mild yes is probably a polite no; at best, it means maybe”. There are more components to a 
language than words, in particular in the Middle East we typically see this phenomenon; high-
context communications118. 
 
In the Arab world language is also a collective phenomenon. Most Muslims worldwide will 
learn how to read the Curran in Arab, no matter what will be there mother tongue. This does 
                                                                                                                                                        
113 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 331 
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not mean that all Muslim speak Arab and are able to communicate or do business in a 
common language. However, in The Gulf States Arab language are spoken quite similarly by 
all locals. 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• There are more components to communication than language. 
 
3.6 Other measures of a Land 
Cultural, national, regional and global differences are measured across many variables. While 
culture is devoted a lot of attention there are many other angels which we can shine a light 
from in order to illuminate our differences. 
 
Hofstede cites Marvin Harris (1981) that “aspects of social life which do not seem to be 
related to each other actually are”. Put differently “the various parts of society are interrelated. 
When one part of society changes, other parts must also change”, Dr. Frank Elwell119 
explains.  
 
The first assumption of Harris’ concept of Cultural materialism (CM)120 essentially holds that 
an institution cannot be looked at in isolation from the economic, political, or religious 
institutions of a society. When one part changes it has an effect on other parts of the system. 
Viewing society as a system of interrelated parts is at the core of most sociological theory.  
 
Thus we will focus on any measures of a land in order to better understand the complete 
picture. 
 
3.6.1 Measure of a Land - National wealth (GDP per capita) 
General national wealth – GDP (gross domestic product) per capita is considered being one 
good indicator. Disregarding tax havens (which typically have small populations many of 
which are fabulously wealthy) national wealth gives an idea about a counties level of 
development.  
                                                 
119 http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Four/Presentations/Harris/index.htm 14-03-07 
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Figure 6 – GDP (PPP) per capita (national wealth) map (2006)
121
 
 
According to the IMF122 all nine counties in focus are among the top 47 with Norway in a 3rd 
place at $ 43,574 and Saudi Arabia at 47th place with $ 16,744. Also all Scandinavian nations 
were ahead of all Gulf Arab states. 
 
We’ll add that climbing the GDP per capita ladder is a lot quicker if every man in the lands 
wealth increase annually by e.g. $ 1000 than if only a Despot and his closest family (even if 
it’s a big one) increase their wealth by a couple of million. 
 
                                                 
121 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita based on IMF 2006 data 25-4-07 
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42%2C624%2C449%2C626%2C564%2C628%2C283%2C228%2C853%2C924%2C288%2C233%2C293%2C
632%2C566%2C636%2C964%2C634%2C182%2C238%2C453%2C662%2C968%2C960%2C922%2C423%2
C714%2C935%2C862%2C128%2C716%2C611%2C456%2C321%2C722%2C243%2C965%2C248%2C718%
2C469%2C724%2C253%2C576%2C642%2C936%2C643%2C961%2C939%2C813%2C644%2C199%2C819
%2C184%2C172%2C524%2C132%2C361%2C646%2C362%2C648%2C364%2C915%2C732%2C134%2C36
6%2C652%2C734%2C174%2C144%2C328%2C146%2C258%2C463%2C656%2C528%2C654%2C923%2C3
36%2C738%2C263%2C578%2C268%2C537%2C532%2C742%2C944%2C866%2C176%2C369%2C534%2C
744%2C536%2C186%2C429%2C925%2C178%2C746%2C436%2C926%2C136%2C466%2C343%2C112%2
C158%2C111%2C439%2C298%2C916%2C927%2C664%2C846%2C826%2C299%2C542%2C582%2C443%
2C474%2C917%2C754%2C544%2C698&s=PPPPC&grp=0&a= or http://url.raw.no/lGRO0Q 25-4-07 
 
 
33 
3.6.2 Measure of a Land - Human Development Index (HDI) 
Another measure is the Human Development Index (HDI)123, made by the UN. It “is a 
comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standard of living for 
countries worldwide”124. It’s been used since 1993 by the United Nations Development 
Program in its annual Human Development Report. 
 
HDI is a way of measuring well-being, in particular child welfare. It is used to determine and 
indicate whether a country is a developed, developing, or underdeveloped country and also to 
measure the impact of economic policies on quality of life. Husted125 also hypothesized that: 
 
• “The higher the level of economic development, the lower the level of corruption in a 
country”. 
• “The greater the inequality in the distribution of income, the higher the level of 
corruption in a country”. The latter is difficult to assess because of the lack of Gini 
coefficients for the Middle East. 
 
 
Figure 7 – HDI map (2006)
126
 
                                                 
123 http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/ 25-4-07 
124 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Index 22-4-07 
125 Husted, B. W. (1999) 
126 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:HDImap_spectrum2006.png based on UN 2006 data 19-5-07 
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Figure 8 – HDI map, Scandinavia vs. Gulf Arab states (1975 – 2004) 
 
Since 2001 Norway has held 1st place on this ranking, with Sweden and Denmark just slightly 
being. The Arab Gulf States are posting significant gains. The 1990 score is missing for 
Kuwait (due to the first Gulf War) while the first numbers published for Qatar was in 2004. 
 
3.6.3 Measure of a Land - Distribution of Economic Freedom 
The Heritage Foundation’s (HF) index of Economic Freedom127 is another statistic that makes 
for interesting reading. It concerns itself with ten types of freedom enjoyed (or not) around the 
world128. 
 
“Economic theory dating back to the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of 
Nations in 1776 emphasizes the lesson that basic institutions that protect the liberty of 
individuals to pursue their own economic interests result in greater prosperity for the 
larger society. Perhaps the idea of freedom is too sophisticated, as popular support 
for it constantly erodes before the onslaught of populism, whether democratic or 
                                                 
127 http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/htm/index2007_execsum.cfm 25-4-07 
128 http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/htm/index2007_execsum.cfm 25-4-07 
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autocratic. Yet modern scholars of political economy are rediscovering the centrality 
of "free institutions" as fundamental ingredients for rapid long-term growth. In other 
words, the techniques may be new, but they reaffirm classic truths. The objective of the 
Index is to catalog those economic institutions in a quantitative and rigorous 
manner.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – The distribution of Economic Freedom (by HF) 
• Business Freedom  
• Trade Freedom  
• Fiscal Freedom  
• Freedom from Government  
• Monetary Freedom  
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• Financial Freedom  
• Property Rights  
• Freedom from Corruption  
• Labor Freedom  
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Country 2007 
Score 
Business 
freedom 
Trade 
freedom  
Fiscal 
freedom 
Freedom 
from gov't 
Monetary 
freedom  
Denmark 77,6 95,3 76,6 55,2 32,1 86,8 
Norway 70,1 97,0 79,2 66,1 45,9 82,6 
Sweden 72,6 95,0 76,6 53,6 31,5 85,2 
Bahrain 68,4 80,0 69,6 99,6 56,7 80,1 
Kuwait 63,7 67,9 72,2 99,9 39,2 78,8 
Oman 63,9 63,6 73,8 99,0 37,7 79,1 
Qatar 60,7 60,0 71,4 99,9 54,6 72,4 
Saudi Arabia 59,1 52,9 65,4 99,6 46,1 80,1 
United Arab 
Emirates 
60,4 49,2 70,0 99,9 60,3 75,3 
Country 2007 
Score 
Investment 
freedom 
Financial 
freedom 
Property 
Rights 
Freedom 
from 
corruption 
Labor 
freedom 
Denmark 77,6 80 90 90 95,0 74,7 
Norway 70,1 50 50 90 89,0 51,1 
Sweden 72,6 80 70 90 92,0 52,0 
Bahrain 68,4 50 90 60 58,0 40,0 
Kuwait 63,7 50 50 50 47,0 81,7 
Oman 63,9 50 50 50 63,0 73,2 
Qatar 60,7 30 50 50 59,0 60,0 
Saudi Arabia 59,1 30 40 50 34,0 92,9 
United Arab 
Emirates 
60,4 30 40 40 62,0 77,2 
Table 1 – The factor loadings of Economic Freedom (by HF) 
 
Generally the territories’ relative scores are group together, unsurprisingly since cultural 
similarities and interaction between neighboring countries tend to promote similar institutions 
in them. The larges cross-regional differences are found in terms of: 
 
• Business freedom. This is high in Scandinavia easing the task of setting up a new 
business. There is less ‘red tape’ and a more predictable environment. 
 
• Fiscal freedom. Freedom from income and corporate tax. The Scandinavian counties, 
spearheaded by Sweden are significantly behind the Arab Gulf states on this factor. In 
Scandinavia taxation is what the well-fare model is built on, whereas in the Arab Gulf 
states large nationalized oil companies129 is tasked with generating much of the needed 
                                                 
129 Slides supplied by Andreas W. Falkenberg 2007.  “Oil giants.ppt” 16-4-07 
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revenue130. Also the needed revenue is less as there is a completely different well-fare 
system. 
 
• Property rights are higher in Scandinavia. Private property is safe from expropriation, 
contracts are secure and the legal system of the highest quality.  
 
• There is a noticeably higher degree of freedom from Corruption in Scandinavia131 than 
in The Arab Gulf States.  
 
If we look at the global maps for GDP per capita and Economic Freedom it seems that they 
are very good predictors of each other. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Economic Freedom and GDP per capita (by HF)
132
 
 
The top quintile (the top 20 % of the chart) has GDP per capita roughly equaling the 
remaining 80 %. 
 
                                                 
130 Heritage Foundation’s report on Economic Freedom 2007. “Index2007.pdf” 
131 Chapter 3.16.6 Corruption around the world 
132 http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/htm/index2007_execsum.cfm 25-4-07 
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Less known is the Frasier Institutes (FI) Economic Freedom of the World map133. Never the 
less the FI index shows exactly the same tendencies – its Economic Freedom also seems to be 
an excellent measure of flourishing as well as deprivation and poverty. Here the right-side 
bars represent the freest quintile, while left-side the least free. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Economic Freedom and other measures of flourishing (by FI)
134
 
 
3.6.4 Measure of a Land - Pace of life 
Levine and Norenzayan (1999)135 found that ‘the fastest pace of life’ was found in Japan and 
in the countries of Western Europe (Sweden 7th) while the lowest third of the list was 
composed of relatively non industrialized countries including some counties in the Middle 
East, here with Jordan and Syria on respective 26th and 27th places. However, it should be 
noted that Jordan and Syria are unlikely to be very good predictors of modern day Arab Gulf 
states. Still culture should show a lot more inertia than a very rapidly changing society. 
                                                 
133 http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/files/Nov06ffEFW%20map.pdf 22-5-97 
134 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Economic_Freedom_Charts.png, Edited 22-5-07 
135 Levine, R. V. and Norenzayan, A. (1999) p. 196 
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Figure 12 – Pace of life
136
 
 
The pace of life study focused on walking speed, working speed and clock accuracy. 
Hofstede137 found working speed to correlate negatively with PDI (high-PDI indicating lower 
working speed). He also found138 walking speed to correlate with IDV and the whole study to 
primarily be correlated with GDP per capita.  
 
As we have seen (3.3), climate (temperature) seems to have some negative connection to 
overall pace; the hotter it is the slower the overall pace. 
 
3.6.5 Measure of a Land - Schwartz’s seven dimensions 
The Israeli psychologist Schwartz (1999)139 is, perhaps unsurprisingly, thin on his studies of 
the Arab Gulf states. Hofstede still ties Schwartz seven values to his IBM studies on a broad 
basis and found the following correlations to IDV (denotations indicate the positive or 
negative nature of the correlations). 
 
                                                 
136 Levine, R. V. and Norenzayan, A. (1999) p. 194 
137 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 233 
138 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 233 
139 Schwartz, S. H. (1999) and Hofstede, G (2001) pp. 220-221 
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Schwartz derived seven dimensions which could compare cultures considering three issues 
that confront all societies. These issues are: 
• The nature of relations between the individual and the group (IDV)140. 
• Behavior that will preserve the social fabric141. 
• The relations between humankind and the natural and social world142. 
 
The seven dimensions are143: 
• Conservatism (-): “A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, 
and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidary group or the 
traditional order (social order, respect for tradition, family security, wisdom)”. 
• Intellectual Autonomy (+):“A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals 
independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions (curiosity, 
broadmindedness, creativity)”. (Ideas and thoughts). 
• Affective Autonomy (+):“A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals 
independently pursuing affectively positive experience (pleasure, exciting life, varied 
life)”. (Feelings and emotions). 
• Hierarchy (-): “A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of 
power, roles and resources (social power, authority, humility and wealth)”. 
• Egalitarianism (+): “A cultural emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in 
favour of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (equality, social 
justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty)”. 
• Mastery: ”A cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion 
(ambition, success, daring, competence)”. 
• Harmony: “A cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment (unity 
with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty)”. 
 
                                                 
140 Schwartz, S. H. (1999) pp. 26-27 
141 Schwartz, S. H. (1999) pp. 27-28 
142 Schwartz, S. H. (1999) p. 28 
143 Schwartz, S. H. (1999) p. 29 
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Figure 13 – Schwartz Seven dimensions
144
 
 
3.6.6 Measure of a Land - Inglehart dimensions and the World Values study 
Inglehart (1997, 1998, and 2006)145 found that with just two dimensions he could to a large 
degree explain the WVS data (more than 70 % of the cross-national variance in a factor 
analysis of ten indicators). These two dimensions and their loadings constitute “the Inglehart 
Map”146, one of the most well known results of the WVS147. 
 
                                                 
144 Schwartz, S. H. (1999) p. 29 
145 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 223 and Inglehart, R. (2006) 
http://margaux.grandvinum.se/SebTest/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54 7-3-07 
146 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/statistics/some_findings.html 7-3-07 
147 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Values_Survey#Results 7-3-07 
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Figure 14 – The Inglehart Map
148
 
 
• Survival vs. Self-expression values (survival vs. well-being) 
 
“The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between 
societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not…Societies near 
the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to 
authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject 
divorce… These societies have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. 
Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these 
topics.”
149
 
 
Specifically the findings suggest that ‘well-being’ was associated with a combination of high 
IDV and low MAS150. IDV is also strongly correlated with divorce rates151. A thought is that, 
while this research is on divorce rates in marriages, could the stronger UAI seen across the 
                                                 
148 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/statistics/some_findings.html 7-3-07 
149 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/statistics/some_findings.html 7-3-07 
150 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 296 
151 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 227 
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more traditional oriented cultures of the Middle East imply that this tendency to also exist 
within business-relationships. 
 
• Traditional/ Secular-rational (traditional authority vs. secular-rational) 
 
“The second major dimension of cross-cultural variation is linked with the transition from 
industrial society to post-industrial societies-which brings a polarization between 
Survival and Self-expression values… priorities have shifted from an overwhelming 
emphasis on economic and physical security [perhaps set back by 9/11] toward an 
increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life. Inglehart 
and Baker (2000) find evidence that orientations have shifted from Traditional toward 
Secular-rational values, in almost all industrial societies. But modernization, is not 
linear-when a society has completed industrialization and starts becoming a knowledge 
society, it moves in a new direction, from Survival values toward increasing emphasis on 
Self-expression values.”
152
 
 
To Inglehart153 the shift from survival orientation to well-being orientation is the essence of 
‘post-modernization’, and his ‘post-materialist values’ emphasizing values such as 
empowerment, freedom of speech and a drive for a more humane society. This is something 
that resonates very well with Scandinavian culture. 
 
3.6.7 Measure of a Land - Happiness 
Happiness is a state of mind and a social construct - it is not the same thing in everyone’s 
mind154 and doesn’t necessarily take much155. Aristotle stated in the Nicomachean Ethics (350 
BC)156 (ed. H. Rackham) “that happiness is the only thing that humans desire for its own 
sake”157. He used the ancient Greek word Eudaimonia which “is standardly translated as 
‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’ and occasionally as ‘well-being.’”158.  
 
                                                 
152 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/statistics/some_findings.html 7-3-07 
153 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 223 
154 Hofstede, G. (2001) pp. 224-225 
155 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501050228-1029896,00.html 7-3-07 
156 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1098a14-15 8-3-07 
157 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happiness 8-3-07 
158 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#2 8-3-07 
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Chiasson et al (1996)159 did some interesting work on this, although with only from a three 
country sample. They found that the highly collectivist El Salvadorians (IDV:19) not 
surprisingly emphasized more interpersonal factors and religion whereas the more 
individualistic Canadians (IDV:80) and Americans (IDV:91) mentioned more intrapersonal 
and hedonistic (defined, in psychology: “the ethical theory that pleasure (in the sense of the 
satisfaction of desires) is the highest good and proper aim of human life”160) factors. 
However, common to all were “family relationships, having meaning in life and a positive 
self-concept”161. Seemingly, for all their differences they still have those basics in common. 
 
3.6.8 Measure of a Land - Freedom and Democracy 
Freedom House (FH), a NGO supporting freedom and democracy around the world annually 
ranks162 counties on political rights and civil liberties and categorizes them ranging from free 
to not free. 
 
 
Figure 15 – Freedom House World Map 2007
163
 
 
The Americas, Europe (Scandinavia) and typically former colonies sporting well established 
democracies receives a ‘free’ score. While all the Scandinavian countries are monarchies their 
monarchs have only symbolic powers. 
                                                 
159 Hofstede, G. (2001) pp. 224-225 
160 Hedonistic, The Concise Oxford Dictionary 8-3-07 
161 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 225 
162 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_charts.pdf 28-3-07 
163 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Freedom_House_world_map_2007.png 28-3-07 
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The Gulf Arab States range from completely non-democratic (totalitarian164) monarchies to 
constitutional monarchies with elected parliaments. Yet with no opposition parties 
(allowed)165 and strict limitations on who may run and who may vote (for instance only a 
fraction of the countries inhabitants) these elections don’t carry to much weight. Consequently 
Kuwait and Bahrain receive ‘partly free’ while the rest are deemed ‘not free’. The UAE and 
Kuwait last year improved their factor rating (but not enough to impact their score) for 
increasing public freedom of assembly while Bahrain took a move for the worse166. 
 
The concept of Democracy stems from the 5th century B.C. Greece and literally stands for 
“rule by the people”167 It is derived from the Greek the words demos (“people”) and kratos 
(“rule”). The World Audit ranks counties168 in terms of the quality and position of their 
democracies – they rank using the scores169 (not rank) of Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception index and FH’s political rights and civil liberties indexes. 
 
Country Democratic rank of 150
170
 
Denmark # 2 
Sweden # 4 
Norway # 6 
United Arab Emirates # 84 
Jordan # 87 
Kuwait # 87 
Oman # 92 
Saudi Arabia # 119 
Table 2 – Freedom House democratic rank 
 
In predictable accordance with the other measures presented, it’s not surprising to see the 
Scandinavian topping division 1 (of 4) and this chart. The Gulf Arab states all (except Bahrain 
which wasn’t ranked) wind up in division 4, where we at the bottom we find poor, war thorn 
and dysfunctional counties like Zimbabwe and Myanmar.  
                                                 
164 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totalitarianism 29-3-07 
165 TI Global Corruption Report 2006 p. 194 
166 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_overview_final.pdf 28-3-07 
167 http://www.britannica.com/ebi/article-9273962 7-2-07 
168 http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm 29-3-07 
169 http://www.worldaudit.org/methodology.htm 29-3-07 
170 http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm 24-5-07 
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The remarks of Open Democracy’s Faisal Devji stresses one of the main problems facing a 
place such as Dubai171: 
 
“Democracy is misplaced in Dubai, since it is only possible in a community of 
citizens. But if confining democracy to the small minority of Emiratis is nonsensical, 
offering citizenship to the country's majority is absurd, as it would entail the creation 
of a national culture and therefore proscribe the very diversity that makes Dubai 
possible”. 
 
Although he didn’t suggest so, one can speculate that at some time in the future some places 
might see the need not for national leaders and governments, but regional or international 
ones. 
 
                                                 
171 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/dubai_cosmopolis_4543.jsp 24-5-07 
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3.7 The culture model: Culture, Institutions and Moral reasoning 
 
Figure 16 – The Culture model
172
 
 
According to Falkenberg173 a relationship between geography, history and philosophy in a 
culture and its subsequent values and institutions can be depicted as this. The role of 
institutions is to work these values into societies, either through practice (norms and values) 
or through legislation (laws and regulations). Together this should result in ‘the traffic rules’ 
for behavior that is in compliance with certain moral reasoning. 
 
3.7.1 The theory of Cultural values as the underpinning of Institutions 
According to the Culture model cultural values will trickle down into institutions. 
                                                 
172 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #4, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
173 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #4, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
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3.7.2 Definition of culture 
Hofstede state that174: 
 
“culture is the collective programming of the mind; it manifest itself not only in values 
but in more superficial ways: in symbols, heroes and rituals”. 
 
Kluckhohn (1951)175 holds that: 
 
“culture consist in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and 
transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human 
groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consist 
of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their 
attached values” 
 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary176 gives several definitions amongst which we find: 
 
“the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded…”  
“the customs, ideas, and social behavior of a particular people or group.” 
 
3.7.3 Cultural values 
Falkenberg (2006) proposes that culture has to do with survival values177 and that the values 
we share in a culture constitute ‘the traffic rules’ or the boundaries for acceptable behavior178. 
He also perceives them to originate from geography, history and philosophy. The latter 
incorporate religions, as they have had a substantial influence on society’s thinkers, 
philosophers and ‘heroes’ (dead or alive, real or imaginary179).  
 
                                                 
174 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 1 
175 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 9 
176 Culture, The Concise Oxford Dictionary 8-2-07 
177 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #2, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
178 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #3, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
179 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 10 
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Harvard sociologist and anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn (1951/1967)180 held that values are 
“a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others”. According to Hofstede 
values are programmed early in our lives and non-rational, even if they feel rational181. They 
befit our society and our situation but they are not necessarily universal.  
 
Cultural learning and indoctrination starts in the family, which serves as mini-models of the 
society to which children learn to adapt182. School serves to further develop and reinforce 
these relations between the individual and the group183. The individual versus collective 
(group) aspect is also one of Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions – IDV. 
 
Hofstede184 say that “social systems can exist only because human behavior is not random, 
but to some extent predictable.” “We assume that each person carries a certain amount of 
mental programming that is stable over time and leads to the same person showing more or 
less the same behavior in similar situations”185. Consequently “the more accurately we know a 
person’s mental programming and the situation, the more sure our prediction will be”186 of his 
or hers behavior.  
 
Hofstede holds187 that while “values are invisible until they become evident in behavior” 
culture is also visible. Many terms are used to describe visible manifestations of culture but 
the following three; rituals, heroes and symbols alongside values “cover the total concept 
rather neatly”. 
 
                                                 
180 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 5 
181 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 6 
182 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 225 
183 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 234 
184 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 1 
185 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 2 
186 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 2 
187 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 10 
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Figure 17 – Hofstede’s Onion diagram
188
 
 
According to Hofstede “culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. Cultural 
differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster”189. The best way to avoid (any) conflict 
is through knowledge, understanding and often trade. While it’s been claimed “no country 
with a McDonald’s outlet has ever gone to war with another”190 counties and regions do 
engage in trade disputes and even trade wars (over genetically modified food191, bananas192 
and steel193). At times these have escalated into shooting wars (like the Opium Wars194 and 
Japan’s entry into WW2 to secure oil when the Allies refused to sell oil in an attempt to aid 
China195). 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• “Culture is more a source of conflict than synergy…” 
• It’s not always easy to distinguish between universal human programming, culture and 
personality. 
                                                 
188 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 11 
189 http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ 7-2-07 
190 http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/telegraph_15dec96.html 9-4-07 
191 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3025217.stm 22-7-05 
192 http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Bananas.asp 22-5-07 
193 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/260694.stm 22-5-07 
194 Falkenberg, A. W. (2004) p. 15 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opium_Wars 22-5-07 
195 http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-23.htm 22-5-07 and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_War#War_spreads_in_the_East 22-5-07 
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• Cultural values are deeply embedded in a society and they are usually fit for that 
society (not random). Values derived in Scandinavia may in fact be wrong in the Arab 
Gulf states. 
• Cultural values are deeply embedded in a society and they are usually fit for that 
society (not random). Values derived in Scandinavia may in fact be wrong in the Arab 
Gulf states. 
 
3.8  The theory of Institutions as the underpinnings of interaction 
According to the Culture model institutions, ideally fitting the box of acceptable behavior will 
determine the course of actions open to us in a society. They range from saintly behavior 
(strongly encouraged) to illegal behavior (strongly discouraged or banned). 
 
3.8.1 Definition of institutions 
North (1990) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, 
social or economic”196. They are, according to Falkenberg197 found as formal (typically 
written) in the forms of laws and regulations as well as informal (unwritten) as norms, values 
and beliefs. The Concise Oxford Dictionary198 defines and institution simply as an established 
law or custom. 
 
As a result of this: common (business) practice, be it within a firm, a country or a region is 
consequently a product of the way people within that entity collectively are programmed to 
behave and interact. Implicitly to understand and predict business practice an understanding 
of institutions and culture is necessary. 
 
3.8.2 Requirements to institutions 
Hofstede says “institutions reflect minds and vice versa”199 - because if they did not, they 
would not exist. Consequently institutions should reflect the national culture, which Hofstede 
                                                 
196 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #3, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
197 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #3, ORG 408 Compendium 1 
198 Institution, The Concise Oxford Dictionary 8-2-07 
199 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 20 
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tries to measure and compare using five cultural dimensions. The scores assigned counties 
will (to some extent) reflect the values embedded in its people and serve as a basis for 
understanding their values and even predict behavior. 
 
Perhaps the greatest problem for all mankind with regards to institutions is that what’s legal 
(or socially accepted) isn’t always ‘just’.  
 
Falkenberg (1996)200 holds that our cultural values, which tell us right from wrong, constitute 
the basis for our ‘moral compass’. The fact that we share a common set of values with our 
fellow countrymen and often our neighboring counties (our in-groups201) makes interaction 
much easier202 and implicitly – interaction with ‘strangers’, relatively, more difficult. The 
danger of blindly trusting our ‘moral compass’ is its programming which is inherently 
dependent on our time and place203. A Scandinavian compass pointing at ‘right’ might 
actually be ‘wrong’ when operated elsewhere, like in the Arab Gulf states just as a Christian 
moral compass might be wrong according to a Muslim moral compass204. 
 
3.8.3 Levels of institutions 
 
Figure 18 – Micro, Messo and Macro institutions
205
 
 
Any international relation, dealing or transaction is affected by three levels of institutions.  
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These are Micro (interpersonal), Messo (governmental) and Macro (global) level institutions. 
Consequently, even the simplest cross-country/region deal will thus have to ‘fit’ with five sets 
of institutions. Needless to say this is a lot easier if these five sets of institutions originated 
from some common platform, in the case of Sweden and Norway or Bahrain and the UAE this 
is often the case. Across region we will inevitably run into more differences. 
 
Law and order is on all three levels a prerequisite of a functioning society. Where either is 
lacking, society as a whole suffer. Trouble ridden areas of Africa as well as in the Middle East 
are testaments to the case.  
 
3.8.4 Macro level institutions 
• The macro level institutions consist of international rules, regulations, agreements, 
subsidies etc. These are among others put in place by the G8, The World Bank, the 
WTO (World Trade Organization), the EU (European Union) and the GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) and OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries). 
Like previously suggested206 the macro level institutions ought to be built on the ideals that 
are commonly and universally embodied in the mental programming of all mankind207. 
 
As evident from the number of people exercising their ‘voice’ through demonstrations and 
boycotts and in particular in certain parts of the world; terrorism, many macro level 
institutions leave something to be desired. Most of these global institutions are put forth and 
enforced by the Western world, and consequently depict our set of values208.  
 
Falkenberg (2007)209 suggests one of the largest problems relating to macro level institutions 
is the agricultural subsidies in the EU210 (Europe) and the USA211. “These subsidies do not 
just promote uncompetitive and inefficient industry. They also do a great deal of harm in the 
                                                 
206 Chapter 3.7.2 Definition of culture 
207 Hofstede, G. (2001) pp. 2-3 including exhibit 1.1 
208 Falkenberg, A. W. (1996) p. 163 
209 Falkenberg, A. W. (2007) p. 4 
210 http://www.globalisationinstitute.org/blog/agriculture/us-farm-subsidies%3a-an-uncertain-future-
200703281034/ 29-3-07 
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developing world – contributing to the overproduction that makes it impossible for poor 
farmers to make a decent living”212. Or as is the case in the Middle East213, much fury is 
directed towards the West (and the US in particular) for their unwavering support of an Israel 
perceived by many to be a “terrorist, gangster state which has usurped Palestinian land and 
water”. 
 
Another problem is the legitimizing (granting of a resources privilege214) of various non-
democratic governments selling of their country’s natural resources215 for external financing 
of their regime216.  
 
The eight countries constituting the G8 represent less than a sixth of the world population, but 
account for nearly two-thirds of the world's economic output measured by gross domestic 
product”217. Such an asymmetric distribution of power and developed resources will always 
promote discontent with the majority of people who are sharing the minority of the resources. 
 
3.8.5 Messo level institutions 
• The messo level institutions are institutions at the (local) governmental level. These 
are country specific and involve politics (economic, social) and policies (local content, 
CSR, environmental sustainability, women’s and human rights issues), as well as legal 
systems. 
Historically, (functioning) democracies seem to be the best way to ensure the quality of 
Messo level institutions. In democracies we can assume messo level institutions to be a fair 
reflection of the micro level institutions in a society - as people are free to choose leaders and 
lawmakers who represent their values and beliefs218. This doesn’t necessarily mean the 
institutions will promote flourishing for all, as many people will seek flourishing for 
themselves and their groups, at the expense of both other domestic groups and foreign groups. 
Examples of such are the Sunni oppression of the Shia in Iraq (during the Saddam Hussein 
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reign)219 and African farmer’s suffering under competition created by western agricultural 
subsidies and trade barriers220. 
 
Scandinavian counties have fairly old and established democracies. Their messo level 
institutions, although imperfect are well in sync with the populations as a whole. The UN 
constantly ranks them as some of the world’s best countries in which to live221. 
 
The Arab Gulf states aren’t democracies and do feature a host of ‘special laws’, ‘special 
practice’ of the law and a lot of freedoms are reigned. They are still steadily improving in 
many ways – as indicated by their constantly improving HDI scores222. 
 
3.8.6 Micro level institutions 
• According to Falkenberg (2007)223 “at the micro level we find the institutions that are 
represented in the local culture”, and in the case of internationalization issues: cultural 
similarities and differences. These are the local traffic rules224.  
As stated225 culture is basically the sum of a people’s mental programming. It isn’t any one 
person and it’s too costly and time consuming to analyze everyone so we usually choose to 
analyze a sample. The idea is that this sample will allow us to infer something about the 
populous in focus as a whole, be it Europeans, Danes, women, heterosexuals, golfers, wine-
lovers or executives. 
 
Typically countries sharing similar circumstances (geography, history, religion, interaction) 
will feature similar culture or micro institutions. As is the case in Scandinavia and as is the 
case in the Middle Eastern, this is actually why the GCC/’Gulf Arab states’ was formed226.  
In Europe and North America, where institutions are quite similar and cultural (as well as 
economic) exchange is extensive, this is a self reinforcing circle.  
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In business (and/or general exchange facilitation) the parties are usually looking form 
common ground in order to strike a win-win deal227. But when we venture outside our own 
realm it usually gets more complicated. People from different cultures necessarily hold 
different values and according to Hofstede (2007)228 “cultural differences are a nuisance at 
best and often a disaster”. These conflicts can be between two cultures or between local micro 
and messo level institutions. 
 
Suggestions and words of advice:  
• A moral compass is time and place dependent and not to be followed blindly. 
• Institutions are more than laws and regulations; it’s also norms and values. 
• Institutions are at times inadequate and thus not to be followed blindly. 
 
3.9 Moral reasoning 
Hofstede states that “Morality is in the eye of the beholder, not in the act itself”229. 
Etymologically the term ‘ethic’ is Greek for ‘what is common’ and similar to Latin ‘moral’ 
which refers to ‘proper behavior’. In that respect they are strikingly similar. In practice it’s 
been suggested that ethics can also be regarded as the study of moral230. 
  
Velasquez231 argue that: 
 
“Moral reasoning always involves two essential components: (1) an understanding of 
what reasonable moral standards require, prohibit, value or condemn; and (2) 
evidence or information that shows that a particular person, policy, institution or 
behavior has the kinds of features that these moral standards require, prohibit, value 
or condemn.” 
 
According to Velasquez there are three main criteria that ethicians can utilize to evaluate the 
adequacy of their moral reasoning232: 
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1. Most importantly moral reasoning must be logical and all its argumentation rigorously 
examined. 
2. The factual evidence supplies must be “accurate, relevant, and complete”. 
3. “The moral standards involved in a person’s moral reasoning must be consistent”. 
 
From this follows the old term that we must be willing to practice what we preach233. 
 
If a (moral) standard is inadequate or unacceptable, it can often be revealed by showing that 
under certain (hypothetical) conditions it will produce unacceptable results234. In the 
following we will discuss moral reasoning from different perspectives on ethics. 
 
3.9.1 Perspectives on ethics 
Falkenberg (2007)235 suggest three main perspectives on ethics: utilitarianism, justice and 
human rights. 
 
3.9.2 Perspectives on ethics: Utilitarianism 
The basic message in utilitarianism is “the greatest good for the greatest number”236. 
 
Pareto optimal transactions (“‘win-win’ or at least ‘win-no change’ exchanges”)237 and 
utilitarianism are among the basic premises of our economic systems and under just 
institutional frameworks usually capable of promoting happiness238. Utilitarianism is also the 
origin of modern (economic) cost-benefit analysis239 
 
According to Falkenberg (2007)240 “if an accepted institution fails to promote flourishing and 
we act according to the accepted institution” we will in fact do wrong and our act will 
consequently be unethical.  
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Figure 19 – Perspectives on Ethics – Utilitarianism
241
 
 
A society, like a business will always find their resources scarce and will always have to make 
choices. In business, a net present value (which in turn originates from cost-benefit analysis) 
analysis can be a useful tool in the decision making process. However, such a ‘utilitarian 
approach’ can also lead to the ‘wrong’ conclusions in a society where legal options don’t 
correspond with just options. 
 
The limitation of utilitarianism is related to its dependence on functioning markets and/or 
democracies in order to ensure ethical conduct. Also weightings (levels of utility and 
disutility) have to be assigned to different actions, which in practice is likely to be 
burdensome and people are unlikely to agree on the relative weightings. Finally the quest for 
the greatest total utility can be perused at the expense of someone in the ‘value chain’242 and 
how the end utility is distributed243 can also be neglected. 
 
Due to weaknesses regarding measurement (weightings), justice and subjectivity 
utilitarianism244 in itself is at times an insufficient yardstick in the quest for justice although 
its message is a good one. 
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3.9.3 Perspectives on ethics: Human rights 
 
Figure 20 – Perspectives on Ethics – Human rights
245
 
 
There are many different approaches to some basic human rights. Today the most widely 
accepted is the UN universal declaration of Human Rights (1948)246, where article 1 reads “all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. Falkenberg (1996)247 maintains 
that this declaration “is clearly influenced by the current western Judeo-Christian humanistic 
values”.  
 
The Bible’s Book of Colossians 3:11 read “here there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcised 
or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all and in all”. Islam also 
proclaims that all believers are equal before God248. In this respect they are strikingly similar 
– neither nationality nor social status (master-slave) matter. 
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  2  Ownership of property  
  3  Freedom from torture  
  4  A fair trial   
  5  Non-discrimination  
  6  Physical security   
  7  Freedom of speech and association 
  8  Minimal education 
  9  Political participation  
10  Subsistence  
 
(from Ths. Donaldson: The Ethics of 
International Business 1989 Oxford 
University Press 
An act is ethical only if it follows institutions which are in compliance with basic human rights.   
Institutions are compliant only if they promote basic Human Rights. 
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The US Declaration of Independence (1776)249 clarifies the point further: “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.” The intent of the Declaration of Independence is also included in the US Bill of 
Rights250 (first proposed by James Madison on June 8th 1789251). The European Council 
convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950 as 
amended) article 1 also holds that “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention” 252. 
 
In the spirit of these (and probably others) Donaldson (in Figure 19)253 suggest ten rules for 
ethics in international business. He holds254 that an organization should not deprive any 
person of any of these rights (1-10), in the case of 6-10 an organization should even protect 
for deprivation. However he does not task any organization (in an international business 
setting) with assisting those deprived or wronged (by others). 
 
3.9.4 Perspectives on ethics: Justice 
Over the last century a lot of different philosophies and approaches to politics have been 
tested, in particular across Europe. According to Velasquez some of the more important are: 
 
• Justice as Equality: Egalitarianism  
Egalitarianism is derived from the French word ‘egal’ meaning equal or level. It was 
popularized in the famous slogan of the 1789-1799 French revolution – “Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité”.  
 
This approach holds that “every person should be given exactly equal shares of a society’s or 
a group’s benefits and burdens”255. However,  human beings are not similar, and differ in 
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terms of abilities, desires and needs and can fail to provide incentives256. Still egalitarianism 
and the concept of equality are very important throughout the Muslim world. 
 
• Justice based on Needs and Abilities: Socialism 
While the term socialism covers a wide variety of actual practices and philosophies, they all, 
to varying degrees reflects the idea that work burdens should be distributed according to 
abilities and benefits according to needs. In practice what’s happening is that ‘social 
democratic’ countries, such as the Scandinavian, have established generous well-fare states 
(the Scandinavian model)257, employ redistribute taxation schemes (resulting in their low 
Gini-index scores)258 and provides free-of-charge schooling all through the university level. 
 
In socialism, consequently, one is to work according to ability and receive compensation 
according to need. This introduces an incentive problem as one won’t be rewarded according 
to ability and effort. According to Milgrom and Roberts’ Incentive-Intensity Principle259 the 
most profitable effort can be encouraged with a certain level of incentive pay (payment 
according to output, measures by appropriate means). When this principle is not met, effort 
will be too low (not enough output) or too high (marginal output isn’t worth the marginal 
cost).  
 
• Justice based on Contribution: Capitalist justice  
Capitalist justice maintains that “benefits should be distributed according to the value of the 
contribution the individual makes - to a society, a task, a group, or an exchange”260. The 
harder one works the more one deserves, is also the assumption behind the Protestant or 
puritan work ethic (PWE)261. In the USA this has evolved into a secularized work ethic 
emphasizing that individual effort will be rewarded with success and loafing will be 
punished262 - conceptualized in the term “God helps those who helps themselves”. In this way 
capitalistic justice easily could ignore those unable to fulfill their basic needs.263. In a 
functioning market (with no intervention) every excess dollar one person possesses could 
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imply someone else is a dollar short. Another problem is a market’s pricing systems which 
can be argued to feature grave imperfection in terms of justice264; for instance a top athlete 
can earn in a week what a surgeon does in a lifetime. 
 
• Justice as fairness: Rawls 
Velasquez presents John Rawls’ (1971)265 ideas. This represents a more comprehensive 
system, taking lessons from many different philosophies and also addressing their limitations. 
According to Rawls266 institutions ought to promote the following principles:  
 
1.  The principle of equal liberty 
Each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with 
similar liberties for all, and… 
 
2a. The difference principle 
…social and economic inequalities are arranged so that they are both 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and… 
 
2b. The principle of fair equality of opportunity 
…attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
 
The first and most important (should the principles ever come in conflict) is the ‘principle of 
equal liberty’267 which basically holds that “all men are created equal”268. Second is the 
‘difference principle’ (2a) which states that economic inequalities can and should exist in 
order to maximize the pie which also the least fortunate in a society shall receive a piece of269 
(maxi-min). Finally Rawls introduces the ‘principle of fair equality of opportunity’ (2b) which 
implies that each and every one should have access to the training and education required for 
a desirable job270.  
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While imperfect271, Rawls’ theory preserves the basic values embedded in our moral belief 
and fits the basic economic institutions of the West272. It doesn’t reject the market economy, 
work incentives or the inequality of hierarchical organizations273. It forbids discrimination 
based on race, religion or gender274. It also takes into account both collectivistic and 
individualistic ideas incorporated in our culture275 as well as “the criteria of need, ability, 
effort and contribution”276.  
 
Rawls suggest that for evaluating objectively and fairly according to these criteria we would 
use an (imaginary) panel in the ‘original position’ under a ‘veil of ignorance’277. Because the 
panel “are ignorant of their particular qualities, the parties to the original position are forced 
to be fair and impartial and to show no favoritism towards any special group: They must look 
after the good of all.278” 
 
 
Figure 21 – Perspectives on Ethics – Justice
279
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 A W Falkenberg  
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promote “the Good”.  Just institutions promote flourishing across time and place 
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Falkenberg (1996, 2007)280 suggests a slightly different set of ‘principles of the Good’, for an 
international setting. He adopts Rawls’ idea of the ‘original position’ and the essence of 
Rawls’ principles, but also emphasizes that his principles must transcend time and place – the 
panel members must draw a life at random, unaware of when and where they will end up281. 
Falkenberg’s principles are those of: 
 
1. Survival and hand-over
282
 
Assuming that we would always want to live, the panel must grant us circumstances 
which enable us to. Furthermore, the world grows increasingly populous and 
consequently we much always hand it over in an improved state – enabling it to 
sustain a growing population. This encompasses an emphasis on sustainable 
development and (natural) resource utilization. 
 
2. Equal moral standing
283
 
This is the same as Rawls’ ‘principle of equal liberty’ (above). This bans all 
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, age, etc.  
As Rawls, Falkenberg recognizes that national border can be an unjust institution.  
Still national borders in many cases are necessary (to secure functioning societies, 
economies and jurisdictions), their (immediate) removal isn’t called for. The authors 
do however suggest that emigration is an unalienable right while immigration isn’t. In 
effect this legitimizing that aspect of the ‘pariah’ phenomenon284. They also both 
accept that we in a pinch would discriminate in favor of family members285. For this 
reason family members are by law considered unfit to participate in certain decisions 
affecting ‘their own’ family or close friends (close in-groups) in for instance Norway 
through incompetency clauses (inhabilitets bestemmelser)286. 
 
3. Maxi-min for index goods
287
 
288
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Falkenberg, as Rawls, sees it as beneficial to arrange index goods in such a fashion 
that they provides incentives for effort, encouraging it and maximizing the output of a 
society in order to maximize its contributions to its least fortunate. 
 
Falkenberg (2007)289 summarizes that:  
 
“an act is ethical only if it follows the rules of a ‘just institution’. Institutions are just 
only if they promote ‘the GOOD’. Just institutions promote flourishing across time 
and place.” 
 
The fact that this framework is at best incomplete is also duly noted290. 
 
3.9.5 In practice – the inherent egalitarianism of Islam 
Throughout the gulf, including the Arab Gulf states religion has a much stronger stance than 
the West, for both reason of tradition, the relative recentness of the religion-offsetting factors 
(such as technology291) and because it serves as a base of power. In the more ‘secular’ west 
Church and State are for most intents and purpose separated, so one doesn’t enhance the 
power of the other. 
 
When oil was found in The Arab Gulf States, things changed dramatically and as oil flowed 
out of the gulf - cash flowed in. The story that followed could easily have resembled that of 
for instance Nigeria, Haiti, the Soviet Union or Russia - where opportunities for quick and 
concentrated wealth created a small elite and a poor and oppressed majority. 
 
Instead the local Sheiks (rulers) used the money to start developing infrastructure. Schools, 
hospitals and roads were built. Still a Bedouin at heart, Sheik Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan of 
Abu Dhabi actually paid out oil revenues in a huge lump sum payment to all the Arabs living 
there. Needless to say, some spent it more wisely than others292.  
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With the inherent egalitarianism found in Islam, along with what hindsight certainly has 
proved to be wise and honorable leaders, the Arab Gulf states prospered. The oil reserves 
were nationalized and some of the world’s largest oil and gas companies were created; Saudi 
Aramco, Qatar Petroleum, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC293. 
Much of these revenues have since been used to develop these counties.  
 
In recent years, however, equality seems to have taken a back seat to development, and 
segregation has followed as a result of massive immigration294. Also the enormous riches 
accumulated by, in particular (some) nationals across the region, are offsetting the traditional 
conviction which considered unnecessary wealth and lavish pleasure improper. 
 
3.9.6 In practice – Macro level issues 
In terms of macro level issues – in particular with regards to the Middle East can often be 
traced back to one thing: Oil. Responsibility (response-able295) for some, if not most of these 
problems, resides mainly with the West - while others mainly with the Arab Gulf states 
themselves. 
 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are all OPEC members, and could perhaps be 
commemorated for being among the more peaceful and benign members296. Among the 
OPEC members, only Indonesia (whose membership is under review297) receives a ranking of 
‘free’, while Kuwait and Venezuela receives the rank of ‘partly free’. All others are found 
‘not free’.  
 
In OPEC’s own words their objective is: 
 
“ to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to 
secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to 
those investing in the industry”
298
. 
                                                 
293 Slides supplied by Andreas W. Falkenberg 2007.  “Oil giants.ppt” 16-4-07 
294 Chapter 3.13.3 ‘In-groups’ and Lingjærde, E. S. (2007) p. 11 
295 Falkenberg, A. W. (2004) p. 27 
296 http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm 25-5-07 
297 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OPEC#Membership 26-5-07 
298 http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm 25-5-07 
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Figure 22 – Crude oil prices since OPEC’s conception (1960-2006)
299
 
 
OPEC´s mission of securing fair and stable prices for producers (including themselves) isn’t 
really reflected in reality: oil prices are as volatile (and increasing300) as ever and as oil 
companies post record profits301 the questions about ‘fairness’ of the industries return on 
capital (ROI) has come under scrutiny302. 
 
 “OPEC is a cartel303 - a group of producers that attempts to restrict output in order to keep 
prices higher than the competitive level”304. Consequently the “OPEC faces the classic 
problem of all cartels: overproduction and cheating by members” which is a destabilizing 
force, and at times have reduced the profits of the ‘swing producer’ - mainly Saudi Arabian 
greatly305. With the Arab Gulf states, and in particular Saudi Arabia’s policing, this cartel can 
continue to function. 
 
                                                 
299 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rbrtea.htm and 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/BPCrudeOilPrices.xls 25-5-07 
300 http://mondediplo.com/2006/05/07timeline 26-5-07 
301 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR2005102702399.html 25-5-07 
302 http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/24/gas.investigation/index.html and 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1027/p01s04-usec.html  25-5-07 
303 Shy, O. (1995) pp. 78-79 
304 http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/OPEC.html 26-5-07 
305 http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/OPEC.html 26-5-07 
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In the US and Europe cartels are outlawed by antitrust laws, but since OPEC is organized by 
sovereign states it cannot be targeted by antitrust laws from other jurisdictions. 
 
OPEC can very well be regarded as an institutional problem – and in the case of many of its 
members there is no doubt of OPEC being an instrument to aid the financing of brutal 
regimes. 
 
 
Globally, the US and the EU stands for 42 % of all oil consumption306. Problems in the 
Middle East, who by comparison are dwarfed by the atrocities in terms of both natural and 
manmade disasters like famine307, civil war308 and such in Africa receives little international 
attention an even less intervention or action309. This is surely a macro level institutional 
problem the rich (response-able) and oil dependent economies of especially the West should 
address with more concern. 
 
These two examples of macro level institution problems are in direct violation of all three 
suggested perspectives on ethics. The utilitarianism approach suggestion that one aim for “the 
greatest good for the greatest number”, seems increasingly lost also because the current War 
on Terror seem to overshadow and tie up resources that could and most defiantly should be 
focused on more dire problems for humanity in other areas. Human rights violations and 
failures to promote the Good with both violations in terms of liberty and equality are many 
and frequent. In the Arab Gulf states these topics are usually eclipsed by ‘more important 
topics’, usually involving trade, the War on Terror or the dead-locked Arab-Israeli conflict. In 
the case of Africa, time (media coverage, diplomatic focus) and resources (money, military) 
are usually all but exhausted elsewhere. 
 
3.9.7 In practice – Messo level issues 
Messo level problems they manifest themselves rather differently in this part of the world. In 
the case of the Arab Gulf states, they have not been subjected to civil war, severe civil unrest 
or coup attempts in recent times (with the exception of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990)..  
                                                 
306 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2174rank.html 24-5-07 
307 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_famines#21st_century 16-02-07 
308 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars#Contemporary_civil_wars 16-02-07 
309 http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/interventions.html 16-02-07 
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Never the less, several national problems plague these countries. In the UAE the leadership is 
primarily concerned with the rights and protection of their nationals (native Emirati citizens) 
and being ‘business-oriented’, which implicitly means the rights and protection of those with 
money and power. Discrimination and mistreatment of immigrants from south east Asia with 
no voice or outside/exit option is largely neglected310. In Dubai Lingjærde claim suicide is 
actually regarded as an exit option311. Since suicide and euthanasia is “explicitly forbidden”312 
under Islam, and looking at the reported numbers313 (or lack thereof) it seems it’s not an 
option making the headlines. 
 
Also, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the low level of unrest can to a great extent be attributed to 
a highly oppressive system of government314. 
 
Another messo and even micro level problem which will be comprehensively discusses later, 
is that of corruption. 
 
These messo level problems also conflict with all the three perspectives on ethics, from the 
utilitarianism concept, to the human rights violations and failures to promote the Good 
(justice). Hofstede found315 that respect for Human Rights (as stipulated by the UN) “is a 
luxury that wealthy countries can afford much more easily than poor ones”. Thus the Arab 
Gulf states with their increasing wealth316, should be held to increasingly higher standards in 
this respect. Yet we see that there, as in other places totalitarian governments tend to attempt 
hushing up violations, and with often extensive power over the media they are successful in 
hiding violation from their own peoples317.  
 
Question totalitarian governments then force us to ask is: why would someone trust a 
government that doesn’t trust them? 
 
                                                 
310 Lingjærde, E. S. (2007) p. 11 
311 Lingjærde, E. S. (2007) p. 11 
312 http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/islamethics/euthanasia.shtml 14-03-07 
313 http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide_rates/en/index.html 14-03-07 
314 http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/sau-summary-eng 29-3-07 
315 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 247 
316 Chapter 3.6.1 Measure of a Land - National wealth (GDP per capita) 
317 http://www.transparency-lebanon.org/Archives/Press/GCR%202002-%2029.08.2002.PDF 26-4-07 
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3.9.8 In practice – eight rules institutions should reflect 
While we should always be alert there are times and places where it’s more important than 
others to actively look out for issues than others.  
 
In countries populated by what Falkenberg318 describe as benign peoples and Rawls (1999) 319 
as reasonable liberal peoples (typically constitutional democracies) or decent peoples 
(typically consultation hierarchy), we expect institutions to reflect at least these eight rules320: 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other 
than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. 
 
If institutions don’t reflect these eight rules, it’s not reflecting the principles of ethics and an 
organization should be very vary of adhering to the institutions breaking these rules. 
 
3.9.9 In practice – the Courtroom of World Opinion 
The term ‘courtroom of world opinion’ dates back (at least) to 1962 when US Ambassador to 
the UN, Adlai Stevenson nailed the U.S.S.R. Ambassador Valerian Zorin to the wall of the 
UN General Assembly over the soviet buildup of nuclear missiles in Cuba and stated that 
“you are in the courtroom of world opinion” 321. That courtroom convicted the U.S.S.R. and a 
blockade of Cuba which prompted the withdrawn of the missiles followed322. 
                                                 
318 Falkenberg, A. W. (2005), p. 9 
319 Falkenberg, A. W. (2005), p. 9 
320 Rawls, J. (1999) p. 37 
321 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874589,00.html 26-5-07 
322 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,925769,00.html 26-5-07 
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Today the courtroom of world opinion is much greater and more important – globalization, 
communication and the internet have given prosecutors like Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO’s) great powers. According to Falkenberg “in recent years NGO’s has accused several 
MNC’s of unethical practice in LCD’s. Most of the allegations have centered on violations of 
basic human rights, lack of concern for the environment or various safety issues. This has 
caused great embarrassment for the involved MNC’s and could result in a tarnished 
reputation, trust erosion, lowered brand equity and lower sales”323. 
 
Evidently there are many challenges for when doing business across borders, not only in the 
traditional regard of making the business work (achieve profitability) but also with regards to 
what we do when an institution will have us conduct an act that is ethically questionable or 
even wrong.  
 
Regrettably, we at times have to choose the lesser of two evils, unjust and grossly unjust. 
While we might not approve of child labor there could be worse fates in life. Banning child 
labor can force these children to work (or be sold) under the radar where human trafficking 
industry operates. We use sky-drops and tons of fuel to deliver medicine, clean water and 
food in crisis situations. Similarly, in the case of the Arab Gulf states many of the immigrant 
workers makes a wage, and even if it’s only a hundred dollars a month it provides 
subsistence, something not always possible in their native counties. 
 
In the real world we unfortunately have to accept injustice at some crossroads. But ultimately 
we should aspire to act ethically and legally. When the two don’t coincide we should seek 
alternative courses of action in an attempt not to break the law while still acting ethically.  
 
The bigger the company the more power and response-ability they have to fight unjust 
institutions. Repercussions from breaking an unjust law are unlikely to be worse that 
concession in terms of justice. In the courtroom of world opinion a compromise on the latter, 
should it ever be known - can land even the largest companies in a world of trouble324.  
 
                                                 
323 Falkenberg, A. W. (2004) pp. 22-23 
324 Falkenberg, A. W. (2004) pp. 22-23 
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Mahatma Gandhi in his last days gave his grandson Arun a list with ‘Seven blunders of the 
World’325: 
 
• Wealth Without Work 
• Pleasure Without Conscience 
• Knowledge Without Character  
• Commerce Without Morality  
• Science Without Humanity  
• Worship Without Sacrifice  
• Politics Without Principles  
• Rights Without Responsibilities 
 
Many of these are clearly building on the same principles and observations that have inspired 
the various authors used through this thesis. 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• Institutions should be checked for against perspectives on universal ethics: 
utilitarianism, human rights and justice. 
• Universal ethics must always trump mundane institutions.  
• If an agreement cannot be reached that enables us to conduct business in a ‘just’ 
manner we should respectfully decline. A wise and honorable man or woman should 
respect that another cannot go through with a transaction for matters of conscience. 
• If we suspect we are not opposite an honorable man, we are perhaps at the wrong 
table. 
 
3.10 Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions 
Dutch Professor Geert Hofstede studies of culture embedded in IBM employees (and relating 
to their employer) have produced what’s often referred to as simply the ‘Geert Hofstede 
Cultural Dimensions’, the IBM-studies or the 5 Cultural Dimensions (5D) model. In the 1980 
original there were four cultural dimensions: 
 
                                                 
325 http://www.gandhiinstitute.org/Library/LibraryItem.cfm?LibraryID=780 5-6-07 
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• Power distance (PDI) 
• Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) 
• Individualism and collectivism(IDV) 
• Masculinity and femininity (MAS) 
 
In the 2001 rewrite a fifth dimension is present based on Confucian dynamism: 
 
• Long-term orientation (LTO) 
 
As mentioned this is not a study of organizational culture but of national culture in an 
organization. In the first four dimensions charts 74 countries each. The fifth sports a more 
modest 23 counties. They are contrasted by an extreme at each end of the scales and ought to 
be viewed as continuums326. It is also important to keep in mind that the values are relatively 
assigned and only interesting when viewed together. For instance, Sweden isn’t 33 % long 
term oriented. Additionally the scales are always likely to be in some state of fluctuation (as 
the world is ever changing).  
 
3.11 Power distance (PDI) 
 
 
In brief - the basic issue involved is human inequality.  
 
Rank (of 53) Country PDI 
7 Arab countries
327 80 
47/48 Norway 31 
47/48 Sweden 31 
51 Denmark 18 
Table 3 – Power distance index 
Mean 57, SD = 22 
                                                 
326 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 225 and others 
327 Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
Hofstede suggests the following one-line definition of Power Distance (PDI): 
 
 “The extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally.”(Hofstede 2001, p. 98) 
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PDI is one of the factors where the Arabic world is furthest from Scandinavia, Arabic 
countries score a very high-PDI while the Scandinavian counties reside at the opposite side of 
the scale, among the lowers-PDI counties. 
 
With regards to PDI three themes will be in particular focus. These are equality, pariahs and 
power. 
 
3.11.1 The origins of PDI 
Power distance is according to Mulder (1977)328 “the degree of inequality in power between a 
less powerful Individual (I) and a more powerful Other (O), in which I and O belong to the 
same (loosely or tightly knit) social system”. 
 
In organizations of a certain size some hierarchy (implying power inequality) is desirable. 
This holds for everything from egalitarian political parties to MNE’s to the most totalitarian 
regimes. This is also broadly accepted and recognized as the way to organize. The acceptance 
of this fact is evident even in very low-PDI countries (like Scandinavia) where leadership’s 
authority is matched and maintained by the subordinate’s obedience. This forms a symbiotic   
circle. Power distance is by definition just a social characteristic, not an individual one.329 
  
3.11.2 Moral and natural equality 
Jean-Jaques Rousseaus (1752/1972)330 proposes a distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘natural’ 
inequality. While he rejects the first, he accepts the second as a fact of human existence. 
 
• Moral equality  
Moral equality suggests the notion that we should all be the same before the law. This 
is also what Rawls and Falkenberg argues331. 
 
• Natural equality 
                                                 
328 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 83 
329 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 218 
330 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 80 
331 Chapter 3.9.4 Perspectives on ethics: Justice 
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There is no denying the fact that all men are not equal with regards to abilities, 
triggered by personal abilities and opportunities granted us - like schooling, a safe and 
secure childhood etc. While a just society owes everyone a chance for their ‘pursuit of 
Happiness’332 each and every one of us cannot be held accountable for others not 
making it for themselves, given the opportunity. Still we are all tasked with providing 
a safety net for them. This is factored into Rawls’ ‘Difference principle’ (2A)333 and in 
Falkenberg’s three principles for the GOOD334, of which the first335 advocates that we 
shall provide ‘a minimum requirement for survival’ and the third a maxi-min 
distribution of index goods336. In other words the fortunate majority (or minority) of a 
people are to support the less fortunate in their society. Redistributive tax systems 
which (to various extents) are employed in many societies are a part of this logic. In 
1996 Norway was the most redistributive country in the world337. 
 
3.11.3 Pariahs  
It’s a sad fact of human history that some are more equal than others – implicitly: some are 
less equal than others. Bohannan (1969)338 introduces the term “pariahs”, intended to 
categorize the unintegrated immigrant workers in a society. These can be either (racial) 
minorities or even majorities. They are generally kept out of many parts of the social structure 
in a country even though they may live and work there for extended periods of time. In the 
case of pariahs the inequality can be total. 
 
3.11.4 Power 
Power has many meanings, most of which imply (some capacity for) control or force339.  
In high- and low-PDI societies power (in amount) and its actual capacity differs greatly but 
Machiavelli340, however, suggests that we can separate them into the ‘lions’ approach (in 
                                                 
332 http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/declaration_transcript.html 4-6-07 
333 Velasquez, M. (2002) p. 117 
334 Falkenberg, A. W.  (1996) p. 166 
335 Falkenberg, A. W.  (1996) p. 166 
336 Falkenberg, A. W.  (1996) p. 169 
337 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 112 after OECD report 
338 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 82 
339 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_power 23-02-07 
340 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 113 
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high-PDI counties) and the ‘foxes’ approach (in low-PDI countries) of exercising power - 
basically through strength or cunning.  
 
In low-PDI societies it’s considered best if (political) power doesn’t go together with wealth 
and status. In high-PDI counties power is often the way to secure wealth and status. 
 
High-PDI societies are also associated with more revolutionary fervor341. Still, since the 
1970s the countries that have suffered most from revolutionary changes in governments are 
those residing on the middle of the PDI scale. The (really) high-PDI countries with 
authoritarian governments continue (pressures for revolutions, coup d’états, civil wars being 
firmly oppressed) while the lower PDI countries continue with relatively stable pluralist 
systems342.  
 
3.11.5 Other differences between low and high PDI societies 
People brought up in and indoctrinated with the values of their society will often want to 
denote these findings differently (positive – negative). These issues will be addresses later. 
These are findings (and in some cases popular clichés) for which Hofstede provides some 
empirical evidence. 
 
 “Yes-man-ship” or acquiescence is markedly more present in high-PDI countries343. Hofstede 
found that people were more likely to answer yes to any (survey) question, regardless of its 
content. “Always consider the cultural context. A mild yes is probably a polite no; at best, it 
means maybe”344.  
 
Some other fundamental differences345 are the fact that high-PDI societies typically feature 
centralized decision structures and extensive hierarchies. Subordinates expect to be told (and 
not consulted) and managers rely on formal rules and not on their experience and that of their 
                                                 
341 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 111 
342 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 111 
343 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 97 
344 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 136 
345 Hofstede, G. (2001) pp. 107-108 exhibit 3.8 
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subordinates. Information also tends to be constrained by this hierarchy. Typically, this is a 
contribution factor to the lower levels of efficiency often found these societies346. 
 
3.11.6 PDI in practice 
Generally high-PDI tends to lead to higher inequalities in terms of wealth distribution. 
Unfortunately Gini-coefficients aren’t calculated for either six Gulf Arab states, but matching 
the Scandinavian value of about 25347 (where 0 is equal distribution of income and 100 is the 
absolute opposite) they certainly won’t.  
 
In this case (Gulf Arab states) this can in part be contributed to their vast oil reserves, which 
offers the possibility for quick but concentrated wealth. 
 
Another contributing factor is the large populous of pariahs in many Middle Eastern 
countries. A Human Rights Watch study from 2003348 found that “nearly ten million 
foreigners, most of them unskilled or semi-skilled migrants, work in Gulf states. Migrants 
comprise some 90 percent of the 1.7 million workers in the United Arab Emirates” and 
“despite their value to both their home countries and the societies in which they work, many 
migrant workers suffer from discrimination, exploitation and abuse”. Still “most of the 
companies involved in violations are based in countries with strong workers’ rights, and the 
managers in charge of laborers in Dubai are rarely locals”349, everything “from management 
to labor” is outsourced350. 
 
While natural inequality is both a product of and a prerequisite for prosperity, we typically see 
where high natural inequality exist (high-PDI societies), moral inequalities also tend to be 
present. In the Middle East this is very evident in the case of the Pariahs (un-integrated 
immigrant workers). 
 
In the spirit of profit maximization (determine the price and output yielding the greatest 
return) there is in terms of reward (salary), discrimination (laws) and abuse of course a big 
                                                 
346 Chapter 3.3 History and chapter 3.6.4 Measure of a Land - Pace of life 
347 Gini index https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2172.html 15-04-07 
348 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/09/19/uae6388.htm 4-6-07 
349 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/dubai_cosmopolis_4543.jsp 21-4-07 
350 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/dubai_cosmopolis_4543.jsp 21-4-07 
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difference in the way pariahs originating from Scandinavia and south Asia are treated. 
Scandinavians won’t live and work there if some concessions weren’t made to accommodate 
them while cheap labor from south Asia is readily available as just a couple of dollars a day, 
is a lot better that they might achieve in their native country351.  
 
Depending on what one looks for and ones opinion of this system, as a whole pariahs are big 
noise factors in the PDI. This is because they might skew the dataset (which holds for other 
dimensions and measures as well). As IBM employees conceivably would belong to the 
education minority with good outside options, they might be poor yardsticks of the average. 
This in terms of mean352 and not to mention the median353 or mode354 employee in countries 
like the UAE with mostly foreign labor (90 %), of which most are poor. Still, in a lot of other 
studies this is an even bigger noise factor: as they are not citizens (only inhabitants) they don’t 
count. 
 
When we compared corruption, GDP per capita and distribution of economic freedom we saw 
that corruption correlates positively with PDI while GDP per capita and economic freedom 
are correlated negatively with it. 
 
Within organizations unequal distribution of power is an essential component. Leadership can 
work in no other way and a real democracy in a broader sense than a board of directors usual 
doesn’t exist. Leadership is complementary to subordinate-ship - you’re not really leading if 
you don’t have followers. Similarly “authority exists only where it is matched by 
obedience”355. How this obedience comes about is another matter, but around the world we 
can witness everything from satisfactions to complacency to intimidation at work. 
 
Respondents in high-PDI countries agree more than those in low-PDI countries with the 
statement both “there are few qualities in a man more admirable than dedication and loyalty to 
                                                 
351 Global “population below poverty line” https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2046.html and 
Global “unemployment rates” https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2129.html 15-4-07 
352 Defined: Arithmetic average, by Zikmund, W. G. (2003), p. 405 
353 Defined: The midpoint of the distribution, by Zikmund, W. G. (2003) p. 406 
354 Defined: The measure of the central tendency (e.i. most people buy Coca-Cola over Sprite or Fanta  Coca-
Cola is the mode beverage of the three), by Zikmund, W. G. (2003) p. 406 
355 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 82 
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his company”356 and “the average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid 
it if he can”357 – basically McGregor’s (1960)358 theory X. 
 
That loyalty and honor are factors more emphasized in (modern) Arabic culture isn’t 
surprising, with their stronger focus and higher regard for their history and heritage in terms 
of tradition, customs and religion. That Arabs have a stronger dislike of work is a 
controversial claim, but there are quite a few issues in their society which act as barriers 
against working: 
 
• High unemployment through much of the region is an obvious barrier to working 
(Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman359). 
 
• Higher illiteracy, which ranges from about 10 to 25 % in the Arab Gulf states. 
UNESCO’s traditional definition of literacy is “the ability to read and write, with 
understanding, a short simple sentence about one’s everyday life”. In a contemporary 
world it is suggested that we also begin to recognize the importance of “ability to use 
and communicate in a diverse range of technologies”360. In industrialized counties 
illiterates will have more difficulty finding a job)361. This is also a component of HDI, 
where the Middle East also trails Scandinavia. 
 
• Less favorable working conditions (often no unions, fewer if any rights, more 
physically hard manual labor) 
 
• Pace of life is lower.  
 
• In some countries less or no reason to work for certain groups. (one can make a living 
from being a sponsor) 
 
                                                 
356 Hofstede, G. (2001) p 91 – C12 
357 Hofstede, G. (2001) p 91 – C13 
358 McGregor, D. (2000) and Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 90  
359 http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2003/rankorder/2129rank.html 19-5-07 
360 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literacy - 6/2/07 
361 http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2003/fields/2103.html 19-5-07 and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literacy - 6/2/07 
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• Social problems like oppression of different groups (women, Christians, homosexuals 
etc) in the Middle East. For instance “Saudi Arabia can be considered the ultimate 
male-dominated society”362. Women don’t have the right to interact with men other 
than their relatives363 and must under no circumstance show their face to any man 
outside their immediate family364. Recently moves have been made to curb the 
religious police, the ‘mutawa’een’s’ power365, but there are still lots of issues366 to be 
addressed. In short, women – who statistically represent a substantial share of the 
population367, face restrictions and limitations with regards to what work they may 
actually do. 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• Be aware that some are more equal than others. Always be respectful of their ways 
and traditions but also mindful of possible implications (in particular with regards to 
the less powerful in a society/value-chain). 
• In The Gulf Arab states, word is associated with your honor. 
 
3.12 Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) 
 
 
The UAI norm deals fundamentally with a country’s level of anxiety about the future and the 
consequential need for protection of the society through the measures of technology, rules and 
rituals368. Uncertainty avoidance can also be referred to and treated as uncertainty aversion. 
 
                                                 
362 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 333 
363 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 333 
364 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 214 
365 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5016962.stm 4-6-07 
366 http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi/index.html and 
http://xrdarabia.org/blog/archives/2007/06/03/religious-police-under-pressure/ 4-6-07 
367 https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2018.html 8-8-07 
368 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 159 
The one line definition of Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) that Hofstede proposes is: 
 
“The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or 
unknown situations” (Hofstede 2001, p. 161)  
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Rank (of 53) Country UAI 
27 Arab countries
369 68 
38 Norway 50 
49/50 Sweden 29 
51 Denmark 23 
Table 4 – Uncertainty avoidance index 
Mean 65, SD = 24 
 
The strong uncertainty avoidance sentiment is “what is different is dangerous”370. The Arab 
countries reside right in the middle of this dimension while the Scandinavian countries all end 
up on the ‘not-so-uncertain’ side of this continuum. This corresponds very well with the fact 
that UAI decreases with increasing national wealth (GNP/capita) while military budgets are 
significantly negatively correlated with in (across the 25 wealthier counties)371.  
 
In relation to UAI some recurring topics we will be dealing with are relating to stability, trust, 
and freedom. 
 
3.12.1 The origins of UAI 
There are different kinds of uncertainty relating to different factors. Hofstede uses a broad and 
far-reaching understanding of these terms372: 
 
• Technology is understood to include all human artifacts (tangible and intangible). 
Technology has helped us face the wrath of nature. 
• Law is meant to include all formal and informal rules that guide our behavior – in this 
sense clearly overlapping what we consistently refer to as ‘culture’373. The law helps 
us defend ourselves against each other (although this is often aided by technology). 
• Religion is meant to encompass all revealed knowledge of the unknown. The 
knowledge of a life after death (which both Christians and Muslims share) is the 
ultimate certainty of believers that allows them to face uncertainties in this life, like 
Muslim martyrs (or suicide attackers) certainty that they will receive everlasting 
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happiness and 70 virgins in paradise374. Also in the so called Christian civilization we 
find a long history of martyrs giving their lives for their belief375. 
 
3.12.2 UAI in society 
In Europe and most Western countries UAI tends to be correlated with PDI376, but globally 
we’re just short of significant correlation377. In Europe we see ‘germanic’ cultures (including 
Scandinavia) converge on the lower band of both PDI and UAI, while the ‘latin’ cultures are 
on the high band378. 
 
The three questions (and their answers) determining UAI concentrate on379: 
• Rule orientation (follow even if one thinks it better to break it). Statistically, the more 
educated people are, the less rule-oriented they are 
• Employment stability (duration). This breaks down to three factors: 
o The older the subject, the more stable 
o The more educated, the less stable 
o Percentage of female employees, the more women the less stable (follows from 
family role380) 
• (Perceived) stress level at work. The higher up the hierarchy (organization) one gets, 
the more stressful it gets. A Norwegian proverb goes “it’s windy at the top” [det blåser 
på toppen] 
 
There are also a series other interesting factors Hofstede found UAI to show a positive 
relationship with381: 
• Lower ambition for advancement 
• Preference of large organizations (large implies more stability) 
• Tendency to avoid competition amongst employees and the notion that “competition 
between employees usually does more harm than good”382 
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• Resistance to change 
 
Hofstede383 found that if we broadened our scope to include poor countries, unhappiness was 
primarily a matter of poverty (low GNP/capita) while in rich counties it was a matter of high 
UAI (cultural anxiety) - high UAI “tends to stand for lower subjective well-being”384. 
 
UAI also correlates negatively with newspaper and book reading as well as internet usage. 
This could suggest that low-UAI countries are more inquisitive and curious in searching for 
information and new knowledge385. Similarly low-UAI countries are shown to be more 
innovative. For instance Saudi Arabia which got its first patent laws in 1989 took more than 
six years to issue its first patent386. Still low-UAI countries are less inclined to follow rules 
and regulation, which often results in not necessarily accepting (and adopting) innovations 
any more quickly387. 
 
With UAI also follows more absolute certainties in religion and more intolerance towards 
other religions388. Hofstede states that religion and uncertainty avoidance appears to be 
‘meaningfully related’ although religion isn’t the primary cause of UAI differences389. 
 
3.12.3 Rationality, rules, risk and power 
Vilfredo Pareto (1916/1976)390 suggests that behavior is rational when consisting of activities 
that “are logically linked to an end, not only in respect to the person performing them but also 
to those other people who have more extensive knowledge.” 
 
Rules are semi rational391, they try to make behavior predictable. Hofstede elaborates that they 
should consider both the rational and non-rational side of human behavior. Good rules should 
produce the desired outcome if they are obeyed and concur with the values of the people 
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386 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 337 
387 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 167 
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whose behavior they try to influence. Then they are likely to be obeyed (non-rational side). 
Bad rules fail one or both of these criteria. Bad rules are often a result of being the produce of 
or conceived by some but not intended to apply to everyone - they may even grant a select 
group privileges while placing burdens on others. ‘Private laws’392 are just such a kind of 
undesirable institutions, due to their promotion of unequal treatment they often turn out to 
promote unjust or unethical rules393. 
 
Uncertainty avoidance does not equal risk avoidance394. Uncertainty is to risk what anxiety is 
to fear395. While risk and fear relates to an object or an event, uncertainty and anxiety are both 
diffuse feeling with no probability attached396. It follows that uncertainty-avoiding societies 
dislike ambiguous situations. Desirable keywords will rather be structure and predictability. In 
an interview one respondent (dubbed R1) had a very befitting example relating to this. In the 
predominantly Muslim Middle East, many don’t believe in wearing seat-belts (or even find it 
to be blasphemous) as the outcome of a crash depends on the will of Allah397, not a humanly 
devised restraint. This seems highly irrational and certainly risky – to westerners. It illustrates 
though, how cultural differences relate to rationality, risk and religion. Technology, with all 
its risk reducing properties, can offset the need for (religious) rituals that otherwise help some 
cope with intolerable uncertainties398. 
 
Hinings et al (1974, p 40)399 suggested that “coping with uncertainty is the variable most 
critical to power, and is the best single predictor of it” although not the only one. The power 
of superiors is more tied to position and relationships in low-UAI societies400. Yet the high-
UAI countries see more appeal in hierarchical control and formalized conceptions of 
management401. Lower-UAI countries show “greater tolerance of other opinions, less fear of 
tomorrow and less fear of the unknown”402. Finally and predictably, uncertainty avoidance is 
found to be a major component of xenophobia and racism – alongside cultural masculinity 
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(MAS) 403. 
 
3.12.4 Freedom 
Freedom implies uncertainty of behavior, in oneself and others404. Freedom to choose – 
liberty is at the core of all modern Western societies (and others). We believe in free 
speech405, free press406, freedom of religious, political and to a certain degree sexual 
preference. 
 
Under systems with totalitarian traits, like in the Middle East, many freedoms are typically 
reigned in, often in the claimed pursuit of equality (rooted in the inherent egalitarian heritage 
of Muslim societies407). In many Arab countries there are also other forces working to 
offsetting freedom and resisting reformation408 
 
3.12.5 Trust 
An important topic throughout this thesis is trust. Hofstede409 found that the World Values 
Survey’s “generally speaking, would you say people can be trusted” and UAI showed robust 
correlations. Younger democracies, statistically, tended to show higher UAI values than those 
with old democracies (Scandinavia) 410. While the Middle East’s only real democracy is Israel, 
many of the Arab Gulf states are also moving in that direction411.Trust is relatively speaking 
more important the higher uncertainty aversion (avoidance) we face in a society. In Saudi 
Arabia Morrison et al holds that the locals need to know you – and like you before they will 
do business with you412.  
 
Jeffrey D. Sachs (2006)413 suggests that the key to the Nordic (Scandinavian) successfulness 
are their social ‘safety nets’, high R&D and higher education spending. This is predominantly 
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carried out by a large public sector and financed by a subsequent high tax rate. The essence of 
this is what is often referred to as the Nordic or Scandinavian (welfare) model414. Gert 
Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen (2006)415 suggest that trust is actually 
what makes this model work. The connection between relative size of the public sectors and 
perceived level corruption found in many places does not appear here416. 
 
Hofstede found a negative correlation between UAI and confidence in the legal systems in all 
countries and with the police across the wealthier counties417 (which are the ones in focus). 
The same tendency is also visible in the World Values Study (1990-1993) question 272-
285418. One of the justifications for this can be the finding that in wealthy high-UAI countries 
there is more corruption (than in lower-UAI countries)419. 
 
Finally Hofstede summarizes some characteristics regarding openness to new experience and 
information; Trust420: 
Low UAI High UAI 
If necessary, employees may break rules Company rules should not be broken 
Most people can be trusted One can’t be careful enough with other 
people, not even family 
Acceptance of foreigners as managers Suspicion of foreigners as managers 
Table 5 – UAI Characteristics 
 
3.12.6 UAI in practice 
What’s different is dangerous, in the eyes of the uncertainty averse, and it thrives in these 
societies. Yet, over the last decades, the Middle Eastern societies have changed a lot more 
than the Scandinavian. Similarity Norway’s second largest political party421 won’t denounce 
playing on people’s xenophobia for votes422 and ironically call themselves ‘The progress 
party’423. 
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UAI has also something to do with religion, PDI and national wealth. These are areas where 
we see distinct differences in the Middle East and Scandinavia. The importance of religion 
and PDI in business life has already been discussed. Increased national wealth will manifest 
itself in many different ways – one of which is and increased market (for basically anything). 
Trade relations are also generally a way to promote mutual understanding and flourishing. 
 
Hofstede found UAI to hamper innovation but making its implementation easier424. 
According to Kolltveit and Reve (2002) an innovation process consists of 
inventiveness/ingenuity, adoption and diffusion (nyskaping, adopsjon og diffusjon)425. 
Hofstede’s use of the term innovation doesn’t seem to put Kolltveit and Reve’s emphasis on 
the fact that innovation can also be a new or modified application or utilization of that which 
already exists. But regarding risk, which naturally comes with something new or unknown the 
uncertainty sentiment is defiantly back. While innovation certainly is important, the 
innovative part of it is only half the job. In order to determine successfulness Kolltveit and 
Reve cite Methlie’s ‘degree of success = f(quality x accept)’ formula426. Low-UAI counties – 
more open-minded, are better at first part of this while high-UAI countries usually are better 
latter part – implementing it since when the decision to use the innovation is taken at the top 
of the hierarchy, the rest scramble to make it so. 
 
The mega projects (for instance cities427 and islands428) undertaken throughout the Arab Gulf 
states are partly a testament to this, in the West such endeavors simply aren’t undertaken (no 
doubt for a multitude of other reasons also). The distribution of economic freedom also 
suggest that the Arab Gulf states in many ways have quickly established much of what has 
taken decades (and centuries) to reach in Europe. Basically copying much of what is now 
proven elsewhere and successfully implementing it at home. 
 
Rules, which are instruments intended to shape behavior, implicitly increasing predictability 
and reducing risk, are more likely to be followed in high-UAI societies. Unfortunately, this 
applies also to bad rules - evident in the acceptance of ‘private laws’, which typically work 
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better in acquiescent societies (as high UAI, also being high on the PDI index tend to be). A 
certain level of regulation is desirable. It makes it easier (and safer) to live, work and attract 
all important Foreign Direct Investments (FDI’s) to the many less developed areas of the 
world. Where law and order is absent, we generally see a lot of suffering (many regimes in 
Africa being prime examples). Similarly, in overregulated societies we also find a lot of 
suffering (the slowly dying phenomenon of command economies being excellent example of 
this). If we compare ‘the economic freedom map’ to the ‘HDI map’ we see that freedom 
(within reason) seems to a way to promote flourishing. 
 
One of the most noteworthy implications of UAI is on that of freedom. Americans in 
particular, like to speak of themselves as leaders of ‘the free world’ and to many Westerns 
freedom is perhaps the one of our societies’ most cherished properties. In the Muslim world, 
equality trumps freedom429. Implications of this are for instance bans on certain liberties, 
typically excused for religious and/or political reasons. 
 
Another substantial contribution of UAI is with regards to trust. In particular in Scandinavia 
there has been done a lot of research on what seems to be an X-factor in the development of 
society. Scandinavian (or Nordic) countries receive generally very good scores across all the 
rankings and indexes introduced in chapter 3.6 Other measures of a Land. And it’s 
undoubtedly not due to an economic advantage, since Sweden, Denmark and Finland 
manages superbly without any of Norway’s petroleum reserves. 
 
Svendsen and Svendsen430 found that this actually is just due to trust. They found that 
Scandinavian trust their governments and their governments reward that trust by again 
trusting its citizens. In the Middle East trust and respect is something that has to be earned, 
evident in the fact that the business climate is inherently relations based – and trust is what 
relations are all about. Another demonstration to this fact is Horowitz’s remarks that in Cairo 
“policemen stood at intersections simply to enforce traffic lights”431, under such condition 
there are bound to be problems in the relationship between state and citizen. 
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If we are to get things done in a smooth and efficient manner, some level of trust is necessary. 
If not the transaction cost produced would render us uncompetitive. This is also the case in 
Scandinavia. What happens is domestication of the marketplace, not (necessarily) through 
mergers and acquisitions but through family and hereditary rule with extensive mingling 
public and private sector, sacrificing meritocracy. The fact that marriage within families 
(cousins) is historically desirable in Arab tradition surely helps enforcing the bonds of 
families and groups432.  
 
On the topic of separation of political power and economic power, or lack thereof, Moore 
(2004) found evidence of state-building and economic development not to be top down (as it 
typically is). Both Kuwait and Jordan seem to have experienced a more mutual relationship433. 
Moore cites Waldner’s argument (also relating to corruption) that “it is elites who make side-
payments for their own political goals and not redistributive-seeking groups that demand 
them”434. Thus businesses involvement in the creation of Kuwait’s (and Jordan’s) founding 
economic institutions is both a form of rent-seeking and a part of state-building435. 
 
The Scandinavian model, as much of Scandinavia works on a professional assumption of 
trust. We trust other’s behavior to be predictable along the rules, regulations and system 
basically governing our society.  
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• In the Arab World business is more personal and dependant on trustful relations than 
in Scandinavia. 
• They won’t do business with us if they don’t know us (don’t trust us) 
• Trust can and should be earned thought relationships and friendships. 
• Trust and relationships should be mutual. 
• Favoritism exists between friends and families. 
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3.13 Individualism and collectivism (IDV) 
 
 
Schwartz (1999)436 says that “the first basic issue confronting all societies is to define the 
nature of the relation between the individual and the group”. 
 
Rank (of 53) Country IDV 
9 Denmark 74 
10/11 Sweden 71 
13 Norway 69 
26/27 Arab countries
437 38 
Table 6 – Individualism/collectivism index 
Mean 43, SD = 25  
 
Important and recurring topics through this section are in identity and ‘in-groups’. 
 
3.13.1 The origins of IDV 
In the world of animals we can usually distinguish between gregarious (live in herds) and 
solitary animal. In terms of humans there is no doubt that most people thrive in herds – or as 
we’ve come to call it - societies. We are so to say relational beings. 
 
The debate of individuality versus collectivism is one littered with strong moral overtones. 
And as all aspects of culture, it’s a part of our mental programming, indoctrinated in us from 
early childhood. For instance in the USA (IDV: 91) individualism is viewed as one of the 
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unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede 2001, p. 223) 
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reasons for the country’s greatness438 and the word ‘collectivism’ sound too much like 
‘communism’439, which to them is an invective. Embracing that idea, on the highly 
collectivist side, we find China (IDV: 20), where collectivism literally has been the name of 
the game. In Mao Zedong’s opinion individualism and liberalism was evil and selfish. This 
pro-collectivist ethos, while taken to the extreme, was thoroughly founded in Chinese 
tradition440. 
 
The inherent egalitarianism found in Islam441 might just be one of the causes for the Middle 
East’s more collectivist attitude (when compared to Europe). The highest ‘ranking’ Muslim 
county on the IDV chart is Iran, at a mere 24th place442. 
 
Of the cultural dimensions IDV is the most closely correlated to economic development or 
national wealth (as measured by GNP/capita)443. It’s negatively correlated with PDI (until we 
control/correct for national wealth) and within most wealthy countries (like the Scandinavian) 
it’s also negatively correlated with UAI444. Hofstede speculates445 that national wealth 
actually is a driver of individualism. 
 
3.13.2 The importance of identity 
Where PDI is concerned with emotional dependence on more powerful people like superiors, 
IDV refers to emotional dependence (or lack thereof) on groups, organizations and other 
constellations. While working with highly related topics or dimensions they are conceptually 
different. In some cultures individualism is seen as a good thing and a sign of well being (as 
will be a point of further discussion; it’s highly indicative of national wealth) while others see 
it as alienating446. 
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Hjelholt (1976)447 argue that: 
 
“Without identity the system or group is neither productive nor satisfying as a place to 
live. And if we have to get our identity from other systems and just be a prisoner in the 
working organization, we create a society which is clearly asking for trouble.”  
 
 
Before oil was struck Abu Dhabi’s448 economy was fuelled by fishing, camel herding, 
agriculture (growing of dates and some vegetables), as cultured (artificial) Japanese pearls 
collapsed the natural pearl market in the 1930’s449. The city was predominantly constructed of 
palm fronds with some mud huts. Then oil was stuck in 1958. The first paved road in the 
UAE was made in 1961450. Today, less than five decades later, it’s got one of the most 
modern skylines in the world.  
 
Since then, Abu Dhabi (along with the other Arab Gulf states) has seen enormous growth, 
both in riches and in terms of population. Today 80 % of Abu Dhabi’s population are (non-
citizen451-) expatriates452. Still the country is a Muslim state453, with at least officially strong 
roots back to Bedouin culture454. This fact is that – what is actually the indigenous culture of 
Abu Dhabi and/or the UAE will at some point be a difficult question, even more so than 
today. Certainly it’s not a collective programming of its inhabitants, as there are massive gaps 
between what kind of cultures and societies they were born and raised in. With the present 
citizen-to-expatriate ratio (1:4) the collective programming of a very large portion of those 
one interact with (outside ones family) are bound to be aliens in the country. Hjelholt’s 
‘warning’ that importing culture was asking for trouble - was perhaps meant for just these 
circumstances.  
 
If ones sense of identity is strongly linked to ones religion455, ones group and ones society, 
then sudden monumental shifts in these can also lead to turmoil and problems on the 
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individual level. Cause and effect is another discussion, but the fact that much of the Middle 
East is trouble ridden, and that much of it is due to Western influence, money and policy - is 
indisputable456. 
 
3.13.3 ‘In-groups’ 
Hofstede holds that it’s important to be ‘in-group’ members in order not to be seen as 
strangers. In-group members are those belonging to a select society. Everyone belong to 
several in-groups, the likes of families, department co-workers, choirs, alumni societies, 
company soccer teams and so on. 
 
Chiu et al (1998)457 say that: 
 
“Collectivist cultures emphasize the goals, needs, and views of the ingroup over those 
of the individual. Compared to individualist cultures, collectivist cultures place 
greater emphasis on collective goals and standards, are more loyal and generous to 
other members of the ingroup [and] are more allocentric”.  
 
While individualism and collectivism work at the cultural (here: society) level we can also 
distinguish between the same underlying tendencies at the psychological level (individual). 
Triandis et al (1999) and Triandis (2001) suggest the following understanding of the terms: 
allocentrics (collectivists) and idiocentrics (individualists): 
 
“Allocentrics tend to define themselves with reference to social entities” and “often 
have internalized the norms of their in-groups, so they enjoy doing what their in-group 
expects them to do (Triandis et al, 1990)”
458
.
   
 
“In-group goals have primacy or overlap with personal goals, in-group harmony is a 
value, and social behavior tends to be very different when the other person belongs to 
an in-group versus an out-group.
 459
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For idiocentrics, the individual is the basic unit of social perception, the self is an 
independent entity, personal goals have primacy over in-group goals, in-group 
confrontation is acceptable, and social behavior is not so different when the other 
person belongs to an in-group versus an out-group.”
 460 
 
Ng (1980, p. 229)461 highlights the fact that the way power is exercised differs between in-
group and between-group situations. Accordingly it depends on whether or not the actors 
belong to the same in-group or group. Getting along also takes president to getting ahead462, 
very similar to what we’ve already seen with regards to acquiescence. Similarly Chiu et al 
(1998)463 argue collectivist societies are more concerned about status and promoting the group 
and social harmony than individualistic ones. 
 
3.13.4 Moral and calculative behavior 
Etzioni (1975)464 claimed that we on an organizational basis could expect more ‘moral’ 
involvement where collectivist values prevailed and more ‘calculative’ behavior where 
individualist values were dominant. Corruption, or rather grand corruption is another area 
where we consider calculative behavior to be a component (does the reward justisfy the risk). 
But as we’ll see, IDV is in fact the only IBM variable not found to predict corruption. 
 
While it’s circumstantial, it’s interesting to note that Smith et al (1995)465 found the belief in 
the role of luck to correlate negatively with Christianity (but not the Hofstede or Schwartz 
indexes). Luck is inherently unpredictable and has little or nothing to do with calculative 
behavior (chance is something else). On the other hand, in the Muslim (Arab) world we have 
the term ‘Insha’Allah’ meaning ‘God willing’ or ‘if it’s God’s will’466.  
 
I’ve lived in Dubai, in the UAE for several years. There I once witnessed a crew of 
construction workers sitting on the roof of a lorry, obviously on their way to work, 
with their feet dangling on the windshield on a four-lane highway. 
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Their conviction was probably that God willing they wouldn’t die till their time came anyway. 
To non-believers (or those believing otherwise) this is another example of seemingly extreme 
determination that doesn’t appear to carry any calculative component. 
 
3.13.5 Schwartz’s seven dimensions 
Schwartz found that there are three basic issues confronting all societies: 
 
• The nature of relations between the individual and the group (IDV)467. 
• Behavior that will preserve the social fabric468. 
• The relations between humankind and the natural and social world469. 
 
He also derived seven dimensions470 which all could be compared against, which Hofstede 
ties to his IBM studies on a broad basis. Hofstede found the following correlations to IDV471.  
 
Schwartz’s seven dimensions (denotations indicate the positive or negative nature of the 
correlations):472  
 
• Conservatism (-) 
• Intellectual Autonomy (+) 
• Affective Autonomy (+) 
• Hierarchy (-) 
• Egalitarianism (+) 
• Mastery (only with MAS) 
• Harmony (only with UAI) 
 
Schwartz found that Hierarchy and Conservatism values relate positively to each other, 
because they both regard the actor (individual or group) as a pawn in a collective of 
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interdependence and mutual obligations473. Hofstede found that they correlated negatively 
with IDV474. 
 
Further Schwartz found Egalitarianism and Intellectual- and Affective Autonomy values were 
positively related, as the view that the social actor as an autonomous entity underpinned them 
both475. Hofstede found these both correlate positively with IDV476.  
 
Only Mastery and Harmony did not correlate with IDV. These did however correlate with 
MAS and UAI477, in that order. 
 
3.13.6 IDV in practice – ‘in-groups’ 
The concept of in-groups is very well illustrated by the first in-group to which we all belong – 
that is of course our own family478. If we’re in a position where we can, will or must treat 
people differently, we usually will favor ‘our own’ (in-group). Cognizant of this, a family 
member is by law considered unfit to participate in certain decisions affecting ‘his/her own’ 
(close in-groups)479 in for instance Norway. In Arab tradition, where family-ism hasn’t been 
phased out to the extent the West has witnessed, the individual isn’t the entity in focus, the 
(entire) family is480. Consequently private laws and famili-ism play much bigger roles in the 
Middle East than in Europe481. 
 
In the collectivist society the in-group or out-group distinctions that children are imprinted 
with in a family, are further reinforced. This often manifests itself in subgroups being formed 
in classed at school. Students from the same in-group as e.g. the teacher expect preferential 
treatment because of it482, basically ethnocentrism in action. Similarly Triandis (2001)483 
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holds that “allocentrics are often more ethnocentric than idiocentrics”. In individualistic 
societies that kind of behavior will be totally unacceptable484.  
 
According to Hofstede485 “in collectivist cultures one does not trust just anybody – one trusts 
only ‘one of us’. A consequence of this particularistic way of thinking is that in a collectivist 
society a relationship of trust should be established before two parties sit down and do 
business. Once both parties belong to the same in-group they are both entitled to (and 
expected to give) preferential treatment.  
 
For example, foreigners are usually offered ‘special prices’ that in fact has to be haggled 
down486. This is done by the merchants at Sharjah’s Blue Souq487 (central market) every day. 
The initial price offered to e.g. a Scandinavian is above what would be offered to a local 
customer. However, this is in their culture not considered wrong or immoral – it’s simply a 
matter of ‘us-them’ thinking; we just don’t belong to their in-group. 
 
While this might not be make-or-break when buying a carpet or what is at any rate cheap 
jewellery to western tourists, the same thinking also applies in many large business deals. In 
Saudi-Arabia, when considering business offers, a fellow tribe member (in-group) will 
generally get the deal even if his offer is less advantageous than that of a foreigner488.  
He points out that “only natural persons are worthy of trust, and via these persons their friends 
and colleagues, but not impersonal entities like companies”. Accordingly, losing certain 
people (those with the in-group relations) can quickly put a company in an out-group position. 
It also suggests another reason for going with local people, not just the ‘traditional marketing’ 
reason that local people have local market knowledge, but also because the local market 
knows the local people.  
 
Society is expected to be there when one needs it, and one is expected to be there when the 
society needs. Under these circumstances one can’t act independently or individualistically489. 
This is what constitutes the core of the (family) network orientation that the West shrugged 
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itself of (or some would say lost) in the Middle Ages490. As previously stated we are talking 
about a relations-based marketing system. 
 
3.13.7 IDV in practice – norms and values in societies 
Different kinds of values and different emphasizes within them naturally leads to different 
norms evolving. We’ve earlier held that norms (as a component of institutions) comes from 
values, while not contesting that, Hofstede remarks that this assumption is “often naive, [as] 
more often, values and norms follow modal behavior”491. 
 
Then we can put forth the following generalization492: Low-IDV implies a tendency to keep 
different (values) standards for in-groups and out-groups (particularism as opposed to 
universalism). It’s not likely to always hold, but it seems to fit with what we’ve seen thus far.  
 
In individualist cultures it’s desirable to speak ones mind – telling the truth493, ‘speak up’ and 
‘challenge’ e.g. ones professors494. In most collectivist societies direct confrontation is 
something to be avoided, the answer ‘no’ being a form of confrontation, ‘yes-man-ship’ or 
acquiescence495 instead thrives, just like we’ve seen is also the typical case in high-PDI 
societies. Collectivist (low-IDV) societies typically also feature much more high-context 
communications, which will be a noise-factor to anyone not familiar. That’s a language they 
often don’t speak very well.  
 
Horowitz496  notes that “exaggeration and Arabic go hand-in-hand, acceptance is blown up to 
enthusiasm” and “a mild yes is probably a polite no; at best, it means maybe”497. It’s also 
likely to indicate that a society holds traditional values, which is in sync with what 
Hofstede498 and Morrison499 found. High-IDV societies were typically more ‘modern’ or 
‘postmodern’ when compared to low-IDV societies. 
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3.13.8 IDV in practice – personnel economics and more 
Levine and Norenzayan (1999)500 found the entire pace of life, and in particular walking 
speed to correlate negatively with ‘collectivism’. Hofstede501 sees “this as a physical 
expression of their [high-IDV societies] self-concept”, a higher focus on themselves, getting 
somewhere and making something for themselves. 
 
In high-IDV cultures employees are expected to act as ‘economic men’ – rational and self-
interested people which abilities and skills are best utilized if the employer can align their 
interests, e.g. through the use of incentives502. 
 
Hofstede found503 that while in an individualistic setting meritocracy  (government by people 
selected according to merit504) is the norm and while in a collectivist society one always takes 
(in-)group into account. Hiring within family or the family of other company employees is 
seen as reducing risk which is desirable as uncertainty avoidance usually is ‘stronger’ in 
collectivist societies.  
 
Another factor reducing the risk-taking in individualistic societies is the fact that at least in 
Scandinavia laws and regulations are in place to secure the meritocracy (at least in public 
positions) and the fact that one often won’t take a chance on anything but meritocracy because 
legally, a ‘risky’ worker can’t be hired, ‘tried out’ and fired if it turns out the it was a bad call. 
Consequently one is less inclined to give the ‘risky’ worker a change505. This is less of an 
issue in many parts of the Middle East506, as dismissals are easier to perform, but oddly poor 
performance is viewed as a lesser reason for dismissal507. 
 
Earley (1994) points out the fact that within any organization there will exist many different 
in-groups and “the managerial challenge arises from getting to know each employee’s values 
and beliefs as they are shaped by culture and by individual experiences”508. 
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Misumi (1985)509 highlights that any leader should be concerned with task performance as 
well as group maintenance. What (actions) belong to what category will depend on the 
context, but IDV is certain to affect both. 
 
While groups and their maintenance is an important aspect of an organization, managers 
should distinguish between focusing on groups and on the individuals, in particular when 
wanting to reach the individuals. With regards to training, “individualists performed best 
when exposed to training focused at an individual level, whereas collectivists performed best 
when exposed to training focused at a group level”510. In terms of incentives and bonuses, if 
given, they should in an individualistically oriented setting be linked to individual 
performance and in a collectively oriented setting they should target the in-group in focus511. 
Targeting a group of people with the same task and incentive can actually foster the 
development of an in-group – as they are given something in common, a common task512. 
Especially with regards to individualistic settings managers should be mindful of the 
importance of structuring the total compensation package so that it fosters teamwork and 
cooperation, where necessary. 
 
Yet, corruption with (individual) payments being made could be assumed to break even more 
with the collective programming of minds in collectivist oriented societies and in particular 
those dominated by Islam (equality, not liberty). From this point of view corruption seems to 
be an error in society, which is most likely aided by a series of other factors. 
 
Not surprisingly inventiveness which in many ways is the ultimate expression of 
independence (and ability to think, act and produce independently) correlates with IDV513. 
 
Singapore, South Korea and Japan have shown us that wealth can coexist with unbalanced 
power, at least for some time. But statistically, as countries get richer, PDI will be offset and 
IDV increase514. It’s conservable that the Middle East, with its relatively newfound fortunes, 
is on just that same path.  
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Suggestions and words of advice: 
• Know the locals, know how and why and also let them know you.  
• The focus on the in-group (the collective) not on the individual. 
• Constricting business to an in-group or family setting is a way to reduce uncertainty. 
• Be in-group, develop a relationship, be honorable and extend them the same courtesy 
and treatment you wish to receive, and it can be very profitable. 
3.14 Masculinity and femininity (MAS) 
 
 
The duality of the sexes, and the fact that societies differ with regards to the relative position 
between them is one of the most fundamental facts Hofstede touches upon. “Almost 
universally women attach more importance to social goals such as relationships, helping 
others, and the physical environment, and men attach more importance to ego goals such as 
careers and money”515. 
 
Rank (of 53)
516
 Country MAS 
23 Arab countries
517 53 
50 Denmark 16 
52 Norway 8 
53 Sweden 5 
Table 7 – Masculinity/femininity index 
Mean 43, SD = 25 
 
                                                 
515 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 279 
516 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 286 exhibit 6.3 
517 Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
Hofstede’s fourth cultural dimension is dubbed ‘masculinity’ (MAS), naturally 
contrasted by its opposing force “femininity”. The suggested definition of this 
dimension is as follows: 
 
 “Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly 
distinct: Men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on material 
success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned 
with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social 
gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, 
tender, and concerned with the quality of life.” (Hofstede 2001, p. 297) 
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In a strict sense only that which has to do with procreation separates the ‘feminine’ from the 
‘masculine’ 518. Masculinity and femininity will refer to the dominant gender role patterns, 
that of male assertiveness and female nurturance519. Statistically men will show more 
masculine behavior while women more feminine behavior520. The dimension is called 
masculinity simply because respondents were mostly men521. 
 
MAS is the only one of the four IBM dimensions not (at all) related to national wealth. 
Implicitly, it makes no sense trying to controlling of national wealth like with the other factors 
and consequently it’s at times difficult to compare it along lines we do the others522, where we 
often distinguish between rich and poor counties. 
 
3.14.1 The origins of MAS 
Van de Vliert et al (1999)523 holds that “male supremacy is no more natural than warfare”. 
Harris (1977, p. 65)524 find “the occurrence of both depends on climatic conditions, on 
whether the people had to compete for scarce resources or collaborate for common survival”. 
 
In addition to the religious heritages525 pulling in different directions a suggested explanation 
for the very feminine scores reported by all the Scandinavian countries are their Viking 
heritages, from the 8th to 11th century A.D526. Here women were in charge while their men 
were away on lengthy ‘business’ trips527. Feminine values, like cooperation and shared 
responsibility (between the sexes) were also central in the Hanseatic League period 
superseding the Viking era from the 12th/13th to the 15th century528. 
 
Hofstede is quick to distinguish between sex and gender, as referring to biological functions 
and social functions, respectively529. Across the majority of societies there is a tendency that 
men and women take different (gender) roles: Men deal with economics and other 
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achievements, while women devote more attention to take care of people – in particular if 
there are children involved. Anthropologist Margaret Mead (1950/1962A)530 suggests this is 
due to women gaining a “sense of irreversible achievement” that men forever seek to 
compensate with building all kinds of monuments and killing game (as well as enemies), or 
more modern context: e.g. trading stocks. 
 
3.14.2 Masculine and feminine preferences 
Gender, while being an involuntary characteristic, like nationality, contributes to how our 
mental programming is in fact programmed531. Best and Williams (1993)532 found that 
children in Muslim countries typically were indoctrinated with gender stereotypes earlier than 
children in Christians countries. Gender role socialization starts in the family and is, like the 
other cultural dimensions, further reinforced in school533. Both girls and boys learn their place 
in society and most of them will also come to want it that way534.  
 
It’s also evident and continually cemented in us by most types of media. For example; 
women’s magazines535 (like ELLE, Cosmopolitan) and men’s magazines (like FHM, Motor 
Trend). Here we find distinct differences, both in terms of cover stories and content. 
 
In high-MAS countries men’s values and women’s in the same job differ more than in low-
MAS countries536. In other words, the difference between the genders is larger in the high-
MAS counties than in the low-MAS. 
 
Hofstede found537 that while “an individual can be both masculine and feminine at the same 
time”, on a country level culture tended to be one or the other (technically in the continuum 
in-between). Statistically, “when one moves to a higher level of analysis, the number of 
factors found normally gets smaller” and at a country level a higher number of people holding 
masculine values tend to correlate so strongly with fewer people holding feminine values that 
we can treat the two as one dimension. 
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The IBM studies uncovered that across all (covered) occupations some significant gender 
differences cropped up538: 
 
More important for men: More important for women: 
• Advancement 
• Earnings 
• Training 
• Up-to-datedness (didn’t show any age 
effect.) 
 
• Friendly atmosphere 
• Position security 
• Physical conditions 
• Manager 
• Cooperation 
 
Table 8 – MAS gender differences 
 
An interesting fact is that the three ranking ‘most important’ factors for men show a negative 
age effect – they become less important (regardless of gender) as men get older, while most of 
the women’s ‘most important’ factors come across as became increasingly important with 
age539. For recognition and freedom there was no age effect. Underlying this is the reality that 
as we age we tend to become more social and less ‘masculine’ ego oriented. At age 50 there is 
almost no difference between men and women’s values, coincidentally this is also the age 
where most women are out of, or in a less ‘burdensome’, mother role. Consequently, their 
values can very well be similar to those of men (who’ve come a long way by this age)540. 
 
A study of members of the American Management Association (AMA)541 conducted by 
Powell et al (1984)542 uncovered that its women placed greater emphasis on careers over 
family and home life than their men did. The reason seems to be that the female executives 
(which weren’t exactly a representative cross section of females in general) held more 
‘masculine’ goals than even the average male executive. The two most feminine countries in 
the study, Norway (IDV:8) and Sweden (IDV:5) also saw this effect543. 
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3.14.3 Organizations as masculine constructs 
In masculine societies the following factors or statements meet more approval (questions not 
exactly reproduced)544: 
 
1. (High) stress (A37) 
2. Decisions made by individuals are usually of a higher quality than decisions made by 
groups (B57) 
3. A large company is a more desirable place to work than a small company (C17) 
4. A company is responsible for its employees (B52) and for society (B58) 
5. The private life of an employee is a concern of the company (C19) 
6. Employees have an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if they can (C13) 
7. For getting ahead, knowing people is more important that ability (C15) – implicitly: 
who you know is more important than what you know 
 
People in masculine cultures are more skeptical towards others. They are more inclined to 
identify themselves with McGregor’s (2000)545 Theory X, which holds that people will avoid 
working if they can and that “management consists of getting things done through other 
people”. In higher-MAS countries the job also took a more central position in one’s life and 
job satisfaction makes a larger contribution to a person’s total life satisfaction. Accordingly 
more importance is assigned to having a satisfactory job in order to have a satisfactory life546.  
 
In low-MAS societies McGregor’s (2000) 547 Theory Y seems to prevail and with this comes 
an inherent belief in worker empowerment548. This is much more of an issue in Scandinavia 
than in the Middle East. Consequently, we’ve also come a lot further with regards to 
empowerment in Scandinavia than in the Middle East. The feminine pattern is also thinking 
‘small is beautiful’ and to keep the company out of one’s private life. In summary, the 
company belongs in a masculine world.  
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3.14.4 Competitiveness 
Uncertainty avoiding, masculine cultures have lower norms of emotional stability (i.e. are less 
emotional stability). A judge in Toledo549 (at the time of Arab or ‘Moors550’ rule, from 8th 
century to 1185 A.D.551) describes Christians living outside the Arab seized territories: “their 
temper is cold and their mentality rough, their bodies bulky, their skin pale and their hair long. 
They lack shrewdness and spiritual depth, stupidity and folly reign among them”. In 
comparison to the Christians this judge held the Moors temper to be ‘hotter’ and their 
shrewdness and spiritual depth to be greater. 
 
In masculine cultures hard values rule – in its extreme sense winning is “the only thing”552 
and consequently failing, for instance in school, is a disaster553. ‘Signaling theory’554 holds 
that performance in school indicates potential performance in a job (implicitly: failure in 
school is a bad omen of things to come). The fact that schooling often is more expensive in 
high-MAS countries further strengthens this line of reasoning. Yet as a whole, women still 
perform better in schools (college) than men555, but eventually turn out to trail them in terms 
of careers556. 
 
In contrast, the feminine countries of Scandinavia schools devote more attention to 
encouraging and helping weaker students than openly praising the best ones557. Scandinavia 
has for a long time had free-of-charge schools (all through the highest university levels) and 
relatively generous public scholarships558. 
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Not surprisingly, in the more ‘result oriented’ masculine cultures we see even at a young age 
that people (youths and adolescents), subjectively tend to rate themselves as more competent 
than equally competent respondents is more feminine cultures559.  
 
3.14.5 Macho-ism and nationalism 
In feminine cultures ‘macho’ behavior is more likely to be a source of ridicule than in 
masculine cultures560. High-MAS societies are also more inclined to assign ‘a sense of 
responsibility’ to men (only) – and the more so the higher the MAS score561. 
 
Psychology, which is used to understand and interpret the minds of people everywhere, 
suffers from the same fallacy as a lot of the other research we gather and analyze to prepare us 
for what’s out there – it’s a western construct. Psychological theories are often based on U.S. 
models, as most of the research originates from there. In the U.S. psychology (focus is on the 
individual) is very popular but what we gather from it, the frame of reference we construct 
(psychological theories) aren’t necessarily as universally applicable as our utilization of them 
assume562. 
 
There is no ‘one best way’ of dividing gender roles. Neither men, nor women necessarily feel 
better off in one society because perceived happiness is far more than a question of MAS. A 
woman in one culture might view another as oppressed, while she in turn might regard the 
former as immoral. It’s all in the eye of the beholder563. Bártová (1976, p. 257)564 even found 
that “the oppressed women like the oppressing men” and, to many, the “abaya, worn in the 
UAE are statements of fashion as much as anything else”565 
 
For Scandinavians entering the Arabian market an advantageous factor is the fact that low-
MAS societies disagree with the statement “foreign goods are more attractive than our own”, 
imported goods are a way to show off in high-MAS cultures566. Professor Sanjay Goel stated 
                                                 
559 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 304 
560 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 309 
561 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 309 
562 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 310 
563 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 310 
564 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 310 
565 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/dubai_cosmopolis_4543.jsp 21-4-07 
566 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 311 
 
 
108 
that in the case of India (MAS:56)567, local “manufacturers have it rough”568, for this exact 
reason.  
 
3.14.6 Masculinity in meetings, conflicts and perception of unions 
Hofstede includes an anecdotal observation from a Dutchman working for an American 
company. The Dutchman held that in the U.S. meetings was a chance to tell success stories 
than addressing issues while in the Netherlands they served to address issues and find 
solutions. In the U.S. this was done at other times and by individuals569. Polley (1989)570 
similarly found when comparing the U.S. to Scandinavia (Norway and Sweden) that while 
U.S. groups, in a narrow majority (58 %) reported to be of one mind while the corresponding 
number for Scandinavia was only 26 %. Also, the Scandinavians (much like the Dutchman) 
were much more accustomed to conflict – and solved these through compromise and 
negotiations while the high-MAS Americans would rather ‘let the best man win’ and, if at all 
possible, avoid involving the unions. 
 
Unions are generally perceived as more ‘good’ in feminine cultures where they are seen as 
helping their small and weak employees against the big and strong employer571. In more 
masculine cultures the view of unions as a nuisance572 and preference treatment of non-union 
members is legal and more common573. In the Middle East there is no culture for Unions, but 
things are slowly changing574. 
 
3.14.7 Masculine- or feminine-orientation, political differences 
Porter (1985) suggests three generic strategies to reach (and sustain) a competitive advantage: 
Either through cost leadership575, differentiation576 or focus577. Hofstede has found578 that in 
                                                 
567 http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_india.shtml 18-5-07 
568 Goel, S. (15-11-06) ORG-410 autumn 2006, “goelilp2006.ppt” presentation, slide 6 
569 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 316 
570 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 316 
571 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 322 
572 www.mises.org/story/2124, www.detnews.com/2005/autosinsider/0502/26/A01-98482.htm 21-03-07 
573 http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/20/news/companies/delta.reut/index.htm 21-03-07 
574 http://www.uaeinteract.com/news/default.asp?ID=356, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Federation_of_Workers_Trade_Unions_in_Bahrain and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Confederation_of_Free_Trade_Unions#Middle_East 18-4-07 
575 Porter, M. (1987) pp. 66-68 
576 Porter, M. (1987) pp. 68-69 
577 Porter, M. (1987) pp. 70-71 
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high-MAS cultures they typically posses a competitive advantage in terms of manufacturing – 
efficiently, well and fast in particular on a large scale (cost leader or focus style579), while 
low-MAS cultures excel in manufacturing according to customer specifications, service 
industries (consultation and transportation), biochemistry and high-yield agriculture 
(differentiation or focus style580). 
 
Taxation is an issue for all business, and an interesting one in many places. We won’t debate 
its positive and negative impacts, but we can clearly distinguish between predictability (good) 
and fairness (good, but to a certain degree dependent on the eye of the beholder) in taxation 
systems. A testament to the importance of understanding the local culture with regards to 
understanding tax systems is the fact than in the U.S. there is a common belief that economic 
problems in i.e. (low-MAS) Sweden is due to high taxes which subsidize the poor, while in 
Sweden (and continental western Europe) popular belief is that economic problems in the 
U.S. is due to too much tax relief for the rich and not for ordinary Americans. Former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton581 holds in his autobiography582 that former Presidents Reagan and 
Bush, as well as the current President Bush’s belief in ‘trickle down economics’ are 
fundamentally flawed. With the benefit of hindsight it’s apparent that in recent decades “the 
fiscal situation improves under Democrats and deteriorates under Republicans”583. Yet 
Republicans still hold the Presidency, a testament to the fact it certainly is a very complex 
issue (and the fiscal situation isn’t the only things people choose to vote over). 
 
Hofstede also found584 national permissiveness (acceptance for debatable acts such as 
joyriding, use of soft drugs, bribery, prostitution, divorce, suicide) to be strongly negatively 
correlated with MAS, in other words; feminine cultures were much more permissive than 
masculine cultures. Similarly in feminine cultures (at least in the wealthier ones like 
Scandinavia) criminal sentences reflected more a desire for correction and less on 
punishment585.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
578 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 317 
579 Peng, M. W. (2006) pp. 52-55 
580 Peng, M. W. (2006) pp. 52-55 
581 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickle-down_economics 20-03-07 
582 Clinton, B. (2004) My life 
583 http://www.intelligentguess.com/blog/2007/04/15/usa-fiscal-deficit-as-a-percentage-of-gdp-under-the-recent-
four-presidencies-since-1980/ 18-5-07 
584 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 319 
585 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 319 
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Other findings, regarding racism and xenophobia found that in Europe “respondents in more 
masculine and poorer countries required assimilation, whereas those in feminine and wealthy 
[in particular Scandinavia] favored integration”, even if they aren’t always very good at it586. 
In the Middle East this reasoning isn’t directly transferable since citizens in many places are 
in minority – and also do not want integration. In masculine cultures, such as the UAE, the 
expelling of unemployed (legal) pariahs (for that reason) is more acceptable than in feminine 
cultures587. Still Hofstede588 found that to be more a product of less compassion for the weak 
in a society, than xenophobia. The UAE have in recent years taken steps to speed up 
emiratization of the private sector work force589. 
 
Hofstede also found it evident that feminine countries are usually more supportive of a 
political left (specifically: socialism) while masculine countries are more concentrated around 
the ‘no-nonsense’ political center. The political right doesn’t correlate with any of the IBM 
indexes590. 
 
3.14.8 MAS in practice 
American interviewers, when looking at CV’s and interviewing (for potential employees) tend 
to discount information (supplied by the applicant) whereas the Dutch upgrade it. Allegedly 
this is because American applicants usually oversell themselves and the Dutch are too modest. 
This works just fine, as long as all stick to their native environment. The potential for cross-
cultural errors is thus apparent591. The obvious question is then: Is this phenomenon only 
limited to CV’s and job-interviews? What about contract bids, commercial/advertisement 
promises etc? Does the fact that exaggeration and Arabic go hand-in mean we should be more 
vary592? What about acquiescence593? It certainly is yet another reminder that we’re dealing 
with a culture with wide-spread high-context communications.  
 
                                                 
586 http://e24.no/kommentar/spaltister/jensen/article1742456.ece 18-4-07 
587 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 319 
588 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 319 
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590 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 321 
591 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 315 
592 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 136 
593 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 136 
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The fact is that hierarchy in the Middle East (in particular within tribes) is based on age and 
sex594, with old trumping young and men trumping women. The authority of the ‘father’ is the 
main pillar of the Arab tribe hierarchy and the second is ‘masculine’ authority, expressed 
primarily through the relations between husband and wife595. Since men tend to adopt more 
feminine values with age some convergence is inevitable. Women’s position relative to that of 
men in the Middle East seem through Western eyes to be a weak and oppressed one596, but 
actually Muhammed’s intent when limiting women to the private sphere of the family was 
that of protection597. According to Maqsood, the (Sharia) law is to “come down hard on the 
men who allow their womenfolk to get into difficulties”598. 
 
The Inglehart’s599 WVS findings suggest that ‘well-being’ was associated with a combination 
of high IDV and low MAS600. Specifically, MAS was correlated positively with well being in 
poor countries and negatively in rich countries, but here wealthy feministic oriented countries 
showed the highest levels of well-being601. Even if MAS doesn’t affect national wealth it’s 
apparent that in the UNDP’s HDI index602, the Gulf Arab states are gaining on Scandinavia 
but still trailing them. The (historical) reason for this, Hofstede speculates, are people in poor 
countries being locked in a ‘struggle for survival’ and under such circumstances feminine 
values would render them more vulnerable603. Toughness and decisiveness are much more 
valuable traits in this environment, depicting strength and leadership. 
 
While it’s difficult to compare different countries’ income tax, corporate tax or VAT due to 
the complexity of most taxation schemes, the trend is that Scandinavia (with their much larger 
public sectors) feature higher tax rates across the board while the oil rich nations of the 
Middle East don’t604. Free trade zones605 have also caught on in the Middle East and attracted 
a lot of FDI’s. With their volume as evident through the enormous need for and immigrants 
and pariahs they also represent a significant internal market. Additionally they have been, and 
                                                 
594 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 211 
595 Brøgger, J. (1993) p. 213 
596 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 333 
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still are very helpful asserts in particular for Dubai, in its quest to establish itself as an 
international hub, in terms of transport and commerce. 
 
As mentioned, Schwartz (1999)606  value dimension ‘Mastery’ correlated significantly with 
MAS. It “comprises the values ambitious, capable, choosing own goals, daring, independent 
and successful, all on the positive pole”607. The claim that 16 %608 (or even 24 %609) of the 
worlds construction cranes are in Dubai, certainly befits these adjectives. 
 
Husted’s (1999)610 put forth a number of hypothesis’, of which the 6th reads: “the greater the 
masculinity of a culture, the higher the level of corruption in a country”, which he was able to 
prove. However, Hofstede found this to be only partly accurate611, but in the case of 
Scandinavia versus the Middle East it definitely seems to be the case. Corruption often is the 
easiest way to get the means to show off and that’s more important to the people in high-MAS 
cultures612. Even if the economic institutions and possibilities are there, national 
permissiveness is still trailing Scandinavia significantly613. 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• In The Gulf Arab states Men and Women are not equals. 
• Harder and tougher values dominate. 
• Tradition and respect are highly valued. 
• Who we know is often more important than what we know. 
 
                                                 
606 Schwartz, S. H. (1999) p. 29 
607 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 296 
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3.15 Long-term orientation (LTO) 
 
 
This section of Hofstede’s cultural analysis differs from the others in the sense that it’s not 
based on the IBM studies, nor is it conceived by ‘western’ minds614. The scores are based on a 
questioner by Chinese scholars in 23 countries – of which Sweden is the only Scandinavian 
participant. Through the WVS97615 scores for Denmark and Norway are derived (in addition 
to an alternate score of 22 for Sweden). The downside is the lack of an analysis on the Middle 
East. Yet Hofstede devotes a section of the LTO-discussion to “the Muslim world”. The 
upside to it (LTO) is, in the authors mind, its completing of a framework for cultural analysis 
through an organization. 
 
Rank (of 23)
616
 Country LTO 
50 Denmark (46)* 
52 Norway (44)* 
12 Sweden 33 (22)* 
Table 9 – Long-term orientedness index 
*WVS97 scores in parentheses.  
 
3.15.1 The origins of LTO 
LTO is divided in two sections, one dealing with family, work and social life and the second 
dealing with ways of thinking, including religion and philosophy617. LTO isn’t correlated with 
any of the other IBM-dimensions, but with national economic growth from 1965 to -85 and 
even more till -95 (more recent data isn’t presented)618. 
                                                 
614 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 351 
615 Hofstede, G. (2001) pp. 356-357 
616 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 356 exhibit 7.1 
617 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 351 
618 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 351 
The short definition of Long Term Orientation is:  
 
“Long Term Orientation (LTO) stands for the fostering of virtues oriented 
towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite 
pole, Short Term Orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to 
the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of 
‘face’ and fulfilling social obligations”. (Hofstede 2001, p. 359) 
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It’s heavily inspired by the teachings of Confucius619 (Kong Ze), which argued that ethics 
should trump religion. His key principles are as follows620: 
 
• The stability of society is based on unequal relationships between people. Some form 
of hierarchy is necessary; it’s grants powers to some and duties to others. 
• The family is the prototype of all social organizations. Bringing harmony is of its 
primary functions. 
• Virtuous behavior towards others consists of not treating others as one would not like 
to be treated oneself. Implicitly, “so in everything, do to others what you would have 
them do to you”, as read in the Book of Matthew 7:12 – the so called golden rule621. 
This is quite in line with Islam’s “God helps His servant as long as His servant is 
helping his brother”622, but stopping short of Christianity’s love your enemies.  
• Virtue with regard to one’s tasks in life consist of truing to acquire skills and 
education, working hard, not spending more than necessary, being patient, and 
persevering. Moderation is prescribed in all things. This is also reflected in more 
modern western philosophies such as the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE)623 
 
3.15.2 The limitations of LTO 
All the Hofstede dimensions are on what’s basically ordinal scales624, meaning we can rank 
them (67 is more than 55), but we can’t quantify the differences (80 isn’t simply twice as 
much as 40). It is also possible to receive a score outside the 0 – 100 field even though the 
data is sorted in an attempt to fit within that range. Thus even if the scores are computed in a 
different manner, as long as issues with validity and reliability are met, it’s still assumed to be 
both useful and usable dimension for our task. 
 
The only Muslim countries to receive a LTO score is Bangladesh (LTO:40) and Pakistan 
(LTO:0!). Neither can be argued to be ‘Arabic’ enough to supply a good frame of reference. 
                                                 
619 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 351 
620 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 354 
621 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 354 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethic_of_reciprocity 25-03-07 
622 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethic_of_reciprocity#Islam 25-03-07 
623 http://www.coe.uga.edu/~rhill/workethic/hist.htm#protest 25-03-07 
624 http://www.math.sfu.ca/~cschwarz/Stat-301/Handouts/node5.html 19-5-07 
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Consequently, LTO’s direct contribution to understanding the Arab Gulf states will be 
somewhat limited. 
 
3.15.3 Traits of LTO 
Some general remarks should still be made, much of the essence of LTO ties into the other 
dimensions and religion. Some of the more interesting, typical, implication of low-LTO: 
 
• Quick results expected625 (i.e. stock markets, quarterly results) 
• Respect for tradition626 
• Less pragmatic and more moralistic attitude towards marriage627 
• Meritocracy, which is (social and economic) differentiation according to abilities628. 
Also success is more attributed to ability than effort than in high-LTO cultures629 
• “Humility” is a feminine virtue630 
 
3.15.4 Respect for traditions 
The Arab world or the Muslim world places a much stronger emphasis on tradition than the 
Scandinavian countries. Arab (or Muslim) societies tradition values are in many ways also 
their religious values as most of them identify themselves as Muslim631 before recognizing 
themselves as a citizen of e.g. Dubai632. Muslim people strongly believe that Islam this is the 
true and superior belief633. 
 
While Saudi Arabia have changed immensely since WW2 – into a technological society634 -
the culture embedded in the society don’t change that fast – their values and traditions are still 
those of a non-technological society635. Hofstede holds that “Muslim traditions are still caught 
                                                 
625 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 360 exhibit 7.5 
626 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 360 exhibit 7.5 
627 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 361 
628 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 362 
629 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 365 
630 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 366 exhibit 7.6 
631 Chapter 3.2.1 Origins 
632 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/dubai_cosmopolis_4543.jsp 21-4-07 
633 Brøgger, J. (1993) pp. 179-180 
634 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 332 
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116 
in a definition of Truth that hinders their coping with modernity”636. Hofstede speculates637 
that the enormous oil-riches accumulated over the last decades might have been more of 
nuisance than an asset – like TI elaborates in their theory of “the oil curse”.  
 
3.15.5 LTO in practice 
The modern intellectual elite in new Arab national states that are working to modernize their 
respective countries are being fought by (religious) fundamentalist as well as large parts of the 
public which cultural horizon is determined in their childhood Islamic teachings638. Among 
these fundamentalist there are unfortunately many opinion leaders who seem to view modern 
technology and Western ideas as a threat rather than an opportunity639. Religion is 
traditionally a source of power, especially where it’s got a strong footing, which is still the 
case through much of the Middle East. Zakaria states that today this position is further 
reinforced by the belief, through many levels of society, that Islam is the answer to many of 
the modern world’s problems and shortcomings640. In Saudi Arabia “the King supports 
modernization as long as it does not undermine the country’s stability and Islamic 
heritage”641.  
 
Culture is underpinned by lots of interrelated dynamics, but one (of many) general rules of 
thumb on culture is; don’t try to change it (too) quickly. According to Falkenberg it typically 
won’t work and it usually turns out nasty642. Establishing democracies in a Western sense of 
the word has been is difficult and it’s speculated to be partly due to lack of democratic 
institutions and traditions in Arabic urban societies643. Political parties have tended to attract 
leadership with little regard for democratic play644. Popular movement often takes on a 
fundamentalist character and mobilization is typically founded in Religion and the notion that 
‘we hold the absolute truth’ with ‘no accept for different points of view’645 – which has been 
(and with no apparent end in sight) anything but smooth sailing. Zakaria also holds the 
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perception that the Western-style approach to politics has just brought tyrants and stagnation. 
This does not aid the Western case and is something fundamentalist forces exploit646. 
 
Morrison et al’s finding that “Westerns seem to have a particular difficult time adapting to 
(Saudi) Arabian customs and traditions”647 seem spot on. Their suggestion is that one should 
learn the rules before one got there and accept that one isn’t going to change the Arabs or 
their rules648. Local knowledge is the key to successful local action. A prime example of a 
failure in this regard is ‘the coalition forces’ attempts at establishing democracies in 
Afghanistan and in particular in Iraq. Lack of insight and ‘poor planning’649 have cost the 
coalition dearly in terms of political capital650 and money651, and the local populations in 
terms of lives652 and human suffering653.  
 
Falkenberg, Zakaria654 and Morrison et al, while through different perspectives seem to be 
quite in unison with these words of author and scholar C. S. Lewis655: 
 
“Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the 
most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent 
moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may 
at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us 
without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.” 
 
Suggestions and words of advice: 
• Do your homework and come prepared! 
• The want our business, not our society or its values. 
                                                 
646 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11182278/site/newsweek/page/2/ 19-5-07 
647 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 330 
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• In their land act in accordance with their rules and traditions. 
 
3.16 Corruption 
 
 
Corruption is a complex term to which there exist a myriad of different definitions. We’ll use 
the broad and well established definition and Transparency International (TI). They define 
corruption as “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain”656. This definition is basically 
the same as Falkenberg’s657 “misuse of ones position - for personal gain” by a public or 
private official. An understanding of this should also extend to the situation where a (for 
instance: oil) company official bribe a government official to secure a deal, since both (of 
them) stand to gain. One receives a bribe and the others surely receive some accreditation or 
reward from the company. 
 
Some typical examples of corruption are658: 
 
• Bribery  
• Kick backs 
• Contracts 
• Tax evasion 
• Fraud 
• Insider trading 
• Public permits  
• Licenses 
• Tax rules 
• Court decisions  
• Nepotism 
 
 
The left column exist in both B2B (business to business) and B2G (business to government) 
relations while the right is usually only found in B2G relationships. It’s difficult to refer to an 
organization as corrupt just because they have been involved in an activity facilitated by the 
use of corrupt practice. Very often only a select handful of people actually know of the 
corrupt actions – they are illegal and subsequently the less people that know, the better. In the 
                                                 
656 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorr1 26-4-07 
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Corruption, including bribery, favoritism and nepotism is a recurring phenomenon in many 
places. What is corruption and where do we find it? What kind of damage does it do? What 
causes it and what measures can be implemented to limit it? 
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Statoil-Iran incident this seemed to be the case as just a few people at the top were ousted and 
found to be guilty of any wrongdoing659. 
 
Still, when dealing in treacherous waters one should pay attention, sleeping at the wheel don’t 
exempt one from ‘sins of omission’660. 
 
In this chapter interviews and response to the questionnaires are worked directly into the 
sections they are intended to describe.  
 
The purpose of these interviews and questionnaires Scandinavians who work/have worked in 
the Arab Gulf were the initial choice. Finally it was settled on a sample or panel consisteing 
of 4 respondents from Dubai in the UAE, one (R4) form Muscat in Oman, one (R5) from 
Ahmadi in Kuwait and finally one (R7) from Cairo in Egypt. Several of the respondents had 
held different jobs or a mixture of positions in the Middle East, but all had been connected to 
the shipping-, oil and gas sector or to media (R7).  
 
The respondents are numbered R1 through R7 and the questions Q1 to Q8M. Respondents R1 
and R2 have also been subject to interviews. These interviews served to shed some light on 
and refine some impressions and comments. They also turned out to further prove the initial 
findings and thus add to both their validity and reliability. 
 
3.16.1 Petty and Grand corruption 
In fighting and avoiding corruption we should distinguish between ‘according to rule’ and 
‘against the rule’ corruption661. The former, namely greasing or facilitation payment is where 
a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the receiver of the bribe 
(the bribed) is required to do by law. The latter, on the other hand, is where a bribe is paid to 
obtain services the bribed is prohibited from providing. 
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The first kind of corruption (according to rule) is most commonly meet in the form of petty 
corruption, and usually involves small amount of money for lower level employees662. During 
a study of the recession in 2001-02 TI found this often to be due to poverty and/or low wages 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region663 – in other words, petty corruption rose 
as a consequence of declining real wages. A few dollars seldom pay for breaking the law; it’s 
rather a token sum to ‘grease’ or speed up the execution of the law664. It can also be perceived 
as a response by the little guy to the example set by the big guy (government and businesses). 
All the respondents were in complete agreement that facilitation payments are customary in 
certain places (Q8665). One (R7) also states in reply to Q5666 that corruption is a “product 
mainly of systematic mismanagement and failed economic policies, in combination with 
poverty. However, it should be noted that the worst corruption generally takes place among 
the already wealthy”. 
 
The latter kind of corruption is grand corruption and is found in the form of both ‘according to 
rule’ and ‘against the rule’ corruption. Grand corruption often involves large amount of 
(usually) money and similarly large concessions667. However it can also refer to the level in 
society which this corruption takes place, namely the higher echelons of society – where it’s 
very often tied to political corruption668.  Where petty corruption is sand in the machinery of a 
society, grand corruption is the equivalent of throwing a spanner in the works. Examples of 
grand corruption are kickbacks, offering no-bid contracts, offering to the highest briber and 
not the highest bidder, giving taxation concessions, granting what should be denied and 
various other forms of misconduct669.  
 
While the aggregated cost of petty corruption (which tends to involve a lot more people) can 
for a society be even greater that the cost of grand corruption670. George Moody-Stuart, a key 
figure behind TI671 never the less holds that petty corruption “can seriously damage the 
quality of life of the ordinary citizen—particularly that of the most vulnerable members of 
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667 Ljunggren and Magnussen (1998) p. 4 
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society. But grand corruption can destroy nations: where it is rampant, there is no hope of 
controlling petty corruption”672.  
 
One respondent (R7, Q7C673) proposed that having “to pay to get what is legally yours - at all, 
might be different from paying to jump in the queue”. To R7 some petty corruption 
unfortunately seems like a necessary tool to save time. 
 
3.16.2 Implications of corruption 
When the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Convention against Corruption former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that “corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by 
diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide 
basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid” 
674. 
 
This is what the World Bank’s have observed to be typical consequences of corruption675:  
 
• Macroeconomic instability due to lack of government revenue, excess spending and 
erosion of expenditure control. Countries amassing dept on ‘white elephant’ projects, 
being exposed to tax evasion and a general loss of confidence from investors and 
financial markets. Customary the cost of this instability is bore by all elements of 
society but in particular the poor. According to Falkenberg it “keeps markets and 
democracies from working”676. 
 
• Corruption reduces foreign direct investment (FDI). As long as conditions are fairly 
predictable (because of or in spite of corruption) a country will usually see FDI’s as 
companies just transfer the extra cost of doing business to its customers. Still it leaves 
countries with a national competitive disadvantage. Counties plagued by the ‘natural 
resource curse’ (chapter 3.16.4 The ‘natural resource curse’ or ‘oil curse’) continue to 
                                                 
672 http://www.cipe.org/publications/ert/e22/E22_05.pdf 1-6-07 
673 Q7C. Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 
 
674 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruption.html 27-4-07 
675 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm 26-4-07 
676 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #19, ORG 408 Compendium 2  
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see FDI’s but they are limited, often excavation and extraction only with no value 
adding which would create much needed jobs and revenue. 
 
• Corruption increases the cost of doing business and small and medium size businesses 
usually carry a disproportionably large burden. These businesses usually play a key 
role in future of developing and transitional economies677. 
 
• Corruption causes environmental destruction. Regulations protecting the environment 
can often be circumvented by bribing inspectors or buying ‘permits’, to allow for 
logging rainforests678, burying toxic waste (Koko Beach incident)679 etc. 
 
• As stated it also creates poverty, just as poverty creates (petty) corruption. It increases 
costs for ordinary people and renders countries less competitive and attractive in the 
eyes of much needed foreign capital. Husted says “it appears that some sort of mutual 
causation may exist between income inequality and corruption”680. 
 
George Moody-Stuart quotes the Anglo-Irish Statesman Edmund Burke who already in 1777 
recognized that “among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot long exist”. Moody-Stuart 
holds “he might almost have had fore-knowledge of the situation in many African, Asian and 
Latin American countries two centuries later, with the serious danger of several former Soviet 
Union countries following the same path”681. 
 
The World Bank’s 1997 Development Report found that “the consequences of corruption 
often do not end with paying off officials and getting on with business. Government 
arbitrariness entangles firms in a web of time-consuming and economically unproductive 
relations”682 further adding to corrupt counties competitive disadvantage. 
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3.16.3 Is corruption a part of Culture?  
When speaking of corruption in culture we should make the distinction between culture and 
personal moral. Corruption is usually a part of the latter. When a poor and deprived people 
attempt to get some ‘grease money’ it’s not due to lack of moral and to enrich themselves, it’s 
to relieve suffering – it’s out of despair and not out of greed. Grand corruption on the other 
hand is usually connected to greed. Insufficient institutional frameworks may allow it to 
happen, but it’s seldom accepted in the society683. The populous as a whole are victims as 
they only feel the adverse effects of it, as the World Bank observed.  
 
In answer to Q5684 on whether corruption is more a product of bad moral or insufficient legal 
frameworks the answers differed greatly. This finding implies that it is in fact some mixture 
of both: 
 
• 2 respondents found it to be due to lacking legal frameworks  
• 2 respondents found it to be due to lacking legal frameworks - which also facilitate 
bad moral 
• 1 respondent found it to be both lacking legal frameworks and bad moral 
• 2 respondents found corruption to be more a product of bad moral 
 
In essence, 2 ½ votes where cast for bad moral as the cause, while 4 ½ cast for insufficient 
legal frameworks – which in turn could serve to fuel bad moral. 
 
While grease money or petty corruption in some places are customary and accepted (and 
consequently can be argued by others to be a property of some cultures) we should perhaps 
refrain from calling it corruption – and refer to it as greasing. The rationale behind this line of 
reasoning is two-fold. Firstly, if we where to refer to greasing as corruption we would brand a 
lot of cultures corrupt. This is very demeaning and at times untrue. Grand corruption is never 
acceptable even if existing institutions just might not be able to properly target and eradicate 
it. Secondly, but perhaps even more importantly branding a culture corrupt would allow us to 
justify engaging in corruption685! Acceptance of corruption as a part of a culture would allow 
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(Western) companies while doing business in ‘corrupt countries’ to utilize corruption at will 
and not search for other option686. This would be a self-enforcing spiral.  
 
Q8M687 of the questionnaire asked is we should refrain from referring to certain greasing 
payments as corruption for just this cause. It received a multitude of different answers and 
opinions: 
 
• 3 respondents agreed, maintaining that this is “a possible angle of approach” (R7) and 
“there is a difference between greasing (smaller amounts) and corruption and [that] 
greasing should not be called corruption” (R6). 
• 3 respondents disagree, and argued that corruption should be called by name (R1, R3 
and R5) 
• 1 respondent is curious and instinctively positive but fearing that those wanting to 
exploit this would get too good an opportunity to do so. Consequently, he doesn’t 
think this approach is possible (R2). 
 
The field is divided, with 4 (one reluctant) rejecting this proposition and 3 approving of the 
idea. How it is to be implemented, if at all possible is another matter.  
 
With regards to whether or not corruption is a part of their (Arab) culture (Q8H688) only one 
did not agree (R6), at least not in the case of the UAE. Another (R1) did only “agree to some 
extent” while noting that “networks and personal favors are more like paying respect”. The 
remaining five agreed. This doesn’t fit with the claim otherwise put forth in this thesis – that 
corruption is in fact not a part of a culture. A possible source of error here might be different 
perceptions of culture. In discussion R1 also suggest that to the practitioners it’s more the way 
of life, they face on a day to day basis, while in certain academia it’s a theoretical construct 
where certain undesirable properties (like corruption) is explained by other means and 
maintained to be outside the ‘collective’ programming - since it’s theorized not to condone 
such practice. Also certain academia’s might credit the ‘collective’ with a more extensive 
understanding of corruption, its adverse effects and a greater desire for justice and 
                                                 
686 Ljunggren and Magnussen (1998) p. 49 
687 Q8M. If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will only help 
legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to avoid acceptance of corruption greasing 
payments should not be called corruption. 
688 Q8H. Corruption is a part of their culture. 
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righteousness - than that ‘collective’ in fact holds. He also emphasized that even if closely 
linked, theory and practice at times keep their distance. 
3.16.4 The ‘natural resource curse’ or ‘oil curse’ 
A serious contributor to corruption is the ‘oil trap’689 or ‘oil curse’690. Transparency 
International’s Quarterly Newsletter (TIQ), discusses and explains the phenomenon in their 
Special Report on Corruption and Oil691. The product of this curse is the unfortunate reality 
that counties reliant on petrodollars692 face poverty, deprivation and political turmoil or 
oppression. 
 
“TI points out that countries dependent on petroleum revenues for their livelihood 
(with the notable exception of Norway) are among the most economically troubled, the 
most authoritarian, and/or the most conflict-ridden in the world. This is true across 
regions – in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Oil-exporting countries 
grow more slowly than non-oil rich countries over time”
693
. 
 
“But corruption explains only part of the oil trap. Oil wealth is one of the hardest 
resources to utilize well. This is because states living from rents (‘profits reaped’, in 
Adam Smith’s words, “by those who did not sow”) are especially susceptible to policy 
failure. Economists attribute this to the ‘resource curse’, referring to the inverse 
association between economic growth and natural resource dependence”
694
. 
 
The report’s refers to this not only as an ‘oil curse’ but also a ‘natural resource curse’, 
recognizing that problem is not limited to oil; precious metals and gems are also a source of 
much suffering. Falkenberg point to Pogge’s (2001) finding that there is in fact a “slight 
negative correlation between developing countries’ resource endowments and their rates of 
growth” 695 and holds that today’s oil and diamond exports, while important “is in some ways 
reminiscent of the slave trade of the past”696. 
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Time’s ‘Africa’s Oil Dreams article697 holds that oil in the Middle East has fueled “corruption 
rather than development” and created a “combustible mix of great wealth, relative poverty, 
grievance and instability”.  
 
In the 2006 blockbuster Blood Diamond698, an old man, obviously vary of this relationship 
say: “we better pray they never find oil here. Then we’ll have real problems”699, while his 
village is being burning to the ground. 
 
3.16.5 Political causes for corruption 
While TI’s Global Corruption Report (GC) 2006 of the Gulf Arab states only includes Kuwait 
in its country specific reporting’s, it has still got some interesting findings. 
 
In late 2004 former Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah 
emphasized that combating corruption had become a key issue for his government700. He 
criticized the municipal sector in particular. A report by the Citizens Services and 
Governmental Bodies Assessment Agency (C2G) had found that the most common types of 
corruption was bribery and favoritism, and found that the most vulnerable government sectors 
(to corruption) were those working with public contracts and procurement.  
 
One of the cause TI points to is the sheer size of the Kuwaiti public sector, it employs 94 % of 
the labor force and consequently give officials a monopoly in a wide range of areas701. Husted 
quotes LaPalombara (1994, p. 338) that when disregarding Scandinavian countries “a rough 
positive correlation does exist between how much of the GDP a government gets its hands on 
and how much corruption exists”702. He then hypothesizes (3) that “the larger the 
governments share of the GDP, the higher the level of corruption in the country”703. 
Extensive and unchallenged public sectors are commonplace in the Middle East 
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(national/nationalized Oil Companies, Airlines etc included). The C2G report finally 
concluded that “political corruption lies at the heart of corruption”704.  
 
The report found several deficiencies in the administrative framework that in effect allow for 
corruption705: 
 
• Lack of accountability by leaders and politicians 
• Absence of a code of conduct and work ethics 
• Absence of deterrents 
• Lack of meritocracy 
• Poor scrutiny of managers and officials 
 
The report also notes several advances in combating corruption such as an anti-corruption 
police force being established and some high-profile arrests and prosecutions being made706. 
Yet it questions the real effectiveness of this, TI suggest that it might be a case of ‘blame 
without responsibility’ and more recent studies do suggest that much of this is in fact window 
dressing, as there has been repeated failures in achieving any real advances in curbing official 
corruption707. 
 
Still, there is an understanding of what must be done, but without democracy and a real 
opposition (no competition or challengers) there seems to be insufficient will and ability to 
meet these tough challenges head on708.  
 
According to George Moody-Stuart this isn’t particularly surprising as “it is not obvious that 
corrupt ministers and officials cannot allow free speech and a free press to expose their 
activities; nor can they allow a parliamentary opposition to do so. At the same time the wealth 
proceeding from grand corruption can play a significant part in enabling corrupt politicians to 
remain in power - by corrupt means”709. 
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Metaphorically Klitgaard et al (2000) suggests the following cause of corruption710: 
 
C = M + D – A 
 
“If someone has monopoly (M) power over a good or service and has the discretion 
(D) to decide whether someone gets that good or service or how much a person 
receives, and there is no accountability (A), then we will tend to find corruption (C).”
  
 
The accountability factor could also be understood as transparency (A = T)711. 
 
Klitgaard et al also hold that corruption is a crime of calculation, not of passion. So when the 
risks of getting caught are low, the penalties mild and the possible rewards high – people are 
more inclined to resort to corruption712. This is the case throughout the Gulf Arab states. The 
obvious question is therefore: under similar circumstances, does what’s shown to promote 
corruption (in Kuwait), also corrupt others? 
 
Ljunggren and Magnussen713 suggest that we view corruption in rich industrialized counties 
(basically the West) as a question of lacking moral (facilitated by insufficiently 
comprehensive institutional barriers) and in the less developed countries (basically the 
developing and third world) as a problem with lacking institutions. 
 
The Arab Gulf states are quickly entering the rich industrialized category. This suggests that 
corruption should face tougher legal barriers and increasingly should be viewed as a case of 
lacking morals. Several respondents already point to this fact in their reply to Q5714. One 
respondent (R1) also points to the fact that while not perceiving Arab countries to have a 
lower moral than the western countries “some moral standards in Islam may be ‘outdated’ 
related to modern way of life and therefore can create double standards (what is said to be 
right and what is practiced in the society)”. The latter remark is highly reminiscent of 
Hofstede’s understanding that Islam in some ways has difficulty coping with modernity715. 
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3.16.6 Corruption around the world 
TI is perhaps most famous for their annual “Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which 
measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and 
politicians”716. 
 
A score of 10.0 indicates a country is squeaky clean while 5.0 is the number TI considers 
borderline in distinguishing countries that have a serious corruption problem717. Although non 
of the counties in focus belong to the poor countries category all the Gulf Arab states receives 
scores between 3,3 (Saudi Arabia, 2006) and 6,2 (the UAE, 2006) while the Scandinavian 
countries score between 8,8 (Norway, 2006) and a stable 9,5 (Denmark, 2001-2006) – 
considerably better.  
 
Country CPI718 
Denmark 9,5 
Sweden 9,2 
Norway 8,8 
UAE 6,2 
Qatar 6 
Bahrain 5,7 
Oman 5,4 
Kuwait 4,8 
Saudi Arabia 3,3 
Table 10 – TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2006 
 
On a more critical note, Special Advisor to the Norwegian aid agency; NORAD (a major TI 
donor) Eva Joly, while applauding the impact the CPI has had in putting corruption on the 
international agenda, is critical of the fact or statement that “in countries that have a lot of 
focus on corruption like Norway, will automatically drop on the index, compared for instance 
with Finland or Sweden where they are talking less about it. But that does not mean that there 
is less corruption” 719. The fact that Norway has vast petroleum reserves and is heavily 
                                                 
716 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_corruption 26-4-07 
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involved with an industry traditionally vulnerable to corruption is also likely to have an 
impact720. 
 
In 2006 163 of the world’s 193 counties are ranked, absent are the 30 counties where TI was 
unable to retrieve reliable data721. Among these we find tax havens722 like723 the Cayman 
Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, the Maldives, Liechtenstein, Anguilla and Bermuda which 
both Eva Joly724 and Falkenberg725 hold must be dealt with in order to get to corruption. She 
holds that tax haven’s holding of criminal money hiders the fight against corruption726. Also 
absent we find a completely different set of counties; the Central African Republic, East 
Timor, North Korea and Togo – all of which undoubtedly are plagued by corruption issues. 
 
When presented with a global CPI map a distinct trend in visible; the West (including 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan) is relatively clean while the others less so. What these 
scores don’t show is who’s actually paying the bribes in these corrupt counties. The index 
basically measures the public sector; implicitly those that accept bribes and not those who 
may offer them. Hence virtually corruption-free counties may very well have export industries 
heavily involved in corruption and that would only manifest itself in the recipients’ score727. 
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Figure 23 – TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) map
728
 
 
If compare this to the Economic Freedom and GDP per capita maps729 we can see a distinct 
pattern - corruption follow restriction and poverty730. 
 
The questionnaire’s Q1731 asked if these scores seemed reasonable to the respondents, and all 
but one replied “yes”. The final respondent (R2) was expecting Scandinavia to show a higher 
level of corruption (lower CPI score). In Q2732 the same respondent (R2) commented that his 
expectancy that corruption would relate to what he regarded as openness in a society was 
seemed to hold. In reply to Q3733 all the respondents agreed – corruption is present in the 
region. In Q4734 all but one (R6) agreed corruption also is a problem in the region. This 
respondent (R6) didn’t perceive this to be the case. His answer might perhaps be understood 
better when read alongside his statement in Q8M735 that “greasing should not be called 
corruption”. The fact that he has lived and worked in the UAE for more than 30 years – might 
also suggest that he is highly adept at working with the local customs. 
                                                 
728 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Corruption_Perceptions_Index_2006.png 26-4-07 
729 Chapter 3.6 Measures of a Land 
730 Slides supplied by Andreas W. Falkenberg 2007.  “Branding MBA 2007.ppt” 16-4-07 
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732 Q2. Do you perceive corruption to be a ‘taboo’ issue in the region? 
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734 Q4. Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
735 Q8M. If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will only help 
legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to avoid acceptance of corruption greasing 
payments should not be called corruption. 
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As stated, a shortcoming of the CPI is its inability to detect who is paying the bribes. Five of 
the respondents wholeheartedly agreed with Q8A’s736 statement that “the person paying the 
bribe just as guilty as the person taking it”. Two respondents (R2 and R5) remained hesitant, 
since they believed that in some cases one is simply forced to resort to corruption – even if 
one doesn’t want to. When asked if Western companies are just as much to blame for the 
Middle East’s corruption problems as their own officials (Q8B737) most agreed. One 
respondent (R2) made the comment that to his opinion it was much the case of Westerners 
having brought with them or developed a custom or culture which communicated well with 
the Bedouin traditions of doing favors and paying tributes. Coupled with a myriad of more or 
less good intentions this had developed into some of the bad customs we sometimes witness 
in the Middle East today.  
 
Q8C738 suggest that Western companies are just as bad as the local. All but one respondent 
(R5) agree to this (R7 did not to answer Q8C). 
 
Another factor not showing up on the CPI is the utilization of ‘black labor’, which in at least 
Norway is all too common739. This could easily be argued to fit within a definition of 
corruption (e.g. a carpenter or a mechanic using his or her position to offer black labor and in 
effect conspiring with a customer to deprive their society of tax revenue). 
 
3.16.7 Explanations in cultural studies 
Hofstede found corruption to be linked to quite a few of his cultural dimensions.  
 
Most notably high-PDI seem to be followed by a predisposition for corruption as willingness 
to accept a bribe in the line of duty correlates strongly with PDI740, and basic economics 
suggest that (any) demand tend to be meet by supply.  
 
                                                 
736 Q8A. The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it. 
737 Q8B. Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western companies are just as 
much to blame for is as local officials 
738 Q8C. Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local companies. 
739 http://forbruker.no/pengenedine/skattogpensjon/article1413455.ece and 
http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2006/10/20/480339.html 31-5-07 
740 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 99 
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Husted argues741 that “in high power-distance countries there is considerable dependence of 
subordinates on their superiors in the form of paternalism. Paternalism is a system by which 
superiors provide favors to subordinates in return for their loyalty. Decisions are not made on 
the basis of merit, but on the basis of a balance of favors and loyalty. A paternalistic system 
thus leaves considerable room for corruption in the form of favoritism and nepotism”. Also 
“private laws for superiors are more normal in high-PDI cultures”742, this would allow for 
more misuse of power and position and unsurprisingly, the public’s confidence in for instance 
the police suffers because of it743. The notion that the local societies in the Middle East has 
certain elite classes which are subject to private laws (Q8F744) making them able to participate 
in certain corrupt activities (Q8G745), is supported by six of seven respondents. The single 
respondent (R6) not agreeing answers that “in Dubai the laws are the same for all”, and 
implicitly chooses not to dismiss this idea with regards to the rest of the region.  
 
While there is dispute about data (or lack there of) backing up the worst side of Lord Acton’s 
saying746 “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” the tendency is 
plain to see. One could speculate that this lack of data is related to what TI meet in some of 
the 30 countries they were unable to rank. All the respondents agreed with Lord Acton’s 
statement (Q8L747), although R1 held it could possibly be offset by moral, cultural or religious 
values. 
 
In relation to MAS Husted speculates that “one would expect that this focus on material 
success would, in some cases, lead to a greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions in the pursuit of material success”748. Vitell et al749 also “predict that countries 
high in masculinity will be less likely to perceive ethical issues in business practices than 
practitioners from countries with low levels of masculinity”. A higher tolerance in the 
perception of ethical issues in questionable business practices would create more space for 
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practitioners to accept corrupt practices. Husted’s speculation is put to the test in Q8E750 and 
supported by most of the respondents. 
 
Van de Vliert et al (1999)751 suggests that the cold and feminine countries (of Scandinavia) 
ought to be (very) peaceful while the hot and moderately masculine countries (of the Middle 
East) ought to be moderate-to-high on violence. If we extend this idea to the political arena 
we would find tougher and more decisive (both masculine values) politicians, which as Vitell 
et al argues are less likely to feel bound by ethics752 and more willing to use corruption as a 
means to escape poverty for themselves753. 
 
Corruption was also found to be positively linked to UAI, simply because corruption is often 
intended to be a tool used to reduce uncertainty, pay a little on the side and be more certain of 
the (desired) outcome754. While there among the respondents is a lackluster tendency to agree 
with this (Q8I755), the language is vaguer and the disruptive (adverse) effects of corruption are 
pointed to. One dismisses it entirely and two choose not to answer to it.  
 
Husted’s (1999)756 put forth seven hypothesis’ about corruption and their relations to factors 
what we’ve looked at extensively:  
 
H1. The higher the level of economic development, the lower the level of corruption in a 
country. 
H2. The greater the inequality in the distribution of income, the higher the level of 
corruption in a country.  
H3. The larger the government's share of GDP, the higher the level of corruption in the 
country.  
H4. The higher the power distance in a country, the higher the level of corruption in a 
country.  
H5. The less individualistic (more collectivistic) a society, the higher the level of 
corruption in a country.  
                                                 
750 Q8E. Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt transactions. 
751 Van de Vliert, E. (1999) p. 303 
752 Husted, B. W. (1999) 
753 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 113 
754 Husted, B. W. (1999) 
755 Q8I. Corruption leads to predictability. 
756 Husted, B. W. (1999) 
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H6. The greater the masculinity of a culture, the higher the level of corruption in a country.  
H7. The greater the level of uncertainty avoidance in a nation, the higher the level of 
corruption.  
 
Husted found757 only the first hypothesis (H1) measured by GDP (PPP) per capita to be 
significantly correlated to corruption. PDI (H4), MAS (H6) and UAI (H7) were found to be 
significantly correlated only at a 0.10 level. The remaining hypotheses were not significantly 
correlated. 
 
Of course there are more factors to corruption but as a general trend Hofstede still found this 
(MAS) to be partly accurate across the poorer countries758, where corruption is also found to 
be a lot more present. 
 
 
Finally IDV is found not to be a significant variable in corruption759. Hofstede holds that IDV 
is perhaps driven by national wealth760 which we’ve found to be closely linked to freedom 
from corruption (amongst most other forms of economic freedom). However low-IDV is 
usually associated with a slower pace of life (and less concern with punctuality) and that is 
often typical of business culture in societies beset by corruption761. 
 
3.16.8 The international legal battle against corruption 
In the legislative battle on the international arena the United States with its Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977762 started the ball rolling. Since then the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), of which the Scandinavian countries are among the 
founding members763, has entered the scene with its own initiative on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions764. This is currently in the 
process of being implemented in no less than 36 counties765. More recently the UN 
                                                 
757 Husted, B. W. (1999) 
758 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 322 
759 Husted, B. W. (1999) 
760 Hofstede, G. (2001) p. 253 
761 Ljunggren and Magnussen (1998) p. 47 
762 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_Act 26-4-07 
763 http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html 26-4-07 
764 http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,2340,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html 26-4-07 
765 http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,2340,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html 26-4-07 
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Convention against Corruption766 has come into effect, it includes measures intended to 
prevent and criminalize corruption, to increase international cooperation and aid in asset 
recovery767. It is signed by all the Arab Gulf states except Oman. It’s currently ratified by 
Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE768. All Scandinavian counties have also signed it and passed it 
into law769. 
 
Another important initiative is the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative), while 
voluntary participation is touted as advantageous for several reasons770:  
 
“Benefits to companies and investors centre on mitigating political and reputational 
risks. Political instability caused by opaque governance is a clear threat to 
investments. In extractive industries, where investments are capital intensive and 
dependent on long-term stability to generate returns, reducing such instability is 
beneficial. Transparency of payments made to a government can also help to 
demonstrate the contribution that their investment makes to a country”. 
 
Corruption is illegal and as a result of these measures violations can/could be persecuted (e.g. 
Statoil’s corrupt practice in Iran was persecuted in both Norway and the United States where 
they are publicly listed, by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)). Yet, due to a 
lack of transparency (and in some places legislation), in a large part of the world offenders 
many still go free771. Another problem is the offenders – some of them are enormous 
companies with the clot and assets to circumvent and fight prosecution. 
 
When the respondents were asked if they thought a company should commit to full 
transparency in order to aid the combating of corruption (Q6772), all but one favored this idea. 
It was also commented that: 
 
• Cultural relativism might run one into trouble [as we today can retrieve information 
from e.g. Saudi Arabia without going there, staying there and seeing that reality] (R1) 
                                                 
766 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_convention_corruption.html 27-4-07 
767 http://www.u4.no/themes/uncac/main.cfm 27-4-07 
768 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_signatures_corruption.html 27-4-07 
769 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_signatures_corruption.html 27-4-07 
770 http://www.eitransparency.org/section/abouteiti/benefits 28-4-07 
771 Save the Children (2005) p. 3 and Ljunggren and Magnussen (1998) p. 101 
772 Q6. In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency (publish earning and 
spending) in order to combat corruption? 
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• In this day and age (computer age) we ought to be able to make it more difficult to get 
away with (R2) 
• Even with full transparency, some would still find ways to continue as before and 
avoiding capture (R3) 
• It’s already commonplace in Dubai (R6) 
• It should still allow for greasing-payments (R7) 
 
The hesitant (R5) couldn’t picture it having much effect, as a western company couldn’t 
change anything or gain anything by it. In answer to Q7D773 he still maintained transparency 
was a key element in combating corruption, but obviously holds that a (single) company 
doesn’t hold the required clout to pull it of.  
  
 
Table 11 – The World Bank's Multipronged Strategy for Combating Corruption
774
 
 
                                                 
773 Q7D. Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 
774 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/helpingcountries.pdf figure 3.1 p. 22 28-4-07 
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The World Bank “views good governance and anti-corruption as central to its poverty 
alleviation mission”775 and proposes a multipronged strategy for combating corruption, with 
transparency (public oversight), better institutions and policy. The World Bank states that 
these must work in concert to be truly effective. 
 
Unfortunately, there is still a loophole in the form of tax-havens. This is something there 
seems to be little willingness to address and they continue to allow companies and persons to 
stay detached from (illegal) assets776. 
 
Some numbers on and facts about tax-havens – according to Falkenberg777: 
 
• Gives safety for economic and political corruption  
• Enables ’white washing’ of money ($ 1500 billion) for criminals 
• Capital flight, tax evasion, financing of terrorism 
• More than 1/3 of worlds GDP $ 11 000 billion 
• More than 50% of world trade ($ 7 000 billion) is channeled through tax havens 
• Over 150 000 firms are registered in tax havens each year  
• Over one million organizations in all  
 
3.16.8 How do we conduct ourselves when faced with corruption 
We’ve introduced some factors contributing to corruption and pointed to some measures 
(chiefly: transparency and legislative measures) that can be taken to curb it. But these are to 
some extent only macro and messo factors. The fight against corruption must also be taken to 
the micro level. 
 
We will work with the (perhaps overly simplistic and trusting) assumption that we do not 
condone or accept any kind of corruption – disregarding some greasing payment and what is 
customary relations building. Where this is not the case, more knowledge and research into 
the implication of corruption and its adverse affects on people in general should be acquired. 
                                                 
775 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,menuPK:1740542~pagePK:
64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1740530,00.html  2-5-07 
776 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #19, ORG 408 Compendium 2 
777 Falkenberg, A. W. (2006) Essay #19, ORG 408 Compendium 2 
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Consequently, we will have to resist what we perceive to be pressure to corrupt ourselves 
from local officials and/or competitors. 
 
What is often the case when coming from a professionalized business climates to a relations’ 
based business climate is that we lack the relationships (and trust) required and the time to 
gain it. So true to own customs (based on our beliefs about ‘their’ culture) we try to rush the 
relationship process by offering something under the table778. Gifts and favors, which are very 
much a component in building bonds and contacts (also in Scandinavia) can often, turn into 
bribes779. A large share of the bribes paid in international deals seems to be due to 
misunderstandings due to lack of cultural and local understanding780.  
 
All of Q7 in the questionnaire is intended to reveal how much, in the respondents own 
opinion, corruption has to do with the following: 
 
Figure 24 – How much does corruption have to do with… 
 
                                                 
778 Ljunggren and Magnussen (1998) p. 47 
779 Ljunggren and Magnussen (1998) p. 48 
780 Morrison, T. et al (2001) p. 330 and Ljunggren and Magnussen (1998) p. 48 
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To be shown graphically the answers have here been edited and coded to fit a 5-point likert 
scale.  
 
The fact that local knowledge is a difficult measure when locals actually constitute a minority 
in their own land is also pointed to (R6, Q7A). One responded (R5, Q7C) also holds that time 
is not an issue as “here we have plenty of time”. Another respondent (R2, Q7A-D) suggest 
that greed is in fact the strongest driver behind corruption. 
 
Still the respondents overwhelmingly point to a lack of transparency as a key issue - with the 
other factors all making more limited contributions.  
 
If we want to locate (for the purpose of irradiating) corruption in our organization we could 
do a vulnerability assessment to in order to better focus our resources in the search for 
corruption (we still work with the assumption that we, nor our agents aren’t actively seeking 
to corrupt ourselves)781: 
 
• Is the general environment or industry permissive of corruption? 
• Is there an inherent risk of corruption associated with the activity? 
• Then, look for factors like degree of centralization, vagueness of mission, complexity 
of task, size of project, prior evidence of illicit activity etc.  
 
When the answers one or more of these are: high, very, large or yes we have conditions 
suitable for corruption and our level of alertness should be elevated. 
 
 
Then there are many ways in which we can try to curb corruption within an organization. 
Klitgaard et al782 suggests focusing on selecting the right agents (employees) and incentive 
systems, transparency and raising the moral cost of corruption.  
 
Save the Children’s 2005 report on transparency in the oil and gas industry783 suggest a clear 
company policy on transparency, working collaboratively with others to achieve it while 
actively engaging with the EITI and improving anti-corruption/whistle-blowing systems. 
                                                 
781 Klitgaard, R. et al (2000) p. 59 
782 Klitgaard, R. et al (2000) pp. 37-39 
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3.16.9 Measures to combat corruption 
According to the line of reasoning presented here some key elements in combating corruption 
in an organization could be: 
 
1. Trust and relationships. Trust can’t be brought and relationships can’t be rushed. 
Information is power. Spend the necessary time and do the homework – know who 
you’re courting and their customs. This is a key element in competitiveness in any 
business climate and in particular in relations oriented ones. 
 
2. Publicly committing to full transparency will discourage employees trying to cut 
corners by corruption, it should offset some pressure to corrupt by others and it can be 
an excuse for not yielding to such pressure. Transparency is as discusses the only 
really effective deterrent against corruption because it makes it difficult to get away 
with (and even those lacking in moral will fear the wrath of the law).  
 
3. Some places (lacking) institutions and common practice will leave us exposed to 
corrupting forces – both the CPI and the ‘resource curse’ infer that this is the case in 
Middle East. When operating there we consequently need a more stringent company 
policy regarding corruption. 
 
Institutions to combat corruption are in many places in place, but national (messo) and 
international (macro) institutions, investigators and prosecutors are confined to playing by a 
set of rules the offenders all too often can circumvent.  
 
This is where working with NGO’s like TI and initiatives like the EITI to combating 
corruption becomes so essential. These act as watchdogs784 in our society and can launch 
attacks where others (for political or strategic reasons) can’t. Because of the activities of the 
NGO’s amongst others organizations need to know if they are operation in violation of basic 
                                                                                                                                                        
783 Save the Children (2005) p. 3 
784 Falkenberg, A. W. (2004) p. 23 
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moral principles785. Reliance, solely on local conventions and institutions are insufficient in 
guiding us through all the shady places of the world786.  
 
Key learning: In an Arab setting: Gifts and gestures (some form of favoritism) are common, 
expected and full culturally accepted. But these traditions were never intended for some of the 
situations and challenges they face today. Some of these challenges are lack of transparency, 
time and local knowledge together with greed, sometimes bring out the worst in people – 
from both cultures. When unopposed by insufficient institutional frameworks, corruption 
including bribery, favoritism and nepotism can thrive. Corruption can seriously damage the 
quality of life of the ordinary citizen and in particular the most venerable members of a 
society. Grand corruption can also destroy nations and where rampant there is no way to 
controlling petty corruption. The ‘oil curse’ and corruption has throughout the Arab Gulf 
states created a “combustible mix of great wealth, relative poverty, grievance and instability”. 
 
Advice:  
1. Be cognizant of the damage corruption does to a society 
2. Be cognizant of the ‘oil curse’ – and how it works 
3. Build trust and relationships – in such a relations based economy that’s a massive 
advantage. This cannot be bought (even if certain outcomes can). 
4. Publicly commit to full transparency. 
5. Develop and indoctrinate a company policy and a code of conduct. 
6. Be alert (C = M + D – A) 
 
 
4.0 Summary of findings 
The work presented through this thesis gives a lot of suggestion, rules and approaches on how 
to act, react and adapt when working across cultures. They have all been used to highlight 
intricacies we as Scandinavians are likely to encounter on our adventures to the Middle East – 
and in particular to the Arab Gulf states. These advices draw not just on theories of culture, 
institutions, ethics and justice but also on the heritages of them. These are in turn derived 
from history, philosophy – including religion and geography.  
                                                 
785 Falkenberg, A. W. (2004) p. 25 
786 Falkenberg, A. W. (2004) p. 25 
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Throughout the Muslim world, which the Arab Gulf states constitute a large and very 
influential part of, religion has made a substantial imprint on society. Whereas Christianity 
has matured considerably under the scrutiny of philosophy, this has not been the case in 
Islam. In Islam theology has dominated philosophy. This difference is evident in numerous 
ways, not at least in Islam’s inherent difficulty in coping with modernity. To Westerners this 
makes Islam often seem dated and crude. In terms of permissiveness it also seriously lags 
modern interpretation of Christianity. In terms of punishment it condones ways that to us can 
seem both unfamiliar and cruel. Still Muslims much prefer their ways as we do ours. It’s their 
opinion that Islam and it’s legacy has helped them avert what’s perceived to be the Western or 
Christian world’s value crisis, as well as social and environmental problems. But where Islam 
has helped avoid some problems it can be argued that it has facilitated others. Most of the 
Middle East (with the notable exception of Israel) is governed by what are in fact totalitarian 
governments. This can largely be attributed to their cultural heritage and in particular to 
Islam.  
 
In the name of Islam and its conservation many freedoms are also reigned in. Similarly, 
problems with corruption and oppression are also much more widespread in countries ruled 
by totalitarian governments with the Arab Gulf states are no exception. Historically, the 
Middle East has for several millennia been an important region. The Middle East is the cradle 
of both Christianity and Islam (as well as Judaism). Geographically, the Middle East is 
situated between the East and the West. Thought the ages, this location has also served to 
influences both it – and us, through trade and travel but also through war and conflict.  
 
History, geography and philosophy (including religion) are the three pillars what Falkenberg 
refers to as the foundation of people’s cultural values. These cultural values in turn help us 
distinguish between right, moral, what is wanted, useful, expected and desirable – and what is 
not. Cultural values are also what lawmakers, regulators, markets and organizations draw on 
when setting standards for what we can accept and what we seek to denounce.  
 
Through these channels cultural values underpin the institutions we create in order to govern 
and maintain our societies. Our institutions consist of our norms, values, laws and regulations. 
In terms of institutions we distinguish between three operational levels: micro, messo and 
macro. They are cultural, national (governmental) and international (regional) levels. Any 
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dealing between two cultures will thus be subject to five sets of institutions, our local micro 
and messo levels, the macro level and the their messo and micro level. 
 
Differences in geographical, historic, philosophical and religious origins and heritages tend to 
manifest throughout cultures values. There these pillars closely resemble another, cultural 
values also tend to – and then they differ, cultural values also tend to differ. Differences in 
values will also inevitably lead us to develop different institutions. At its base, the legs of a 5-
degree acute angle don’t differ too much. But as we progress further outwards the difference 
becomes larger and larger. Eventually, it will be massive. Fortunately, institutions tend not to 
follow such a linear example, the analogy still being applicable.  
 
Culture as a rule show both great resilience and inertia. Attempts to quickly change a culture 
almost always result in grief and suffering. Hofstede holds that cultural differences are more 
likely to be a source of nuisance than of synergy - and that such differences can be even 
disastrous. Cognizant of this and of the fact that culture isn’t readily changed, we are left only 
two options: Avoid it by choosing not to interact or learn to make the best of it, and perhaps 
be able to leverage it and extract some synergies.  
 
Awareness of institutions and local culture are great aids when doing business in foreign 
corners of the world. It is still to be observed that institutions, while usually well intended by 
those that established them, also could have adverse effects on others.  
 
In a democracy, institutions will tend to reflect the minds and hearts of the people living there, 
since institutions that doesn’t - usually will be replaced. A democratically elected government 
will see to that – or they will see themselves out of office. Where we don’t have democracies 
it’s often more a game of change. The world’s most impoverished and oppressed countries 
usually have a long history of rule by dictators and despots enriching themselves at the 
expense of their people.  
 
The Arab Gulf states are ruled by totalitarian governments and not their populations. Those 
establishing the institutions represent only a small, select group – the elite. They are 
hereditary rulers; in power for life. Their nation’s wealth is also often their personal wealth. 
Very often this arrangement will spell certain doom – as many unfortunate countries have 
experiences. While Saudi Arabia is a clear laggard of this group, in particular with regards to 
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their coping with modernity, the Arab Gulf states have all been blessed with wise and 
visionary leaders. They have all faced some difficulties and there are challenges yet to 
overcome. Compared to other non-democratic countries, rich in natural resources, there is still 
no doubt that they have come very far, very quickly. 
 
Among problems yet to overcome are those relating to justice and ethics. Institutions are not 
always just. This is the case in Scandinavia, but even more so in the Middle East. We’ve 
presented three perspectives on ethics. These are through utilitarianism, human rights and 
justice. These perspectives offer a frame by which we can measure institutions. They intend to 
ensure the greatest good for the greatest number, that human rights and the principles of the 
Good are honored. 
 
Based on this – a series of suggestions and words of advice are proposed: 
 
Religion: 
• Know that a Muslim Arab is first a Muslim, then a national of i.e. Kuwait. 
• The Arab Gulf states cannot be understood without some understanding of Islam. 
• Islam is not just a religion; it’s also the origin of much of Arab culture, values, laws 
and justice. 
• In Islamic culture theology has dominated philosophy and not adapted much to the 
scrutiny of philosophy. Consequently, to a Scandinavian Islam can seem crude and 
unfair even though it was intended to be egalitarian and benevolent. 
• Islam to Westerners seems to have difficulty coping with modernity. 
• To many Arabs the Western societies have lost their way. Their values crisis’ and 
social troubles are things Arabs want no part of. 
• To Muslims Islam is the true and only faith. 
• Scheduling business during Ramadan is a mixed bag. During Eid it’s recommended 
not to. Do also observe and respect prayer times and Fridays (and often Saturdays) as 
not working-days. 
 
History: 
• Much of the Arab tradition is still Bedouin at heart, famili-ist values. Arab hospitality 
is therefore still at a high level. 
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• Historically national borders have not existed. 
• There is no history of democracy. 
 
Communication: 
• There are more components to communication than language. 
 
Culture: 
• “Culture is more a source of conflict than synergy…”. 
• It’s not always easy to distinguish between universal human programming, culture and 
personality. 
• Cultural values are deeply embedded in a society and they are usually fit for that 
society (not random). Values derived in Scandinavia may in fact be wrong in the Arab 
Gulf states. 
 
Institutions: 
• A moral compass is time and place dependent and not to be followed blindly. 
• Institutions are more than laws and regulations; it’s also norms and values. 
• Institutions are at times inadequate and thus not to be followed blindly. 
 
Moral reasoning: 
• Institutions should be checked for against perspectives on universal ethics: 
utilitarianism, human rights and justice. 
• Universal ethics must always trump mundane institutions.  
• If an agreement cannot be reached that enables us to conduct business in a ‘just’ 
manner we should respectfully decline. A wise and honorable man or woman should 
respect that another cannot go through with a transaction for matters of conscience. 
• If we suspect we are not opposite an honorable man, we are perhaps at the wrong 
table. 
 
 
Information and understanding are important components to wisdom, and with wisdom we 
will be better able to meet challenges to which there are no apparent solutions. Consequently, 
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the more knowledge and the more understanding we process the better suited we will be at 
navigating unfamiliar settings. 
 
The five selected cultural dimensions used to contrast societies are not exhaustive but still 
offers a perspective and a systems where we can plot many practically findings. A great deal 
of our two society’s differences can be plotted against these five dimensions. They enable us 
to locate rather predictable patterns in societies from pheromones that could otherwise have 
been discarded as unrelated. Consequently these dimensions provide us with frames to 
understand different cultural manifestation in Scandinavia and the Arab Gulf states: 
 
In terms of power distance (PDI) we find much greater inequality in the Arab Gulf states – 
obviously reminiscent of the fact that they are not democracies. This translates into more 
dependent, acquiescent and conflict avoiding subordinates and the opposite in the case of their 
superiors. Subsequently, traditions, respect and trust are values not to be ignored. 
 
In terms of uncertainty avoidance (UAI), trust is found to be a very important component to 
doing business in the Middle East, or in any other relations based business climate. In 
Scandinavia trust is professionally and predictably extended to almost anyone - until proven 
untrustworthy. In the Middle East trust works very differently in being more personal. Arabs 
are hospitable, but there isn’t any free trust extended to strangers. As business is more 
personal, personal trust, friendship and group belonging can put us in a position where we 
stand to receive better than professional courtesy and treatment. Favoritism exists and can 
very well be leveraged but will require us to develop a relationship. To a higher degree Arabs 
tend to consider what’s different to be dangerous. In order for these relations to work, we 
should remember also to extend them more than simply professional courtesy and treatment.  
 
With regards to individual versus collective orientation (IDV), we found that in collectivist 
societies ‘in-groups’ and group affiliation is central to the way society works. Where 
preferential treatment of in-group members is common and even socially expected; it’s very 
advantageous to be on the inside. But acquiescence and high-context communications are still 
held to be frequent noise-factors. 
 
In terms of masculinity versus femininity (MAS), we must acknowledge that the Middle East 
is a very different arena from Scandinavia. The Arab Gulfs states on the face of it, can 
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resemble a man’s world. In the other end of the scale Scandinavian countries score more 
substantially more feminine than masculine. Yet, we (ourselves) don’t consider Scandinavia 
to be women’s domain. The proliferation of masculine values and the relative position of 
women in their societies have mainly evolved from their heritage. Religion, history and 
geography have subjected these lands to forces and influences that have seen more use for 
typically male traits - like decisiveness, toughness and the need for protection. 
Competitiveness, toughness and decisiveness are prevailing values, as tempers also tend to fly 
higher. 
 
In terms of long-term orientation (LTO) the message is again one of respect and tradition. We 
should adhere to the rules and traditions of Arab societies. We should do some research and 
come prepared with the understanding that we’re on their turf and act accordingly to that. 
They want to do business but they don’t want our moral, our society or our values – they have 
(in their opinion) tried our way and it does not work for them.  
 
Based on this – a series of suggestions and words of advice are proposed: 
 
Hofstede’s Cultural dimensions 
• PDI: Be aware that some are more equal than others. Always be respectful of their 
ways and traditions but also mindful of possible implications (in particular with 
regards to the less powerful in a society/value-chain). 
• PDI: In The Gulf Arab states, word is associated with your honor. 
 
• UAI: In the Arab World business is more personal and dependant on trustful relations 
than in Scandinavia. 
• UAI: They won’t do business with us if they don’t know us (don’t trust us) 
• UAI: Trust can and should be earned thought relationships and friendships. 
• UAI: Trust and relations should be mutual. 
• UAI: Favoritism exists between friends and families. 
 
• IDV: Know the locals, know how and why and also let them know you.  
• IDV: The focus on the in-group (the collective) not on the individual. 
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• IDV: Constricting business to an in-group or family setting is a way to reduce 
uncertainty. 
• IDV: Be in-group, develop a relationship, be honorable and extend them the same 
courtesy and treatment you wish to receive, and it can be very profitable. 
 
• MAS: In The Gulf Arab states Men and Women are not equals. 
• MAS: Harder and tougher values dominate. 
• MAS: Tradition and respect are highly valued. 
• MAS: Who we know is often more important than what we know. 
 
• LTO: Do your homework and come prepared! 
• LTO: The want our business, not our society or its values. 
• LTO: In their land act in accordance with their rules and traditions. 
 
 
In this thesis we’ve finally focused on corruption. As a part of this work Scandinavians who 
work/have worked in the Arab Gulf states or the Middle East was asked to weight in through 
a ‘Questionnaire – Doing business in the Middle East’ and some interviews. This served to 
shed some light on, and further refine some impressions and comments on corruption, both in 
practice and as a phenomenon. Eventually it served mostly to further cement what had already 
been discovered, which is indicative of the initial finding’s validity and reliability. 
 
The most known and frequently used methods of assessing corruption are conceived in the 
West. Corruption is present all over the world, but more so in non-democratic countries and, 
in particular, if they are ‘cursed’ with abundant natural resources. Over the last decade the 
NGO Transparency International (TI) has put corruption on the agenda – and helped elevate 
the phenomenon into an international issue. Yet, in some respects their Corruption Perception 
Index doesn’t show the entire picture. It only measures who accept bribes, neglecting who pay 
them. And it’s no secret that Western companies are also heavily involved. According to TI, 
the ‘oil curse’ referrers to the phenomenon “that countries dependent on petroleum revenues 
for their livelihood (with the notable exception of Norway) are among the most economically 
troubled, the most authoritarian, and/or the most conflict-ridden in the world”. We’ve seen 
that this is true across all regions. To further add to their burden, they tend to grow more 
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slowly than non-oil rich nations and they are more susceptible to policy failures. These 
problems can to a large degree be traced back to the fact that petroleum revenues offer the 
possibility for quick and concentrated wealth and externally financing of a regime – two 
factors which combined make it both lucrative and sustainable to run an oppressive and non-
democratic system of government. 
 
Yet with the inherent egalitarianism and benevolence embedded in Islam, the Arab Gulf states 
have been able to withstand these adverse effects a lot better than what is the case in for 
instance Africa. 
 
Corruption is in the Arab Gulf states found as both grand corruption and a widespread 
proliferation of petty corruption or greasing payments. Yet, some of the aspects that might 
translate into corruption in cultures such as ours are actually the expected and accepted in-
group signs of respect – manifested through some favoritism and the payment of some 
tributes. When we participate in in-groups we should be careful to conduct these activities in a 
transparent, predictable and correct manner. Where it often goes wrong is when a tribute 
becomes a bribe. It’s supposed to be a gesture to the recipient, not a function of the expected 
profits reaped. The latter can result an astronomical payment in the attempt to secure a 
concession. It is sometimes difficult to get this right. But, if we don’t wish to corrupt 
ourselves, it is absolutely essential that we do! 
 
On a company level we should take a series of measure to prevent corruption. The best 
weapon against corruption is transparency, backed by institutions outlawing corruption and 
judicial systems willing to enforce them. Such institutions are already present in many places. 
Throughout Europe and North America a company publicly listed or headquartered should 
already be committing to transparency. In the Arab Gulf states legislation has trailed the West 
but they are working on it. Where they still come up short is on enforcement. This is 
obviously connected to their system of government; totalitarian systems with no real 
opposition aren’t well suited to deal with these challenges. It’s should also be taken into 
consideration that from an ethical point of view tax havens serve no real legit purpose. Their 
unique competitive advantage is their ability to seemingly detach people and organizations 
from their assets. To the corrupt, that’s one of the greatest assets imaginable. 
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Trust and in-group memberships can also represent important measures in preventing 
corruption as this can levitate some of the pressures we might encounter to resort to 
corruption. Trust and in-group membership could grant us for free what we otherwise would 
attempt to buy our way to. 
 
Finally we should develop and cement a company policy, a code of conduct and a corporate 
culture which denounces corruption and employ people with the integrity to live up to these 
ideals to act as our agent in muddy waters. 
 
Based on this – a series of suggestions and words of advice are proposed: 
 
Corruption 
• Be cognizant of the damage corruption does to a society 
• Be cognizant of the ‘oil curse’ – and how it works 
• Build trust and relationships – in such a relations based economy that’s a massive 
advantage. This cannot be bought (even if certain outcomes can). 
• Publicly commit to full transparency. 
• Develop and indoctrinate a company policy and a code of conduct. 
• Be alert (C = M + D – A) 
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5.0 Conclusion 
Derived from the theories and observations we have illuminated a series of intricately 
connected findings related to culture, practice and ethics in the Arab Gulf states from a 
Scandinavian perspective. 
 
Firstly, we should recognize that an Arab will usually identify himself as being a Muslim 
before a country national. It is therefore crucial to have an understanding on Islam. 
Subsequently, much of what we need to know and understand is related to Islam. We have 
seen that Christianity has had a great influence on Western civilizations, in terms of heritage, 
values and beliefs. Islam has had and still has an even stronger position and influence on the 
Middle East. Islam is in essence the origin of their culture, their values, their laws and their 
sense of justice.  
 
In the Christian world philosophy dominates theology, and public interpretation of faith is 
forever being updated and modernized. This has resulted in more permissive and liberal 
societies. While favored by many, Christian civilization is also viewed by many (including 
Muslims) to be partly responsible for what’s popularly perceived to be our value crisis and 
our social and environmental problems. In the Muslim world Islam dominates philosophy. 
Consequently, its teachings and its authority over people’s lives will often seem old-fashioned 
and even crude to Westerners. Arabs still consider their ways to be much preferable – 
precisely as we perceive ours to be. Their values and their cultures are the product of 
generations of heritage. Arabs believe strongly that Islam is the correct and final truth. So 
while they do want our business, they don’t want our society or perspectives. 
 
When in unfamiliar corners of the world, a compass can’t get you anywhere without a map. 
When navigating these foreign waters we should also remember to use a map alongside our 
moral compass. We should not abandon our moral compass – just as we should not abandon 
our morals. But we have seen that we need to observe the fact that other morals might apply 
in The Arab Gulf states.  
 
We have pointed out that in some places and some cases institutions aren’t just. This is the 
case in Scandinavia and so also in the Arab Gulf states. In the Arab Gulf states many 
institutions are derived from Islam, which was intended to be egalitarian and benevolent, but 
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in many respects dates back more than a millennium. Since then Islam has been subjected to 
less philosophical scrutiny and reform than Christianity. Yet, contact is not without friction 
and the Gulf Arab states are all experiencing also internal pressures to update and change 
certain laws and practices, some of which they are yielding to.  
 
An absolute key learning in Ethics and Moral reasoning is that universal ethics always must 
trump mundane institutions. Anyone, anywhere, including Scandinavians doing business in 
the Middle East, should therefore adhere to these three universal perspectives on ethics: 
utilitarianism, human rights and justice. Thus while we should try to respect and adhere to 
their local institutions when dealing in their land, we should not follow local institutions that 
are in conflict with these three perspectives. But the principles of the Good must also be 
exercised wisely as even the very best of deeds at times could cause harm.  
 
The Arab Gulf states feature a relations oriented business climate: They usually won’t do 
business with us if they don’t know us. This can make doing business somewhat time-
consuming. It’s also customary, accepted and even expected that one favors one own in-
group. Arabs are renowned for their hospitality and their generosity. We can also come to 
belong to their in-group. It will also require us to extend them more than the usual 
professional courtesy and treatment, just as we seek to obtain from them. It will take time and 
cost money, but can be very rewarding. However, when allowed to participate in in-groups, 
we should participate in a correct, predictable and transparent manner. We have argued that 
paying for concessions, i.e. bribes and corruption is not what in-groups are about. It can be 
difficult to balance this correctly – but it is absolutely essential that we try to. 
 
In a relations oriented business climate honorable men or women are what we should seek to 
develop business relations with. A wise man should respect that we, for matters of conscience, 
not always will reach an agreement. In The Middle East it’s also important to remember that 
one’s honor is connected to one’s word, even though Arabic language and exaggeration at 
times also might go hand in hand. We should carefully observe this codex of honor and also 
that punctuality from Westerns is expected even if locals don’t always exercise it themselves.  
 
We have seen that the Arab Gulf states face a lot more difficulties with regards to corruption 
than is the case in Scandinavia. To address this, the different states has taken a series of 
measures, although some less effective than others. And with some local Arab systems of 
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government it’s proving to be an uphill struggle. Yet the causes, the problems and the 
solutions to this – which obviously has an adverse effect on most levels of society (of which 
we and our business is a part of, if present there) – are bilateral. We have seen that unilateral 
action itself cannot solve the problem, as there are too many loopholes - also in the West. 
Still, this thesis has throughout the discussions found and argued that we should always seek 
not to corrupt ourselves. We should build and not attempt to purchase trust and relationships 
for the purpose of gaining advantages.  
 
When doing business in The Arab Gulf states this thesis has established that it is possible to 
achieve success while still maintaining a good conscience. To do so we should follow a 
company policy and code of conduct – as we denounce corruption and commit to full 
transparency. 
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Appendixes: 
 
Information about the Arab Gulf states 
This country data was taken by the http://www.intute.ac.uk, from the CIA World Factbook 
(updated August 2005).  
Population  
Bahrain 708,573 note: includes 235,108 non-nationals (July 2007 est.)  
Kuwait 2,505,559 note: includes 1,291,354 non-nationals (July 2007 est.)  
Oman 3,204,897 note: includes 577,293 non-nationals (July 2007 est.)  
Qatar 907,229 (July 2007 est.)  
Saudi Arabia 27,601,038 note: includes 5,576,076 non-nationals (July 2007 est.)  
United Arab Emirates 4,444,011 note: estimate is based on the results of the 2005 census 
that included a significantly higher estimate of net immigration of 
non-citizens than previous estimates (July 2007 est.)  
 
Population growth rate  
Bahrain 1.392% (2007 est.) 
Kuwait 3.561% note: this rate reflects a return to pre-Gulf crisis 
immigration of expatriates (2007 est.) 
Oman 3.234% (2007 est.) 
Qatar 2.386% (2007 est.) 
Saudi Arabia 2.06% (2007 est.) 
United Arab Emirates 3.997% (2007 est.) 
 
Population migration  
Bahrain 0.82 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.) 
Kuwait 15.66 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.) 
Oman 0.35 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.) 
Qatar 14.12 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.) 
Saudi Arabia -4.94 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.) 
United Arab Emirates 0.66 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.) 
 
Life expectancy  
Bahrain total population: 74.68 years male: 72.18 years female: 77.25 years 
(2007 est.)  
Kuwait total population: 77.36 years male: 76.25 years female: 78.52 years 
(2007 est.)  
Oman total population: 73.62 years male: 71.37 years female: 75.99 years 
(2007 est.)  
Qatar total population: 74.14 years male: 71.6 years female: 76.82 years 
(2007 est.)  
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Saudi Arabia total population: 75.88 years male: 73.85 years female: 78.02 years 
(2007 est.)  
United Arab Emirates total population: 75.69 years male: 73.16 years female: 78.35 years 
(2007 est.)  
 
Gender ratio  
Bahrain at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.021 male(s)/female 
15-64 years: 1.372 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 1.084 
male(s)/female total population: 1.255 male(s)/female (2007 est.)  
Kuwait at birth: 1.04 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.037 male(s)/female 
15-64 years: 1.771 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 1.691 
male(s)/female total population: 1.526 male(s)/female (2007 est.)  
Oman at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.041 male(s)/female 
15-64 years: 1.419 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 1.26 
male(s)/female total population: 1.238 male(s)/female (2007 est.)  
Qatar at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 
15-64 years: 2.211 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 2.887 
male(s)/female total population: 1.852 male(s)/female (2007 est.)  
Saudi Arabia at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 
15-64 years: 1.314 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 1.11 
male(s)/female total population: 1.196 male(s)/female (2007 est.)  
United Arab Emirates at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.047 male(s)/female 
15-64 years: 2.743 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 1.849 
male(s)/female total population: 2.19 male(s)/female (2007 est.)  
 
Age structure  
Bahrain 0-14 years: 26.9% (male 96,217/female 94,275) 15-64 years: 
69.5% (male 284,662/female 207,555) 65 years and over: 3.7% 
(male 13,451/female 12,413) (2007 est.)  
Kuwait 0-14 years: 26.7% (male 340,814/female 328,663) 15-64 years: 
70.5% (male 1,128,231/female 636,967) 65 years and over: 2.8% 
(male 44,542/female 26,342) (2007 est.)  
Oman 0-14 years: 42.7% (male 698,461/female 670,793) 15-64 years: 
54.6% (male 1,026,686/female 723,712) 65 years and over: 2.7% 
(male 47,534/female 37,711) (2007 est.)  
Qatar 0-14 years: 23.1% (male 106,853/female 102,713) 15-64 years: 
72.9% (male 455,631/female 206,099) 65 years and over: 4% 
(male 26,689/female 9,244) (2007 est.)  
Saudi Arabia 0-14 years: 38.2% (male 5,369,285/female 5,162,585) 15-64 years: 
59.4% (male 9,316,694/female 7,089,370) 65 years and over: 2.4% 
(male 348,827/female 314,277) (2007 est.)  
United Arab Emirates 0-14 years: 20.6% (male 467,931/female 447,045) 15-64 years: 
78.5% (male 2,558,029/female 932,617) 65 years and over: 0.9% 
(male 24,914/female 13,475) note: 73.9% of the population in the 
15-64 age group is non-national (2007 est.)  
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Birth rate  
Bahrain 17.53 births/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Kuwait 21.95 births/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Oman 35.76 births/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Qatar 15.56 births/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Saudi Arabia 29.1 births/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
United Arab Emirates 16.09 births/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
 
Death rate  
Bahrain 4.21 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Kuwait 2.39 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Oman 3.78 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Qatar 4.82 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
Saudi Arabia 2.55 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
United Arab Emirates 2.16 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.) 
 
GDP ($US billion) 
Bahrain $15.9 billion (2005 est.) 
Kuwait $47.36 billion (2005 est.) 
Oman $40.39 billion (2005 est.) 
Qatar $24.46 billion (2005 est.) 
Saudi Arabia $346.3 billion (2005 est.) 
United Arab Emirates $115.8 billion (2005 est.) 
  
 
GDP per capita ($US) 
Bahrain $23,100 (2005 est.) 
Kuwait $20,300 (2005 est.) 
Oman $13,500 (2005 est.) 
Qatar $28,300 (2005 est.) 
Saudi Arabia $13,100 (2005 est.) 
United Arab Emirates $45,200 (2005 est.) 
 
GDP real growth rate  
Bahrain 5.9% (2005 est.) 
Kuwait 8.3% (2005 est.) 
Oman 5.6% (2005 est.) 
Qatar 8.8% (2005 est.) 
Saudi Arabia 6.5% (2005 est.) 
United Arab Emirates 8.8% (2005 est.) 
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Unemployment  
Bahrain 15% (2005 est.) 
Kuwait 2.2% (2004 est.) 
Oman 15% (2004 est.) 
Qatar 2.7% (2001) 
Saudi Arabia 13% among Saudi males only (local bank estimate; some estimates 
range as high as 25%) (2004 est.) 
United Arab Emirates 2.4% (2001) 
 
Labour force  
Bahrain 380,000 note: 44% of the population in the 15-64 age group is non-
national (2005 est.) 
Kuwait 1.67 million note: non-Kuwaitis represent about 80% of the labor 
force (2005 est.) 
Oman 920,000 (2002 est.) 
Qatar 440,000 (2005 est.) 
Saudi Arabia 6.76 million note: more than 35% of the population in the 15-64 
age group is non-national (2005 est.) 
United Arab Emirates 2.8 million (2005 est.) 
 
Area (km2) 
Bahrain 665 
Kuwait 17820 
Oman 212460 
Qatar 11437 
Saudi Arabia 1960582 
United Arab Emirates 82880 
 
Coastline (km) 
Bahrain 161 
Kuwait 499 
Oman 2,092 
Qatar 563 
Saudi Arabia 2,640 
United Arab Emirates 1,318 
 
Boundaries (km) 
Bahrain 0 
Kuwait 462 - Iraq 240, Saudi Arabia 222  
Oman 1,374 - Saudi Arabia 676, UAE 410, Yemen 288  
Qatar 60 - Saudi Arabia 60  
Saudi Arabia 4,431 - Iraq 814, Jordan 744, Kuwait 222, Oman 676, Qatar 60, 
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UAE 457, Yemen 1,458  
United Arab Emirates 867 - Oman 410, Saudi Arabia 457  
 
 
Questionnaire reply from R1 
1) Does the CPI scores seem reasonable to you?  
Yes 
 
 
2. Do you perceive corruption to be a “taboo” issue in the region? 
Yes, to some extent. My answer could also be: No. Mainly because TI´s definition of 
corruption is seen from a western point of view. Corruption might also be a taboo in many 
western countries. 
 
 
3. Do you perceive corruption to be present in the region? 
Yes 
 
 
4. Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
Yes 
 
 
5. Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, 
regulations and enforcement? 
I do not think Arab countries have more lack of moral than western countries. Even though 
some moral standards in Islam may be “outdated” related to modern way of life and therefore 
can create double standards (what is said to be right and what is practised in the society) 
 
 
6. In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency 
(publish earning and spending) in order to combat corruption? 
 
Yes. Even though you would be an easy target for media feeding on the smallest mistakes you 
might do. Public opinion might also have a lack of understanding for different cultural 
understanding of what corruption is and is not. 
 
7. In your opinion how much does corruption have to do with 
 Lack of local knowledge (unfamiliar culture)? 
Some 
 
 
 Lack of trust (between people of different cultures)? 
Less 
 
 
 Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 
Some 
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 Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 
Some 
 
 
 
8. Which of the following phrases do you agree with? 
 The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it 
Agree 
 
 
 Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western 
companies are just as much to blame for is as local officials. 
Agree 
 
 
 Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local 
companies. 
Agree 
 
 
 Some places it’s customary to make some kind of facilitation payment (paying 
greasing money). 
Agree 
 
 
 Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions. 
Agree to some extent. 
 
 
 The local society has an elite class which are subject to certain “private laws” 
Agree 
 
 
 Private laws enables the social elite to participate in what’s in your opinion corrupt 
activities 
Agree 
 
 
These are highly hypothetical questions: 
 Corruption is a part of their culture (culture is defined as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another”) 
Agree to some extent. But in the Gulf states small favors are not considered being corruption. 
Network and personal favors are more like paying respect. To offer bribes could also be seen 
as an offense. 
 
 
 Corruption leads to predictability 
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At least that’s why most people would be willing to pay of the record 
 
 
 I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe 
Depends on local culture 
 
 
 I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe, even after I had bribed him 
Depends on local culture 
 
 
 “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely”, Lord Acton 
If you do not believe in personal moral or cultural/religious values – I agree that power tends. 
But it is my belief that he is not necessarily right.   
 
 
 If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will 
only help legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to 
avoid acceptance of corruption greasing payments should not be called corruption. 
 
To my opinion greasing payment, according to TI, is corruption and should be called by 
that name. At least within own company. When it comes to moral and company policy I 
would strongly state that we should always begin with ourselves… 
 
 
Questionnaire reply from R2 
 
• Does the CPI scores seem reasonable to you?  
- Både ja og nei, jeg hadde trodd at korrupsjonen var større i skandinavia. 
 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be a “taboo” issue in the region? 
- Ja for det meste, åpenheten er større I deler av UAE enn de andre landene, og 
kanskje det er derfor det er så stor forskjell på Saudi Arabia som er det mest 
lukkede landet og UAE 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be present in the region? 
- Ja, jeg har til og med møtt det på offentlige kontorer. 
 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
- Ja, jeg ser på korrupsjonene som et problem, det undergraver deres forsøk på å 
lage god infrastruktur. Det skaper urettferdighet, og uforutsigbarhet. 
 
 
 
 
169 
• Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, 
regulations and enforcement? 
• Jeg tror det er en kombinasjon.  Innerste i en spiss vinkel er der ikke mye forskjell på 
vinkelbeina, og det ser likegyldig ut om man velger det ene eller det andre. Det vil si 
at I liten skala så blir det å bestikke ikke opplevd som bestikkelse, bare som en 
hyggelig gest, en tjeneste, eller et uttrykk for takknemmelighet eller liknende. Og det 
er det for så vidt også derfor overgangene kan av og til være glidende. Derfor kan 
likegyldighet i en tilsynelatende uvesentlig sak, utvikle seg til dårlig moral, for alt er 
alltid under utvikling og vinkelbeina vil sprike mer og mer. Derfor tror jeg det ene er 
årsak til den andre, altså begge deler. 
 
 
• In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency 
(publish earning and spending) in order to combat corruption?  
- Ja, jeg tror det er nødvendig hvis man skal komme korrupsjonen til livs, og I 
disse data tider, burde det da bli vanskeligere å drive med korrupsjon. 
 
 
 
• In your opinion how much does corruption have to do with 
• Lack of local knowledge (unfamiliar culture)?  25% 
 
 
 
• Lack of trust (between people of different cultures)? 25% 
 
 
 
• Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 25% 
 
 
 
• Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 25% 
 
• Jeg ville kanskje sagt 15 % på A,B,C og D  fordi jeg tror alle faktorene er viktige 
faktorer, som gir oss en fullkommen unnskyldning for det jeg tror er den største 
faktoren; grådighet, men som vi aldri vil erkjenne og derfor kaller den alt mulig annet. 
Jeg tror det er 40 % grådighet. 
 
 
• Which of the following phrases do you agree with? 
• The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it 
- uenig. Personen som betaler bestikkelsen kan være under et krysspress, som 
gjør det umulig å følge det man selv mener er rett. Det kan skade for mange 
andre. Er man den svake part har man ikke alltid noe reelt valg, fordi 
bestikkelsen har for stor og lang tradisjon i samfunnet. 
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• Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western 
companies are just as much to blame for is as local officials. 
- enig, jeg tror at vestlige selskaper har tatt med seg eller utviklet en ukultur som 
kommuniserte godt med nomade samfunnet og nomadenes kultur og tradisjon 
for å gjøre hverandre tjenester og ytelser. Jeg tror det er en kombinasjon av 
flere slike gode og mindre gode intensjoner som er smeltet sammen og som har 
utviklet seg til en stor ukultur. 
 
• Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local 
companies. 
- enig 
 
 
• Some places it’s customary to make some kind of facilitation payment (paying 
greasing money). 
- enig 
 
 
• Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions. 
- enig 
 
 
• The local society has an elite class which are subject to certain “private laws” 
- enig 
 
 
• Private laws enables the social elite to participate in what’s in your opinion corrupt 
activities 
- enig 
 
 
• These are highly hypothetical questions: 
• Corruption is a part of their culture (culture is defined as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another”) 
- enig 
 
 
• Corruption leads to predictability 
- både og, jeg tror på kort sikt og på overflaten at det kan oppleves slik, men jeg 
tror det er å lure seg selv. Fordi jeg tror forutsigbarheten på det å velge rett for 
flertallet og de svake, blir borte. Personlige interesser blir større enn flertallets 
behov. Derfor vil urettferdigheten raskt kunne øke, og det er kaos dannende. 
 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe 
- uenig, jeg tror jeg ville kunne forstå, en som tok imot bestikkelse, men ha tillitt 
til personen ville være vanskeligere, fordi den som har bestukket 
vedkommende kan kanskje komme til å bruke det som en brekkstang for andre 
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ting som vedkommende ikke kan vegre seg mot på grunn av tidligere 
bestikkelse.  
 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe, even after I had bribed him 
- uenig 
 
 
• “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” - Lord Acton 
- enig 
 
 
• If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will 
only help legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to 
avoid acceptance of corruption greasing payments should not be called corruption. 
- dette hadde vært interessant og prøvd, for jeg tror det har noen fordeler ved 
seg, alt har jo det. Jo strengere regler jo flere lovbrytere, og det er ikke bra. 
Men jeg tror de kreftene som er ute etter å utnytte dette her hvis det ble satt i 
system ville få altfor gode vilkår. Derfor tror jeg ikke det er mulig, dessverre. 
 
Questionnaire reply from R3 
• Does the CPI scores seem reasonable to you?  
 
• Yes 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be a “taboo” issue in the region? 
 
• Yes, to NAME it corruption. 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be present in the region? 
 
• Yes 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
 
• Yes 
 
• Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, 
regulations and enforcement? 
 
• None, more as a habit or way of relationship 
 
• In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency 
(publish earning and spending) in order to combat corruption? 
 
 
• Yes, but I fear they will find other ways to avoid being caught 
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• In your opinion how much does corruption have to do with 
• Lack of local knowledge (unfamiliar culture)? 
 
• little 
 
• Lack of trust (between people of different cultures)? 
 
• little 
 
• Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 
 
• little 
 
• Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 
 
• more 
 
 
• Which of the following phrases do you agree with? 
• The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it 
 
• agree 
 
• Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western 
companies are just as much to blame for is as local officials. 
 
• agree 
 
• Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local 
companies. 
 
• agree 
 
• Some places it’s customary to make some kind of facilitation payment (paying 
greasing money). 
 
• agree 
 
• Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions. 
 
• agree 
 
• The local society has an elite class which are subject to certain “private laws” 
 
• agree 
 
• Private laws enables the social elite to participate in what’s in your opinion corrupt 
activities 
 
 
173 
 
• agree 
 
• These are highly hypothetical questions: 
• Corruption is a part of their culture (culture is defined as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another”) 
 
• agree 
 
• Corruption leads to predictability 
 
 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe 
 
• agree 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe, even after I had bribed him 
 
• agree 
 
• “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” - Lord Acton 
 
• agree 
 
• If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will 
only help legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to 
avoid acceptance of corruption greasing payments should not be called corruption. 
 
• disagree 
 
 
Questionnaire reply from R4 
• Does the CPI scores seem reasonable to you?  
• yes 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be a “taboo” issue in the region? 
• Yes, to some extent 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be present in the region? 
• yes 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
• Yes, to some extent 
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• Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, 
regulations and enforcement? 
• The latter 
 
 
• In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency 
(publish earning and spending) in order to combat corruption? 
• yes 
 
 
• In your opinion how much does corruption have to do with 
• Lack of local knowledge (unfamiliar culture)? 
• Quite a lot 
 
 
• Lack of trust (between people of different cultures)? 
• some 
 
 
• Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 
• Quite a lot 
 
 
• Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 
• A lot 
 
 
 
• Which of the following phrases do you agree with? 
• The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it 
• Not necessarily, but usually 
 
 
• Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western 
companies are just as much to blame for is as local officials. 
• almost 
 
 
• Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local 
companies. 
• yes 
 
 
• Some places it’s customary to make some kind of facilitation payment (paying 
greasing money). 
• yes 
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• Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions. 
• yes 
 
 
• The local society has an elite class which are subject to certain “private laws” 
• yes 
 
 
• Private laws enables the social elite to participate in what’s in your opinion corrupt 
activities 
• yes 
 
 
• These are highly hypothetical questions: 
• Corruption is a part of their culture (culture is defined as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another”) 
• yes 
 
 
• Corruption leads to predictability 
• Initially maybe 
 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe 
• True 
 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe, even after I had bribed him 
• true 
 
 
• “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” - Lord Acton 
• Definitely  
 
 
• If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will 
only help legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to 
avoid acceptance of corruption greasing payments should not be called corruption. 
• yes (and no?) 
 
Questionnaire reply from R5 
• Does the CPI scores seem reasonable to you?   
 
• Ja 
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• Do you perceive corruption to be a “taboo” issue in the region? 
 
• Nei 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be present in the region? 
 
• Ja, i hoeyeste grad 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
 
• Ja for de vestlige som er her, mye mindre for de lokale,…“det bare er saann” 
 
• Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, 
regulations and enforcement? 
 
• Mest pga utilstrekkelig lover osv, som i sin tur oppfordrer til det vi kaller “daarlig 
moral”. 
 
• In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency 
(publish earning and spending) in order to combat corruption? 
 
 
• Nei, tror ikke et vestlig selskap kan gjoere noe med det, og har heller ikke noe aa vinne 
paa det 
 
• In your opinion how much does corruption have to do with 
• Lack of local knowledge (unfamiliar culture)? 
 
• lite 
 
• Lack of trust (between people of different cultures)? 
 
• lite 
 
• Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 
 
• Ingenting, her har de god tid… 
 
• Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 
 
• Omtrent alt 
 
 
• Which of the following phrases do you agree with? 
• The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it 
 
• Uenig, noen ganger maa man bestikke for I det hele tatt aa komme noen vei 
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• Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western 
companies are just as much to blame for is as local officials. 
 
• Helt uenig, korrupsjonen er innbakt I systemet her, og kan kun begrenses ved lokale 
lover. 
 
• Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local 
companies. 
• Uenig, Ikke like mye, men jeg tror mange er noedt hvis det skal bli noe business I det 
hele tatt 
 
 
• Some places it’s customary to make some kind of facilitation payment (paying 
greasing money). 
 
• Helt enig 
 
• Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions. 
 
• Enig 
 
• The local society has an elite class which are subject to certain “private laws” 
 
• Helt enig, iallfall her I Kuwait 
 
• Private laws enables the social elite to participate in what’s in your opinion corrupt 
activities 
• Enig 
 
 
• These are highly hypothetical questions: 
• Corruption is a part of their culture (culture is defined as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another”) 
 
• Enig 
 
• Corruption leads to predictability 
 
• Uenig 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe 
 
• Enig 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe, even after I had bribed him 
 
• Uenig 
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• “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” - Lord Acton 
 
• Enig 
 
• If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will 
only help legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to 
avoid acceptance of corruption greasing payments should not be called corruption. 
 
 
• Uenig, I vaare oeyne er det naa korrupsjon uansett 
Questionnaire reply from R6 
• Does the CPI scores seem reasonable to you?  
• YES THEY DO 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be a “taboo” issue in the region? 
• YES, THE AUTHORITIES ARE STRICT RE THIS 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be present in the region? 
• TO SOME EXTEND YOU WILL ALWAYS FIND CORRUPT PEOPLE 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
• NO, IT IS NOT A PROBLEM 
 
 
• Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, 
regulations and enforcement? 
• BAD MORAL, AS MENTIONED THE AUTHORITIES IN UAE ARE VERY 
STRICT RE ANY TYPE OF CORRUPTION  
 
 
• In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency 
(publish earning and spending) in order to combat corruption? 
• YES, AND THIS IS VERYCOMMON IN THIS AREA 
 
 
• In your opinion how much does corruption have to do with 
• Lack of local knowledge (unfamiliar culture)? 
- AS MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION IS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
HAVING ANOTHER BUSINESS CULTURE THIS MAY BE ONE OF THE 
REASONS FOR CORRUPTION 
 
 
• Lack of trust (between people of different cultures)? 
- SAME AS UNDER A 
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• Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 
- YES, THIS MAY HAPPEN 
 
 
• Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 
- YES, PROPABLY ONE REASON 
 
 
 
• Which of the following phrases do you agree with? 
• The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it 
- YES, NORMALLY THIS IS CORRECT 
 
• Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western 
companies are just as much to blame for is as local officials. 
- DO NOT THINK THIS IS A GREATER PROBLEM IN UAE THAN IN THE 
WEST. 
- AS MENTIONED THE AUTHORITIES IN THIS COUNTRY WILL NOT 
TOLERATE ANY KIND OF CORRUPTION AMONG THEIR LOCAL 
OFFICIALS. 
 
 
• Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local 
companies. 
- WHEN READING IN WESTERN NEWSPAPERS ABOUT CORRUPTION 
- DO NOT ALWAYS FINDWESTERN COMPANIES BEING ANY BETTER 
THAN OTHERS. 
 
 
• Some places it’s customary to make some kind of facilitation payment (paying 
greasing money). 
- THIS IS CORRECT, AND HAPPENS ALL OVER THE WORLD, MOST 
PROBABLY NOT MORE IN DUBAI THAN IN OSLO 
 
 
• Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions. 
- DO NOT THINK THIS ANYMORE IS COMMON IN DUBAI 
 
 
• The local society has an elite class which are subject to certain “private laws” 
- NO, IN DUBAI THE LAWS ARE THE SAME FOR ALL. 
 
 
• Private laws enables the social elite to participate in what’s in your opinion corrupt 
activities 
- SEE REPLY F 
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• These are highly hypothetical questions: 
• Corruption is a part of their culture (culture is defined as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another”) 
- CORRUPTION IS NOT A PART OF THE CULTURE IN UAE, BUT AS 
MENTIONED BEFORE, THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION IS 
FROM  
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH ANOTHER BUSINESS CULTURE 
 
 
• Corruption leads to predictability 
- MAY BE IN SOME CASES 
 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe 
- NORMALY NOT 
 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe, even after I had bribed him 
- NOMALLY NT 
 
 
• “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” - Lord Acton 
- "WISE WORDS" 
 
 
• If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will 
only help legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to 
avoid acceptance of corruption greasing payments should not be called corruption. 
- I THINK THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GREASING (SMALLER 
AMOUNTS) AND CORRUPTION AND GREASING SHOULD NOT BE 
CALLED CORRUPTION 
 
Questionnaire reply from R7 
 
• Does the CPI scores seem reasonable to you?  
• I think the picture is generally right. 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be a “taboo” issue in the region? 
• No. It is talked about. It is as near to open as something illegal can be – perhaps a little 
like “black work” in our countries? Everyone knows it is there, most people have a 
hazy borderline for what is acceptable, and though you can get caught and the 
repercussions may be severe (especially if you are a public figure), “everyone” does it. 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be present in the region? 
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• Very much so. Everything from small scale “baksheesh” to blatant corruption in, e.g., 
building and at the airport, the customs services and the police. 
 
 
• Do you perceive corruption to be considered a problem in the region? 
• Yes, but also one that most people do not see how you can get rid of, since so many in 
practical terms makes their real living off it. 
 
• Do you think corruption is more a product of bad moral or of insufficient laws, 
regulations and enforcement? 
• I think it is a product mainly of systematic mismanagement and failed economic 
policies, in combination with poverty. However, it should be noted that the worst 
corruption generally takes place among the already wealthy, as I believe is often the 
case elsewhere as well. 
 
 
• In your opinion, should a company to commit themselves to full transparency 
(publish earning and spending) in order to combat corruption? 
• Yes. However, I also think that there needs to be policies that draw the line 
somewhere in practical terms for what is “corruption” and what is allowable “grease” 
like baksheesh, which in theory is just a tip. 
 
• In your opinion how much does corruption have to do with 
• Lack of local knowledge (unfamiliar culture)? 
 
 
 
• Lack of trust (between people of different cultures)? 
 
 
 
• Lack of time (pay a bribe to save time)? 
• A lot. But where is the borderline between paying to get ahead in a queue and paying 
to get something happening at all? In other words: If you have to pay to get what is 
legally yours at all, maybe that is different from paying to jump in the queue? If, as is 
often the case, the bureaucracy does nothing unless you pay “fees” (for which you get 
no receipts) – then how can you run your business at all? In other words – businesses 
may need to decide that they just cannot go into certain markets if they need to be 
100% clean at home. 
 
 
• Lack of transparency (making it easy to get away with)? 
• Very important. E.g., Egypt is a pure cash culture, making it very hard both to tax and 
to audit cash flows. 
 
 
 
• Which of the following phrases do you agree with? 
• The person paying the bribe just as guilty as the person taking it 
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• Yes. 
 
 
• Corruption is a greater problem in the Middle East than in the West but Western 
companies are just as much to blame for is as local officials. 
• As the seller is equally much to blame as the buyer, yes. 
 
 
• Western companies are just as likely to involve themselves in corruption as local 
companies. 
 
 
 
• Some places it’s customary to make some kind of facilitation payment (paying 
greasing money). 
• Absolutely necessary in most businesses and public offices here. 
 
 
• Great pursuit of material success leads to greater willingness to participate in corrupt 
transactions. 
• Not necessarily. It also becomes a part of the regular business culture and the “regular” 
income of thousands of people who would otherwise have been grossly underpaid. In 
one sense, it allows (or hides) a level of official wages that are impossible to live on in 
reality. 
 
 
• The local society has an elite class which are subject to certain “private laws” 
• Probably, but I have no data to support that. 
 
 
• Private laws enables the social elite to participate in what’s in your opinion corrupt 
activities 
 
• See above. 
 
• These are highly hypothetical questions: 
• Corruption is a part of their culture (culture is defined as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from 
another”) 
 
• Yes 
 
• Corruption leads to predictability 
 
• ?? 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe 
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• I would rather trust someone who openly takes a bribe than one who I suspect of doing 
so... 
 
• I wouldn’t trust a person who took a bribe, even after I had bribed him 
 
• Not entirely, no. 
 
• “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” - Lord Acton 
 
• Indeed. Although I believe that some actually retain a vestige of “good will” for their 
people or shareholders, but yes, the tendency is clear. 
 
• If ‘limited greasing payments’ are common. Then referring to that as corruption will 
only help legitimize some level of corruption, and make it acceptable. In order to 
avoid acceptance of corruption greasing payments should not be called corruption. 
 
• I think that is a possible angle of approach, yes. 
 
 
 
